Court of Appeal, Second Circuit State of Louisiana

Case Number: 51,258-KA

Judge: Shonda Stone

Court: COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

Plaintiff's Attorney:

JOHN SCHUYLER MARVIN
District Attorney

CECIL PAXTON CAMPBELL, II
JOHN MICHAEL LAWRENCE
RICHARD RUSSELL RAY
Assistant District Attorneys

Defendant's Attorney:

Lee Harville

Description: On April 17, 2012, Bossier City Police Detective Shawn Poudrier
(“Detective Poudrier”) received information from the school resource officer
at Rusheon Middle School concerning 13-year-old student, C.S.1 A family
member reported C.S. was involved in a sexual relationship with 26-year-old
Paul Jacob Norman, II (“Norman”), who had been living with C.S. and her
family. Thereafter, C.S. was interviewed at the Gingerbread House, a
children’s advocacy center in Shreveport, Louisiana. In her forensic
interview, C.S. denied having a sexual relationship with Norman. However,
C.S.’s mother, D.S., admitted to police that she was aware of her daughter’s
sexual relationship with Norman. Moreover, C.S.’s cousins, Rhydonia
Gullette (“Gullette”) and Jessica Peters (“Peters”), informed police that they
previously witnessed Norman and C.S. having sex.
On May 25, 2012, Norman was charged by bill of information with
felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile in violation of La. R.S. 14:80.
Norman chose to represent himself at trial and following a two-day bench
trial was found guilty as charged. Thereafter, Norman filed a motion for

1 In accordance with La. R.S. 46:1844(W), the victim and her mother will be identified by their initials only.
2

new trial arguing that the trial court’s verdict was contrary to the law and
evidence because, among other things, he was not permitted to cross
examine Gullette and Peters. Norman also alleged C.S., who testified at trial
that she had sex with Norman multiple times, had been coached into
testifying against him. Norman’s motion for new trial was denied, and he
was sentenced to five years at hard labor. He now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Norman asserts the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove
he had sexual intercourse with C.S.2 In support of his claim, Norman notes
that C.S.’s trial testimony is contrary to the initial statements she made in her
Gingerbread House interview. Furthermore, Norman contends none of the
state’s witnesses testified that they actually saw him having sexual
intercourse with C.S.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.
Tate, 2001-1658 (La. 05/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905,
124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Carter, 42,894 (La. App.
2 Cir. 01/09/08), 974 So. 2d 181, writ denied, 2008-0499 (La. 11/14/08),
996 So. 2d 1086; State v. Crossley, 48,149 (La. App. 2 Cir. 06/26/13), 117

2 At trial, Detective Poudrier testified that Norman’s date of birth is June 2, 1985, and C.S.’s date of birth is April 29, 1998. Norman does not dispute their ages, or that he and C.S. were not married.
3

So. 3d 585, writ denied, 2013-1798 (La. 02/14/14), 132 So. 3d 410. This
standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not
provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation
of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477 (La.
02/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Dotie, 43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 01/14/09),
1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 2009-0310 (La. 11/06/09), 21 So. 3d 297; State v.
Crossley, supra.
The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and
circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by
viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When
the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct
evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence
must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.
State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Speed, 43,786 (La. App.
2 Cir. 01/14/09), 2 So. 3d 582, writ denied, 2009-0372 (La. 11/06/09), 21
So. 3d 299; State v. Crossley, supra.
In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with
physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is
sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Wiltcher,
41,981 (La. App. 2 Cir. 05/09/07), 956 So. 2d 769; State v. Burd, 40,480
(La. App. 2 Cir. 01/27/06), 921 So. 2d 219, writ denied, 2006-1083 (La.
11/09/06), 941 So. 2d 35. Likewise, the sole testimony of a sexual assault
victim is sufficient to support a requisite factual finding. State v. Lewis,
50,546 (La. App. 2 Cir. 05/04/16), 195 So. 3d 495, 499; State v. Demery,
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49,732 (La. App. 2 Cir. 05/20/15), 165 So. 3d 1175. Such testimony alone
is sufficient even where the state does not introduce medical, scientific, or
physical evidence to prove the commission of the offense by the defendant.
State v. Ponsell, 33,543 (La. App. 2 Cir. 08/23/00), 766 So. 2d 678.
Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the
resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the
witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.
State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App. 2 Cir. 09/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writs
denied, 2002-2595 (La. 03/28/03), 840 So. 2d 566, 2002-2997 (La.
06/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S. Ct. 1404,
158 L. Ed. 2d 90 (2004). The appellate court neither assesses the credibility
of witnesses nor reweighs evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95),
661 So. 2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s
decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part.
State v. Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 08/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ
denied, 2002-3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d 422.
La. R.S. 14:80 provides in pertinent part that:
A. Felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed when:

