Case Number: A15-1058

Judge: Margaret H. Chutich

Court: STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Lori Swanson, Attorney General

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney
Tori K. Stewart, Assistant County Attorney

Defendant's Attorney:

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant Public Defender

Description: The facts here are undisputed. In 1997, Boecker caused a car accident that resulted
in another driver suffering serious injuries. When the accident occurred, Boecker had a
blood alcohol concentration of 0.13 and no valid driver’s license. Following this accident,
Boecker pleaded guilty to one count of criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial
bodily harm. See Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2a (1996). His plea was accepted, and he
was convicted in 1998.
In January 2015, a police officer stopped Boecker after observing erratic driving.
After the officer stopped the car, he noticed that Boecker’s eyes were bloodshot and watery,
Boecker was slurring his words, and a strong odor of alcoholic beverage emanated from


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inside the car. The officer brought Boecker to the police department where Boecker agreed
to take a breath test. The test showed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.14.
Boecker was charged with two counts of first-degree DWI. He contested the use of
his 1998 conviction to enhance his 2015 DWI charge to a first-degree offense, but the
district court found sufficient probable cause for enhancement. Following the district
court’s finding, Boecker pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree DWI and received an
executed sentence of 48 months with a 5-year conditional release term.
Boecker appealed, contending that his 1998 conviction did not provide a valid
factual basis for his first-degree DWI plea. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction.
It first concluded that section 169A.24 is ambiguous as to whether Boecker’s 1998
conviction is a predicate felony. State v. Boecker, 880 N.W.2d 391, 394, 396 (Minn. App.
2016). The court of appeals then applied the canons of construction for interpreting an
ambiguous statute and noted that the Legislature’s intent was explicitly stated in the 2012
session law: “The legislature’s intent has always been that criminal vehicular operation
convictions under both the pre-2007 and the post-2007 law be used for enhancing driving
while impaired penalties . . . .” Id. at 395 (quoting Act of Apr. 23, 2012, ch. 222, § 4, 2012
Minn. Laws 685, 687); see Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2016).
The court of appeals rejected Boecker’s interpretation of the statute after it
examined the Legislature’s express intent and concluded that “Boecker cannot avoid
liability for first-degree DWI simply because the [criminal vehicular operation] statute and
the first-degree DWI statute have been renumbered, reorganized, and amended.” 880
N.W.2d at 396. Instead, the court of appeals held that Boecker’s 1998 criminal vehicular


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operation conviction is a predicate felony for his first-degree DWI conviction. Id.; see also
Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3); Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2a(2)(i) (1996). We granted
Boecker’s petition for further review.
ANALYSIS
The question presented here is whether a conviction for criminal vehicular operation
under section 609.21, subdivision 2a, from a year not specifically listed in the first-degree
driving while impaired statute, section 169A.24, subdivision 1(3), can be used to enhance
a subsequent DWI charge to a first-degree offense. The answer to this question resolves
Boecker’s claim that his guilty plea lacked an adequate factual basis.
The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. State
v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea if
it is “necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A
manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid,” but a “defendant bears the burden of
showing his plea was invalid.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. “To be constitutionally valid,
a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. (citing State v. Trott, 338
N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983)). When a plea is not established with a proper factual basis,
it is not accurate and, therefore, is invalid. Id. A district court should not accept a guilty
plea “unless the record supports the conclusion that the defendant actually committed an
offense at least as serious as the crime to which he is pleading guilty.” Trott, 338 N.W.2d
at 251-52 (citing State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1977)).
Here, if the first-degree DWI statute does not include Boecker’s 1998 criminal
vehicular operation conviction as a predicate felony for enhancing his 2015 DWI charge,


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then the record would not show that Boecker actually committed an offense at least as
serious as the crime to which he pleaded guilty. Without a valid predicate felony, the
conduct that Boecker admitted to at the guilty plea hearing amounted to misdemeanor
fourth-degree DWI. Minn. Stat. § 169A.27 (2016). To determine whether Boecker’s plea
was supported by an accurate factual basis, we must interpret the first-degree DWI statute,
section 169A.24, subdivision 1(3).
“Interpreting a sentencing statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.”
State v. Noggle, 881 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 2016) (citing State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d
606, 608 (Minn. 2011)). The plain language of the statute controls when the meaning of
the statute is unambiguous. Minn. Stat. § 645.16. “A statute must be construed as a whole
and the words and sentences therein ‘are to be understood . . . in light of their context.’ ”
Schmidt ex rel. P.M.S. v. Coons, 818 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Christensen
v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 10 N.W.2d 406, 415 (Minn. 1943)). “We interpret a statute ‘as
a whole so as to harmonize and give effect to all its parts, and where possible, no word,
phrase, or sentence will be held superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ” 328 Barry Ave., LLC
v. Nolan Props. Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Jackson v. Mortg.
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 496 (Minn. 2009)). We may read multiple
parts of a statute together to determine whether a statute is ambiguous. Christianson v.
Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn. 2013) (citing Martin v. Dicklich, 823 N.W.2d 336,
344 (Minn. 2012)). “A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn.
2014) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012)).


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Here, Boecker pleaded guilty to first-degree DWI, which is defined as:
Subdivision 1. Degree described. A person who violates section 169A.20 (driving while impaired) is guilty of first-degree driving while impaired if the person: . . . (3) has previously been convicted of a felony under: (i) Minnesota Statutes 2012, section 609.21 (criminal vehicular homicide and injury, substance-related offenses), subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6); (ii) Minnesota Statutes 2006, section 609.21 (criminal vehicular homicide and injury, substance-related offenses), subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6); subdivision 2, clauses (2) to (6); subdivision 2a, clauses (2) to (6); subdivision 3, clauses (2) to (6); or subdivision 4, clauses (2) to (6); or (iii) section 609.2112, subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6); 609.2113, subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6), subdivision 2, clauses (2) to (6) or subdivision 3, clauses (2) to (6); or 609.2114, subdivision 1, clauses (2) to (6), or subdivision 2, clauses (2) to (6).

Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3) (emphasis added).

Boecker asserts that the first-degree DWI statute is unambiguous. He argues that,
because the legislature “expressly limited consideration to those [criminal vehicular
operation] convictions occurring ‘under’ the current, the 2012, and the 2006 Minnesota
Statutes,” his 1998 criminal vehicular operation conviction cannot be used to enhance his
2015 DWI charge. But, because of an intervening amendment to the criminal vehicular
operation statute that took effect on August 1, 2007, Boecker admits that his interpretation
limits convictions for criminal vehicular operation that can enhance a DWI charge to first
degree to only those convictions occurring when the 2006 and 2012 statutes were in effect.
In other words, criminal vehicular operation convictions occurring between the effective
date of the 2007 amendment and through the year 2011 could not enhance DWI charges.


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In contrast, the State contends that another reasonable interpretation of the statute is
that the years listed in the first-degree DWI statute illustrate when changes to the criminal
vehicular operation and first-degree DWI statutes occurred. The State also correctly asserts
that the relevant language of the 2006 criminal vehicular operation statute (specifically
mentioned in the 2014 first-degree DWI enhancement statute) and the 1996 criminal
vehicular operation statute (under which Boecker was convicted) are identical.1
The plain language of the codified 2016 first-degree DWI statute lists three different
versions—two by year and one by reference to the statutory sections—of the criminal
vehicular operation statute, and each version must be considered in a plain meaning
analysis.2 See Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3)(i)-(iii). Subdivision 1(3)(i) lists the
version of the criminal vehicular operation statute in effect in 2012. Id., subd. 1(3)(i).
Under this version, the criminal vehicular operation statute was organized into two

1 Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2a(2)(i) (2006) (“A person is guilty of criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial bodily harm . . . if the person causes substantial bodily harm to another, as a result of operating a motor vehicle; . . . (2) in a negligent manner while under the influence of: (i) alcohol . . . .”), with Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2a(2)(i) (1996) (“A person is guilty of criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial bodily harm . . . if the person causes substantial bodily harm to another, as a result of operating a motor vehicle; . . . (2) in a negligent manner while under the influence of: (i) alcohol . . . .”).

2 The Legislature substantially reorganized the criminal vehicular operation statute in 2007 and additional reorganization and renumbering occurred in 2014. See Act of May 7, 2007, ch. 54, art. 3, §§ 7-11, 14, 2007 Minn. Laws 206, 248-49, 251 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 609.21 (2010)); Act of Apr. 30, 2014, ch. 180, §§ 4-9, 2014 Minn. Laws 281, 28388 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. §§ 609.2111-.2114 (2016)). Similarly, the Legislature also revised the first-degree DWI statute (Minnesota Statutes section 169A.24) to track the amendments to the criminal vehicular operation statute. See Act of May 7, 2007, ch. 54, art. 3, § 14, 2007 Minn. Laws 206, 251; Act of Apr. 23, 2012, ch. 222, §§ 34, 2012 Minn. Laws 685, 686-87; Act of Apr. 30, 2014, ch. 180, § 3, 2014 Minn. Laws 281, 282-83.


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subdivisions. See Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subds. 1, 1a (2012). Subdivision 1 described the
crime, and subdivision 1a described the penalty based on the level of harm to the victim.
Id.
Subdivision 1(3)(ii) lists the version of the criminal vehicular operation statute in
effect in 2006. Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3)(ii). In contrast to the 2012 version of
the criminal vehicular operation statute, the 2006 version was organized into separate
subdivisions by level of harm to the victim. Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subds. 1-4 (2006). Each
subdivision identified a different vehicular crime and penalty to be imposed based on the
level of harm caused. Id.
Finally, subdivision 1(3)(iii) does not provide a year, but it lists the version of the
criminal vehicular operation statute enacted by the Legislature in 2014. Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.24, subd. 1(3)(iii); see supra note 2. Under this version, the statute is once again
organized by level of harm to the victim, and each section identifies a different vehicular
crime and penalty to be imposed based on the level of harm caused. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.2112, subd. 1(2)-(6); 609.2113 subd. 1(2)-(6), subd. 2(2)-(6), subd. 3(2)-(6);
609.2114, subd. 1(2)-(6), subd. 2(2)-(6) (2016).
In addition to the plain language found in the text of the codified first-degree DWI
statute, the 2012 session laws also contain a legislative statement of intent regarding the
first-degree DWI statute and the criminal vehicular operation statute. The Revisor of
Statutes did not codify this statement of intent, but it provides:
The intent of the legislature in enacting this bill is to clarify a crossreferencing change made in 2007 relating to the criminal vehicular operation crime. It was not the legislature’s intent in 2007 to make a substantive change regarding whether prior criminal vehicular operation convictions


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would qualify as prior impaired driving convictions or prior impaired driving-related losses of licenses or be considered as a predicate for the firstdegree driving while impaired crime. The legislature’s intent has always been that criminal vehicular operation convictions under both the pre-2007 law and the post-2007 law be used for enhancing driving while impaired penalties consistent with the provisions of the driving while impaired laws.

Act of Apr. 23, 2012, ch. 222, § 4, 2012 Minn. Laws 685, 687 (emphasis added).

The Legislature has directed that any volume of the Laws of Minnesota, Minnesota
Statutes, and the supplement to Minnesota Statutes that are prepared by the Revisor of
Statutes are “prima facie evidence of the statutes contained in it in all courts and
proceedings.” Minn. Stat. § 3C.13 (2016). Thus, the codified Minnesota Statutes are one
type of prima facie evidence of the laws of Minnesota, but they are not the laws themselves.
Granville v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., Special Sch. Dist. 1, 732 N.W.2d 201, 208 (Minn.
2007). Rather, the “ ‘actual laws of Minnesota as passed by the legislature . . . are
contained in the session laws.’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ledden v. State, 686
N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 2004)); see also Minn.
Stat. § 3C.06, subd. 1 (2016) (requiring the Revisor of Statutes “to publish the laws of the
session in a publication called ‘Laws of Minnesota’ ” after each legislative session).
A reasonable and appropriate extension of the rule set out in Granville, already
acknowledged by the Minnesota Court of Appeals before our decision in Granville,3 is that
session laws are relevant when interpreting the plain language of a statute. See also Chin
v. Merriot, 23 N.E.3d 929, 933-34 (Mass. 2015) (interpreting the plain language of a
codified section of Massachusetts’s alimony reform act together with language in the act’s

3 Xykis v. Arlington Bldg. Corp., No. A04-928, 2004 WL 2984372, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec. 28, 2004).


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uncodified sections, which explained the Legislature’s intent that certain portions of the
act should be applied prospectively).
We have previously looked to the text of the session laws as the primary evidence
of the laws of Minnesota. In three postconviction appeals, we rejected an argument that
the statute under which the defendant was sentenced was invalid because it lacked either
an enacting clause or title as required by the Minnesota Constitution. Evans v. State,
788 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Minn. 2010); Thompson v. State, 691 N.W.2d 841, 843 n.3 (Minn.
2005); Koskela v. State, 690 N.W.2d 133, 134-35, 135 n.3 (Minn. 2004). In each case, we
concluded that the defendant’s claim was “doomed on its merits” because a review of the
session law “makes clear” that the statute was enacted with a proper enacting clause and
title. Koskela, 690 N.W.2d at 135 n.3; see Evans, 788 N.W.2d at 46 (holding that the
defendant’s argument fails because the session law included an enacting clause);
Thompson, 691 N.W.2d at 843 n.3 (same).
Under this rule, to give effect to all provisions of the first-degree DWI statute, the
Legislature’s statement of intent expressed in the 2012 session laws must be considered
along with the codified language of the statute when analyzing the entire statute’s plain
meaning. One cannot be interpreted without reference to the other.
Specifically, we must interpret the first-degree DWI statute as codified at Minnesota
Statutes section 169A.24, subdivision 1(3) in light of what the Legislature expressly stated
in the 2012 session laws:
It was not the legislature’s intent in 2007 to make a substantive change regarding whether prior criminal vehicular operation convictions would . . . be considered as a predicate for the first-degree driving while impaired crime. The legislature’s intent has always been that criminal vehicular


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operation convictions under both the pre-2007 [criminal vehicular operation] law and the post-2007 [criminal vehicular operation] law be used for enhancing driving while impaired penalties . . . .

Act of Apr. 23, 2012, ch. 222, § 4, 2012 Minn. Laws 685, 687 (emphasis added).
After carefully considering the parties’ interpretations in light of the plain language
of the first-degree DWI statute and the applicable session law, we conclude that the State
has the better interpretation: Boecker’s 1998 conviction was properly relied on to enhance
his 2015 DWI charge to a first-degree offense. Agreeing with Boecker, the dissent asserts
that “the crimes listed in clauses (i) and (ii) are time limited, including only those offenses
that were committed while the 2006 and 2012 editions of the Minnesota Statutes were in
effect.” This interpretation creates an obvious temporal gap of at least four years in the
application of the first-degree DWI statute to prior criminal vehicular operation convictions
because of the legislative amendments to the criminal vehicular operation statute in 2007.
See supra note 2. For example, under this interpretation the State could use a criminal
vehicular operation conviction from July 31, 2007 to enhance a current offense to first
degree DWI, but it could not use a criminal vehicular operation conviction from August 1,
2007 through at least the end of 2011. This interpretation is unreasonable in light of the
language of the codified statute and the Legislature’s statement of intent in the 2012 session
laws.
In contrast, under the State’s interpretation, the clauses in subdivision 3 of the first
degree DWI statute refer to the version of the statute in effect during the years4 and

4 Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3)(i)-(ii).


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statutory sections5 expressly mentioned. These versions of the statute include: (1) the
“expanded” version in which all criminal vehicular operation offenses were organized by
level of harm to the victim (the version in effect from 1996-2006 under which Boecker was
convicted); (2) the reorganized version in which all criminal vehicular operation offenses
were consolidated into a single subdivision (the 2007-2013 version); or (3) the re-expanded
and renumbered version in which all criminal vehicular operation crimes are again
organized by a level of harm to the victim (the 2014 and later versions). See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.21, subds. 1-4 (2006); Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 1 (2008); Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.2111- .2114 (2016). Under the State’s interpretation, when a person has a prior
criminal vehicular operation conviction under one of the three versions of the statute, and
that person is later charged with a DWI offense, that charge can be enhanced to first-degree.
This interpretation is the only reasonable interpretation of the first-degree DWI statute
when analyzing the plain meaning of the codified statute in conjunction with the 2012
session laws.
The dissent disagrees and asserts that its statutory interpretation is “perfectly
consistent” with the Legislature’s statement of intent because the 2006 version of section
609.21 is a “pre-2007” law.6 While technically accurate, this statement minimizes the clear

5 Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(3)(iii).

6 The dissent also asserts that our interpretation conflicts with the canon “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” meaning “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn. 2011). Our case law has not been entirely consistent about whether this canon is one of interpretation that may be used, as the dissent does here, to determine if a statute is ambiguous, or whether it is a canon of


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import of the statement of legislative intent specifically set forth in the session laws. In
2012, the Legislature expressly stated that it did not intend in 2007 to substantively change
the prior criminal vehicular operation convictions that would be predicate offenses for first
degree DWI crimes. This stated intent is critical because under the 2006 version of the
first-degree DWI statute, a prior conviction of criminal vehicular operation under section
609.21 and all of its subdivisions was considered a predicate for first-degree DWI crimes.7
And this 2006 version of the criminal vehicular operation statute, section 609.21, is
identical in all relevant respects to the criminal vehicular operation laws found in
Minnesota Statutes 1996 through 2004.
Finally, the dissent’s reference to section 169A.275, subdivision 1(a)—which
provides mandatory penalties for nonfelony DWI violations—in support of its
interpretation is unavailing. In that section, the Legislature expressly provided a 10-year
limitation on the use of prior qualified impaired driving incidents to enhance a second

construction that may be considered only after concluding that the statute is ambiguous. Compare Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 853 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Minn. 2014) (calling expressio unius a “canon of statutory construction” and applying it after concluding the statute was ambiguous), and State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (distinguishing canons of interpretation from canons of construction and concluding that the latter apply only after concluding that a statute is ambiguous), with Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 84 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 1957) (applying expressio unius to determine the “clear and unambiguous” meaning of a contract).

7 Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, our interpretation does not “read out” 2006 and 2012 from the statute; rather, our interpretation gives the reference to these years meaning—a meaning expressly intended by the Legislature. Instead, it is the dissent’s interpretation that makes the Legislature’s statement of intent superfluous by substantively changing the first-degree DWI statute.


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offense. Minn. Stat. § 169A.275, subd. 1(a) (2016). Tellingly, the Legislature did not
include a similar 10-year limitation in section 169A.24, subdivision 1(3), the provision at
issue here, despite including the time limitation immediately before in subdivision 1(1).
Interpreting section 169A.24, subdivision 1(3), to impose such a time limitation would
impermissibly add words to the statute.
Because the State’s interpretation is the only reasonable one, the statute is not
ambiguous. In addition, because any other interpretation is unreasonable, the 2012 session
law and Minnesota Statutes section 169A.24 do not conflict.8 Instead, the session laws
clarify the language of the codified statute. The 2014 amendment to the criminal vehicular
operation statute does not change our analysis or lessen the effect of the Legislature’s 2012
statement of intent. “[P]ortions of [a] law which were not altered by [an] amendment shall
be construed as effective from the time of their first enactment . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 645.31,
subd. 1 (2016). Here, the 2014 amendment resulted in a renumbering and reorganization
of the criminal vehicular operation statute, but the Legislature did not provide a new
statement of intent. Because the 2012 statement of intent was not altered by the
amendment, we read it as effective from the time of its passage by the Legislature and
signing by the Governor.
In sum, the plain language of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.24, subdivision 1(3),
encompasses criminal vehicular operation convictions under both the pre-2007 version and
the post-2007 version of the criminal vehicular operation statute. The record therefore

8 But, if Minnesota Statutes and the session law were in conflict here, the session law would prevail and the statute would remain unambiguous. See Minn. Stat. Vol. I, Preface, xiv (2016).


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demonstrates that Boecker committed the crime of first-degree DWI. Accordingly,
Boecker’s plea was established with an accurate factual basis.

Outcome: