Felon Pleads Guilty To Robbing Coffee Shop With Gun

Case Number: A15-0711

Judge: Steven A. Anderson

Court: STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenney, Assistant County Attorney, Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Matthew Frank, Assistant Attorney General

Defendant's Attorney:

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public Defender

Description: On March 4, 2014, a police officer working with a United States Marshals task force
was looking for J.A. based on an arrest warrant. The officer began surveillance in an area
where information indicated that J.A. could be found. The officer observed J.A. get into
the passenger seat of a Cadillac car and watched the car drive away. Police later learned
that Harris was driving the car; J.A. was in the front passenger seat; and another person,
K.E., was seated behind Harris. They also learned that the car was owned by Harris’s
brother.
The officer followed the car in an unmarked police vehicle. He did not immediately
attempt to stop the car because he was concerned about possible danger to bystanders and
was waiting for additional police support.
Eventually, after additional law enforcement arrived, the officer activated his lights
and siren in an attempt to stop the car. The emergency lights were more noticeable than
normal and were described as lighting up the officer’s vehicle “like a Christmas tree.” The
car continued traveling between 30 and 35 miles an hour for approximately three blocks.
The officer saw movement inside the car. As the car approached the freeway, the officer
feared the occupants might attempt to flee, so he pulled his vehicle alongside the car,
causing it to stop at the curb.
Several police officers then approached the car and ordered the occupants to show
their hands. Although Harris initially complied with this command, at some point he
lowered his hands below the window. However, when commanded to raise his hands
again, he did so. Harris was removed from the car first.
J.A. was less cooperative. When police told J.A. to show his hands, J.A. refused to
do so. He also made furtive movements in his lap and near the glove compartment.
Eventually, J.A. complied with police commands to get out of the car; but after getting out
of the car, J.A. reached his hand into the car again.


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The backseat passenger, K.E., was the last person removed from the car. Police
then secured Harris, J.A., and K.E. in three separate squad cars and inspected the Cadillac
to ensure that nobody else was hiding in it. When police looked up, to the right of, and
slightly behind the driver’s seat, they saw that the headlining of the car had been altered.1
The car had a sunroof in the middle of the roof. A panel slides back into the headlining to
expose the glass of the sunroof and allow light into the car. When police searched the car,
the panel was slid back. However, the void into which the panel usually retracts had been
expanded because the headlining had been pulled down a few inches. The officer noticed
the butt end of a firearm partially sticking out of this void.
The firearm was a .45-caliber Springfield model 1911 with a “huge” magazine
attached to it. There were “quite a few” rounds in the magazine and one in the chamber.
The firearm was cocked and ready to fire.
The State charged Harris with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person under
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016). At trial, the parties stipulated that Harris was
ineligible to possess a firearm, so the only issue the jury considered was whether Harris
possessed the firearm. The State introduced forensic evidence at trial showing that the
firearm contained a mixture of male and female DNA from five or more people.
Approximately 75.7% of the general population could be excluded as contributors to this
DNA mixture, but Harris, J.A., and K.E. could not. The State presented circumstantial

1 “Headlining” is “material that covers the ceiling of an automobile interior.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 1043 (3d ed. 2002).



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evidence that Harris possessed the firearm, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The court
of appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that the circumstantial evidence was
insufficient to convict Harris of the offense. State v. Harris, No. A15-0711, 2016 WL
1396689 (Minn. App. Apr. 11, 2016). We granted the State’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
I.
As an initial matter, we turn to the standard of review. The State argues that the
court of appeals erred by engaging in “fine-grained factual parsing” of the evidence and
that this error demonstrates that our standard of review for convictions based on
circumstantial evidence is unnecessarily complicated, confusing, misleading, and difficult
to apply. The State urges us to abandon this standard of review and adopt in its place a
unified standard of review that applies to all evidence, circumstantial or otherwise.
For approximately a century, we have applied a separate standard of review to
challenges to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence.2 State v. Johnson, 217 N.W. 683,
684 (Minn. 1928). Under that standard, we identify the circumstances proved and
independently consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those
circumstances, when viewed as a whole. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn.

2 Harris argues that the standard of review dates back to State v. Johnson, 35 N.W. 373, 376 (Minn. 1887). Although neither the parties nor the amici dispute this assertion, the dissent argues that the standard of review originated in State v. Johnson, 217 N.W. 683, 684 (Minn. 1928). For our purposes, it is irrelevant whether the standard is either 89 or 130 years old—none of the State’s arguments become more persuasive if the standard is “only” 89 years old. The point is that we have applied the standard of review for a very long time and we do not abandon such well-established precedent without a compelling reason to do so. State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 2005).


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2010); see State v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d 864, 871-72 (Minn. 2016) (considering whether
“[w]hen viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved support[ed] a rational inference that
Robertson was the shooter”); State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013)
(explaining that “[w]e review the circumstantial evidence not as isolated facts, but as a
whole”). “To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved as a whole must be consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.” State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 223 (Minn. 2015).
This circumstantial-evidence standard dates back to at least 1928, and possibly
earlier. Johnson, 217 N.W. at 684 (“[A]ll the circumstances proved must be consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
except that of his guilt.” (citing State v. Johnson, 35 N.W. 373, 376 (Minn. 1887)). It has
remained our law ever since. See State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 411 (Minn. 2016) (“To
sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the reasonable inferences that can
be drawn from the circumstances proved must be consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.”); State v.
Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002) (“Circumstantial evidence must form a
complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the
defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than
guilt.”); State v. Scharmer, 501 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Minn. 1993) (reversing convictions
because “[t]he evidence did not form a complete chain leading so directly to appellant’s
guilt as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any rational hypothesis except that of his


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guilt”); State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Minn. 1989) (reversing a conviction because
“[t]he circumstantial evidence was not inconsistent with rational hypotheses other than
guilt”).
We are “extremely reluctant” to overrule our precedent absent a compelling reason
to do so. State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 2005).3 The State offers several reasons
for overruling Johnson, but none are compelling.
First, the State argues that many other jurisdictions have abandoned a separate
circumstantial-evidence standard of review, opting instead for a unified standard of review
that applies to all convictions. See Easlick v. State, 90 P.3d 556, 557 & n.1 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2004) (listing states that apply a unified standard of review when examining the
sufficiency of both direct and circumstantial evidence). Although previously we have

3 The dissent argues that we should be less concerned about stare decisis here because we are addressing a standard of review, rather than an issue of substantive law. “It is true that stare decisis does not apply with the same strictness in some fields of law as in others. . . . However, it is not inapplicable in any field.” State ex. rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 74 N.W.2d 249, 267 (Minn. 1956). The dissent also argues that previously we have been willing to overrule our standards of review, citing State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006) and State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 2016). Neither of these decisions supports the dissent’s conclusion. In Ramey, we noted that our jurisprudence had been inconsistent on which standard should apply to unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct. 721 N.W.2d at 298. Because of this inconsistency, we needed to abrogate some of our previous decisions to provide clarity in the law. This concern is not present here. In Lugo, we explained “what we meant in [State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn. 1977)].” 887 N.W.2d at 481. We concluded that “our decision in Webber was not intended to, nor did it, announce a rule of deference to district court pretrial legal conclusions that the State has appealed.” Id. at 485 (emphasis added). To make our decision absolutely clear, we added: “To the extent . . . Webber suggests the contrary, it is overruled.” Id. But because we held that Webber did not announce a deferential rule, there was nothing to overrule. Lugo therefore does not support the dissent’s argument.