(1) A person who is seventeen years of age or older has sexual intercourse, with consent, with a person who is thirteen years of age or older but less than seventeen years of age, when the victim is not the spouse of the offender and when the difference between the age of the victim and the age of the offender is four years or greater; or

* * *

B. As used in this Section, “sexual intercourse” means anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse.

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C. Lack of knowledge of the juvenile's age shall not be a defense. Emission is not necessary, and penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime.

At trial, Detective Poudrier testified he interviewed Gullette and her
sister, Peters, who stated they saw Norman and C.S. having sex at C.S.’s
house. Norman did not object to Detective Poudrier’s reference to either
Gullette’s or Peters’ statement. On cross-examination, Norman requested
that Detective Poudrier’s recorded interviews with Gullette and Peters be
played in open court. In her interview, Gullette stated she was at C.S.’s
house for a cookout when she and Peters went around the outside of the
house to knock on C.S.’s bedroom window as a prank. Gullette said that
before she knocked, she looked inside and saw Norman and C.S. having sex.
Gullette and Peters immediately went inside the house and confronted C.S.
and Norman. According to Gullette, Norman responded that “he was a
grown man and could do what he wanted.” Gullette did not actually see C.S.
and Norman having sexual intercourse, but stated they were under the bed
covers, C.S. did not appear to be wearing pants, and Norman’s pants were
pulled down.
In her interview, Peters stated she and Gullette walked around C.S.’s
house to knock on her bedroom window while they were at C.S.’s house for
a cookout. Peters told Detective Poudrier that Gullette saw C.S. and
Norman having sex through C.S.’s bedroom window, but that she did not.
Peters said that she and Gullette told D.S. what Gullette had seen, but D.S.
told them to leave C.S. and Norman alone. Gullette and Peters then went
inside the house and Gullette told Norman that he needed to “put his thing
away.” C.S. and Norman both responded by saying that they were grown
and could do what they wanted. Two days later, D.S., C.S., and Norman
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stayed with Peters at her home. Peters stated she saw Norman grab C.S.’s
crotch, butt, and breasts. C.S. also told Peters that she had sex with Norman
the evening before.
Bossier City Police Detective Karen McDonald (“Detective
McDonald”) testified that she interviewed D.S. According to Detective
McDonald, D.S. admitted that she allowed Norman to move into her house
when he was having family problems. D.S. further acknowledged that she
knew Norman and C.S. were having sex. D.S. stated C.S. would throw a fit
and threaten to run away when she attempted to get Norman to leave the
house. On cross-examination, Norman requested that D.S.’s recorded
interview be played for the court. In the interview, D.S. stated Norman
began coming over to D.S.’s house and spending a lot of time with C.S.
D.S. explained that she once caught Norman in bed on top of C.S., and upon
seeing D.S., Norman immediately jumped out of the bed with his pants
around his ankles. At trial, D.S. testified that after C.S. admitted she was
having sex with Norman, she took C.S. to a healthcare provider to get her
birth control shots. D.S. asserted she never reported Norman’s inappropriate
behavior with C.S.3
C.S., 17 years old at trial, testified she dated Norman for almost a year
before his arrest. C.S. stated she and Norman had vaginal sexual intercourse
more than ten times. C.S. further admitted that she lied to the forensic
interviewer at the Gingerbread House about not having sex with Norman in
order to protect him. On cross-examination, C.S. confirmed that Gullette

3 D.S. pled guilty to the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. At trial, D.S. testified that she was not obligated pursuant to a plea agreement to testify at Norman’s trial.
7

and Peters looked into her window when she was having sex with Norman.
At Norman’s request, C.S.’s Gingerbread House interview was played for
the trial court. During the interview, C.S. denied multiple times that
anything sexual occurred with Norman, and claimed Norman never slept or
laid in her bed.
When viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the state
presented sufficient evidence to prove Norman committed felony carnal
knowledge of a juvenile. At the time of the sexual encounters, Norman was
26 years old and C.S. was 13 years old. C.S. testified that she and Norman
had vaginal sexual intercourse “more than ten” times, and her testimony
alone is sufficient to prove the essential elements of the crime. Lewis, supra.
While C.S. initially denied having sex with Norman, her trial testimony
admitting her sexual relationship with Norman is corroborated by the
testimony of her mother, D.S., as well as the testimony of her cousins,
Gullette and Peters. It is not the duty of this court to assess C.S.’s credibility
or reweigh the evidence presented at trial. As a result, we find the record is
sufficient to sustain Norman’s conviction.
Motion for Continuance
After the first day of trial, and following Detective Poudrier’s
testimony and the admission of Gullette’s and Peters’ statements, Norman
noted his desire to subpoena Gullette and Peters because the state was not
presenting them as witnesses. The state had no objection to Norman’s
request, and the trial court issued instanter subpoenas for both Gullette and
Peters. The next morning, Detective Poudrier testified the police were
unable to locate either Gullette or Peters, and the trial court concluded that
“a good faith effort was made to secure the presence of these individuals at
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trial.” Thereafter, Norman requested a continuance to attempt to personally
locate the witnesses. However, the trial court denied Norman’s motion for a
continuance, explaining he should have subpoenaed Gullette and Peters
before trial to secure their presence.
Norman now argues that he was denied his right to cross-examine his
accusers when Detective Poudrier testified regarding statements he received
from Gullette and Peters. Norman asserts Gullette and Peters did not
comply with the state’s subpoenas to testify at trial, and he was forced to
play the women’s recorded statements to show the inconsistencies in their
statements.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in
“all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him,” and limits the admission of
testimonial hearsay statements at criminal trials to situations when the
declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).
Confrontation errors are subject to a harmless error analysis. See
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1986); State v. Robinson, 01-0273 (La. 05/17/02), 817 So. 2d 1131; State v.
Cope, 48,739 (La. App. 2 Cir. 04/09/14), 137 So. 3d 151, writ denied, 14
1008 (La. 12/08/14), 153 So. 3d 440 (“The correct inquiry is whether,
assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully
realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Furthermore, an irregularity or error cannot
9

be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 841.
Detective Poudrier’s testimony regarding the content of Gullette’s and
Peters’ out-of-court statements violated Norman’s confrontation rights
because the statements were testimonial in nature and neither woman was
available for cross-examination. Nonetheless, any such confrontation error
was undoubtedly harmless, because the remaining evidence presented by the
state, including the trial testimony of C.S. and D.S., was sufficient to prove
Norman’s guilt. Moreover, Norman failed to contemporaneously object to
Detective Poudrier’s testimony regarding Gullette’s and Peters’ out-of-court
statements, and in fact, chose to seek admission of both women’s recorded
statements. La. C. Cr. P. art. 841. Based on Gullette’s and Peters’ recorded
statements, cross-examination of either woman would not have been
particularly helpful to Norman, because their statements were largely
consistent and only differed in minor respects. Consequently, we find no
error in the trial court denying Norman’s motion for continuance.
ERRORS PATENT
Our review of the record reveals two errors patent. First, the trial
court failed to sufficiently advise Norman of the time within which to apply
for post-conviction relief pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8. The correct
time period for Norman to seek post-conviction relief is two years from the
date his conviction and sentence become final. We hereby advise Norman
that he has two years from the date his conviction and sentence become final
to apply for post-conviction relief.
Secondly, Norman’s conviction of felony carnal knowledge of a
juvenile, a “sex offense” under La. R.S. 15:541(24), requires that Norman be
10

subjected to the sex offender notification and registration requirements. See
La. R.S. 15:542. Although the trial court verbally advised Norman at
sentencing that upon his release he would be required to register as a sex
offender for “fifteen years on supervision,” the record does not indicate that
the court complied with the written notification procedure outlined in La.
R.S. 15:543. Because Norman was verbally notified of the requirements,
remand is unnecessary. However, the trial court is directed to provide the
appropriate written notice of the sex offender registration requirements to
Norman within ten days of the rendition of this opinion, and to file written
proof of Norman’s receipt of such notice in the record of the proceedings.
La. R.S. 15:543(A); State v. Sule, 50,774 (La. App. 2 Cir. 08/10/16), 200 So.
3d 396, 400, 268; State v. Diggs, 43,740 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/10/08), 1 So. 3d
673, writ denied, 09-0141 (La. 10/02/09), 18 So. 3d 101.

Outcome: