Date: 06-02-2016

Case Style: STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DARNELL W. SCOTT

Case Number: A-5865-13T2

Judge: Susan Reisner

Court: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

Plaintiff's Attorney: Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent,
Amanda K. Dalton, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor

Defendant's Attorney: Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Richard Sparaco Designated Counsel, on the brief

Description: Defendant Darnell Scott appeals from a July 21, 2014 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We
affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Robert Mega
in his written opinion accompanying the order. We add these
comments.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts
of first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2, first-degree
robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, fourth-degree resisting arrest,
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a), and second-degree conspiracy, N.J.S.A.
2C:5-2. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of fifteen years
in prison, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2. We affirmed the conviction on defendant's direct
appeal. State v. Scott, No. A-2751-10 (App. Div. Oct. 23,
2012), certif. denied, 214 N.J. 117 (2013).
The trial evidence was discussed in detail in our opinion
on the direct appeal and in Judge Mega's opinion. Briefly,
defendant was convicted based on his participation in three
separate incidents: an attempted carjacking, in which the
victim escaped after punching an assailant who was pointing a
gun at him; a successful carjacking in which the victim was
threatened with a gun; and the armed robbery of a customer at a
grocery store.
After his arrest, defendant admitted that he was with
several companions at the scene of each crime, but denied
participating in any of them. Two of the companions, Ragland
and Harris, pled guilty, and pursuant to their plea agreements,
A-5865-13T2 3
they gave sworn testimony incriminating defendant during their
plea colloquies. However, at defendant's trial, they recanted
their plea testimony and attempted to inculpate themselves and
exonerate defendant.
During direct examination, each witness was confronted with
his inconsistent prior plea testimony. In his testimony, Harris
admitted making all of the statements incriminating defendant at
his plea hearing, but attempted to recant them. Harris admitted
that defendant held a gun during the attempted carjacking, but
claimed that he coerced defendant into doing so. Ragland
claimed he could not recall the statements he made at the plea
hearing, because he was allegedly taking psychiatric drugs at
the time. However, Ragland claimed that he, and not defendant,
was the person who pointed the gun at the attempted carjacking
victim.
On his direct appeal, defendant raised the following
issues:
I. THE COURT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE JURY WITH A CHARGE EXPLAINING HOW MR. SCOTT COULD BE FOUND GUILTY OF A LESSERINCLUDED OFFENSE AS AN ACCOMPLICE TO THE CO-DEFENDANTS IF HE DID NOT SHARE THEIR INTENT TO COMMIT THE SPECIFIC GREATER OFFENSES DEPRIVED MR. SCOTT OF DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL. (RAISED BELOW BY PROSECUTOR).
II. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION THAT THE JURY COULD CONSIDER THE FACT THAT TWO OF THE
A-5865-13T2 4
WITNESSES HAD PREVIOUSLY ENTERED GUILTY PLEAS IN JUVENILE COURT TO DETERMINE THEIR CREDIBILITY WAS INCORRECT AND DEPRIVED MR. SCOTT OF DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
III. THE INTRODUCTION OF TESTIMONY THAT A RELUCTANT STATE'S WITNESS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT HE COULD NOT GO HOME IF HE TESTIFIED, ABSENT A LIMITING INSTRUCTION, WAS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL AND LEFT THE JURY TO ATTRIBUTE UNCHARGED CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS TO THE DEFENDANT, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN N.J.R.E. 403 AND N.J.R.E. 404(B) AND DENIED THE DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
Our opinion addressed and rejected all of those arguments
as without merit. Defendant then filed a timely PCR petition,
asserting that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing
to challenge the trial court's denial of his motion for a
judgment of acquittal. He also asserted that his trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to object, after the trial judge
explained to the jury that there would be a delay in producing
Ragland and Harris to testify because they were incarcerated.
In his thorough opinion, Judge Mega rejected both arguments
and denied defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on the
petition. He found that, pursuant to State v. Gross, 121 N.J.
1, 12-14 (1990), the prior inconsistent statements of Harris and
Ragland were admitted for their substantive use, and there was
sufficient evidence to warrant denial of defendant's motion for
A-5865-13T2 5
a judgment of acquittal. He also found that trial counsel made
a reasonable strategic decision not to object to the trial
judge's remark, because the fact of the witnesses' incarceration
would have been elicited on cross-examination in any event.
On this appeal, defendant raises the same arguments, in the
following points:
I. THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO POSTCONVICTION RELIEF BECAUSE APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN NOT RAISING, ON DIRECT APPEAL, THE ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENTS OF ACQUITTAL AT THE END OF THE STATE'S CASE-IN-CHIEF WITH REGARD TO THE SECOND AND THIRD ROBBERIES FOR WHICH THERE EXISTED NO EVIDENCE OF GUILT. II. THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO POSTCONVICTION RELIEF WHERE TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF STATE'S WITNESSES' INCARCERATION, WHERE WITNESSES GAVE EXCULPATORY TESTIMONY; IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
Like Judge Mega, we find no merit in either of those
arguments. They do not warrant further discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following comments.
Because Harris and Ragland were attempting to take
responsibility for the crimes of which defendant was accused,
there was no prejudice to defendant in the jury knowing that the
two men were incarcerated. Moreover, given the trial evidence,
even if defense counsel should have objected, that failure did
not prejudice the defense.

Outcome: Defendant did not present a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of
counsel, and was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
petition.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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