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considered the practice of other states in deciding whether to overrule our precedent, see
Cargill, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 784 N.W.2d 341, 352-53 (Minn. 2010) (noting that our
precedent was “the minority view” among other courts), we never have held that the extent
to which other jurisdictions have adopted a different approach is, by itself, a compelling
reason to overrule our precedent. We are similarly unpersuaded by the State’s argument
here.
Next, the State argues that the circumstantial-evidence standard of review rests on
outdated views of the differences between direct and circumstantial evidence. We have
defined circumstantial evidence as “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether
the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 354 n.3
(Minn. 2012) (quoting 1 Barbara E. Bergman & Nancy Hollander, Whartons Criminal
Evidence § 1:8 (15th ed. 1997)). In contrast, direct evidence is “[e]vidence that is based
on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or
presumption.” State v. Clark, 739 N.W.2d 412, 421 n.4 (Minn. 2007) (alteration in
original) (quoting Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 477 n.11 (Minn. 2004)). Thus,
circumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not
required with direct evidence. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 604 (Stras, J., concurring). This
basic characteristic of circumstantial evidence is not outdated; it is the same today as it was
when we decided Johnson in 1928. Our circumstantial-evidence standard of review


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appropriately balances our need to defer to the jury’s credibility determinations and our
duty to ensure that defendants not be convicted based on insufficient evidence.4
The State also argues that we should overrule Johnson because, since 2010, there
has been a “dramatic increase” in the number of convictions reversed on appeal because of
insufficient circumstantial evidence.5 But the State’s research relies solely on the raw
number of convictions reversed on appeal. It does not attempt to show the number of
convictions that were appealed during the relevant periods, which would allow us to
determine whether there has been an increase in the percentage of convictions reversed on
appeal. Nor does the State attempt to show that a substantial number of these convictions
were wrongly reversed. The State also does not explain why we would abandon a century
long standard of review simply if, as the State argues, a greater number of criminal

4 The dissent notes that some forms of circumstantial evidence, such as DNA or fingerprint evidence, can be very reliable. We agree. But our circumstantial-evidence standard of review is not premised on the view that circumstantial evidence is unreliable. Instead, it is based on the fact that unlike direct evidence, it requires an additional inference to establish guilt and therefore we have adopted a two-step process to account for the additional inference that must be made: a finding that an alleged fact (which does not by itself establish the required element) exists and then a conclusion that if the alleged fact exists, one can reasonably infer that the required element also exists. The fact that DNA or fingerprint evidence can be reliable does not alter the basic characteristic of circumstantial evidence, which is the same today as it was when we decided Johnson in 1928.

5 The State attributes this “dramatic” change since 2010 to our decision in State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2010). However, Andersen simply applied the standard of review that we articulated in State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 2010) (plurality opinion) and State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 2008). As noted in those cases, we did not change the standard of review, but rather merely applied the existing standard. See Stein, 776 N.W.2d at 715 (reaffirming the standard of review applied in State v. Johnson, 217 N.W. 683 (Minn. 1928)); Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858 n.9 (“We apply here the standard we have applied for decades . . . .”).


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convictions have been reversed since 2010. In short, the State’s statistics do not provide a
compelling reason to depart from our precedent.
Finally, the State argues that our standard of review creates confusion for appellate
courts, noting that the court of appeals has said it can sometimes be difficult to identify the
“circumstances proved,” State v. McCormick, 835 N.W.2d 498, 505-06 n.2 (Minn. App.
2013), and has suggested that juries are in the best position to determine which inferences
are reasonable, State v. Seavey, No. A13-0138, 2013 WL 5976070, at *5 (Minn. App. Nov.
12, 2013) (Smith, J., concurring specially). We believe our case law addresses these
concerns.
Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to reaffirm what we have already stated
about the circumstantial-evidence standard of review. As the fact finder, the jury is in a
unique position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence before
it. State v. Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 144 (Minn. 2011). It “is free to accept part and reject
part of a witness’s testimony.” State v. Landa, 642 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Minn. 2002). To be
clear, the first step of our circumstantial-evidence test protects these principles—it requires
an appellate court to winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions
of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict, resulting in a subset of facts that constitute “the
circumstances proved.” See State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 670 (Minn. 2011)
(disregarding evidence inconsistent with the verdict).
Having preserved the jury’s credibility findings, the appellate court considers at the
next step whether a reasonable inference of guilt can be drawn from the circumstances
proved, viewed as a whole, and whether a reasonable inference inconsistent with guilt can


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be drawn from the circumstances proved, again viewed as a whole. State v. Al-Naseer, 788
N.W.2d 469, 474-75, 478-79 (Minn. 2010). This second step does not encroach on the
jury’s credibility determinations because the act of inferring involves the drawing of
permissible deductions, not actual fact finding by the jury. See State v. Jones, 124 N.W.2d
729, 731 (Minn. 1963). The second part of the second step—determining whether a
reasonable inference inconsistent with guilt can be drawn—also ensures that there is no
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. For the foregoing reasons, we cannot agree
that an appellate court invades the fact-finding function of the jury when it applies the
circumstantial-evidence standard of review.
In sum, the State has not established a compelling reason for us to overrule an
approximately century-old rule governing the review of convictions based on
circumstantial evidence. We therefore decline the State’s invitation to abandon the
circumstantial-evidence standard.
II.
Having resolved the standard-of-review question, we next address whether, under
the circumstantial-evidence standard, the evidence in this case is sufficient to support a
guilty verdict. Our “first task is to identify the circumstances proved.” Andersen, 784
N.W.2d at 329 (citation omitted). In determining the circumstances proved, we disregard
evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d at 669-70. The
second step is to independently consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d at 871
(considering whether “[w]hen viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved support[ed] a


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rational inference that Robertson was the shooter”). We give no deference to the jury’s
choice between reasonable inferences at this second step. Fox, 868 N.W.2d at 223. To
sustain the conviction, the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, must be
consistent with a reasonable inference that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Id.
To convict Harris of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, the State was
required to prove in relevant part that he knowingly possessed the firearm. State v. Salyers,
858 N.W.2d 156, 161 (Minn. 2015). A defendant may possess an item jointly with another
person. State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 317 n.7 (Minn. 2004); State v. Lorenz, 368 N.W.2d
284, 285-86 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to infer that the
defendant jointly possessed the marijuana found in the defendant’s bedroom with the
owner of the house). Possession may be proved through evidence of actual or constructive
possession. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d at 159. There are two methods by which the State may
prove constructive possession. Id. The State may show that the police found the item in a
place under the defendant’s exclusive control to which other people normally did not have
access. State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975). Alternatively, if police found
the item in a place to which others had access, the State must show that there is a strong
probability (inferable from other evidence) that at the time the defendant was consciously
or knowingly exercising dominion and control over it. Id.
To establish that a defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion
and control over a firearm at the time in question, the State must prove more than the
defendant’s mere proximity to the firearm. See Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611 (“Because


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defendant did not have exclusive possession of the automobile, one could not automatically
infer from the mere fact that cocaine was found in the automobile that the cocaine belonged
to defendant.”); see also Lee, 683 N.W.2d at 316 (explaining evidence that showed
defendant “exercis[ed] dominion and control over the area in which the firearms and
marijuana were found”). In addition, a defendant’s ease of access to a firearm is but “one
factor relevant to establishing constructive possession, . . . not the sole factor or necessarily
even the most important factor.” Salyers, 858 N.W.2d at 159. In sum, the State must prove
that the defendant had an ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over the
firearm. See, e.g., State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 343-44 (Minn. 2016) (concluding
that facts were “sufficient to give rise to an honest and strong belief” that the defendant
possessed the narcotics, jointly or singly, “that police saw in her hotel room”).
Here, the State’s theory at trial was that Harris constructively possessed the firearm
found in the car, individually or jointly, with his two passengers. Consequently, the issue
is whether the circumstances proved, viewed as a whole, are consistent with a reasonable
inference that Harris knowingly exercised dominion and control over the firearm and
inconsistent with a rational hypothesis that he did not knowingly exercise dominion and
control over the firearm.
The circumstances proved that implicate Harris include: (1) on the night of March
4, 2014, Harris was driving a car, J.A. was sitting in the front passenger seat, and K.E. was
sitting in the rear seat; (2) there was an active warrant for J.A.’s arrest; (3) after securing
backup assistance, the police officer assigned to execute the arrest warrant activated the
lights and siren on his vehicle; (4) Harris continued driving between 30 and 35 miles per


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hour for about three blocks after the officer activated his lights and siren; (5) the officer
saw movement in the car; (6) when the police officer searched the car, he noticed that the
headlining had been pulled down near the sunroof, to the right and slightly behind the
driver’s seat, creating a small void; (7) the officer saw an object, which he clearly
recognized as the butt end of a silver handgun, wedged in this void between the headlining
and roof of the car; (8) a mixture of male and female DNA from five or more people was
recovered from the firearm; and (9) subsequent DNA testing concluded that none of the
occupants of the vehicle could be excluded as contributors to the DNA mixture found on
the firearm, but 75.7% of the general population could be.6
The State contends that, when viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved are
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.7 We disagree. When viewed
as a whole, the circumstances proved do not preclude a reasonable inference that Harris

6 The State observes that the court of appeals erroneously described the sunroof as “toward the back of the vehicle.” Based on this error, the State contends that the first step of the circumstantial-evidence test allows a “subjective delineation” of the circumstances proved. We disagree. An appellate court must accurately describe the relevant facts in analyzing any issue, including during the first step of the circumstantial-evidence test. 7 In the court of appeals, Harris conceded that “[a] reasonable inference to be drawn from the circumstances proved was that [he] knowingly possessed the gun before it was hidden in the liner.” He now attempts to back away from that concession, admitting only that the circumstances proved support “a reasonable inference that at least one of the car’s occupants may have possessed the gun.” Because we conclude that, when viewed as a whole, there are rational hypotheses other than guilt consistent with the circumstances proved, we need not address the impact, if any, of Harris’s attempt to reframe his earlier concession.



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did not know the firearm was in the car.8 Harris did not own the car and the officer who
searched the car did not immediately see the firearm. It was not until the officer looked
up, to the right of, and slightly behind the driver’s seat that he saw an object wedged
between the headliner and the roof of the car. Although the officer “clearly” recognized
the object as the butt of a silver handgun, there is no evidence that a lay person readily
would have recognized the object as the butt of a firearm, especially in the dark of night.
In addition, although the officer saw movement in the car, there was no testimony that this
movement was suspicious or that Harris or either of his passengers ever reached toward
the sunroof. Finally, neither the DNA test results nor Harris’s failure to immediately stop
the car preclude a reasonable inference that Harris did not know the firearm was in the car.
As the State’s expert conceded, approximately 25% of the general population could not be
excluded as a source of the DNA found on the firearm. Moreover, it is reasonable to infer
that Harris failed to immediately stop the car because he knew there was an outstanding
warrant for J.A.’s arrest.
Because the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, are consistent with a
reasonable inference that Harris did not know the firearm was in the car, we agree with the

8 The parties do not discuss Minn. Stat. § 609.672 (2016), which provides that “[t]he presence of a firearm in a passenger automobile permits the fact finder to infer knowing possession of the firearm by the driver,” subject to exceptions that are not relevant here. The court of appeals concluded that section 609.672 “does not negate other reasonable inferences, and therefore does not affect the sufficiency-of-the-circumstantial-evidence analysis.” Harris, 2016 WL 1396689, at *4 n.1 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have never discussed section 609.672, and because the parties do not discuss this provision, we do not decide whether the court of appeals correctly applied it here.



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court of appeals that the State presented insufficient evidence to support Harris’s
conviction of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person.9

Outcome: