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Date: 11-17-2016
Case Style:
AA v. Gerald Nuckolls, Stanley Glanz and The Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County
Case Number: 4:15-cv-00624-CVE-TLW
Judge: Claire V. Eagan
Court: United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (Tulsa County)
Plaintiff's Attorney:
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Defendant's Attorney: Mat Ellis and Nolan Morris Fields, IV
Description: Tulsa, OK - Tulsa County Settles Sexual Harassment Case With Former Sheriff's Department Employee
Tulsa personal injury lawyer Stephen Joseph Capron represented AA former Tulsa County Deputy Sheriff Gerald Nuckolls on a civil rights violation theory and former Tulsa County Sheriff Stanley Glanz and the Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County on civil rights violation theories claiming that the Defendants failed to protect her from sexual harassment by Nuckolls.
Nuckolls, age 28, was convicted sexual battery and indecent exposure for entering Aery's home and attacking her.
The Amended Complaint filed by the Plaintiff stated:
1. Plaintiff is an individual residing in Tulsa, Oklahoma. While within Tulsa County,
Oklahoma, Plaintiff was the victim of multiple personal trespasses, violations – including
violations of her constitutional rights, and assaults by Defendant Nuckolls. These actions
occurred while Defendant Glanz (“Glanz”) was the Sheriff of Tulsa County, Oklahoma.
2. Defendant Gerald Nuckolls (“Nuckolls”) is an individual believed to be incarcerated in
the State of Oklahoma. Nuckolls’ last known address, and the one he provided to this
Court, appear below on the certificate of mailing. Nuckolls was previously a resident of
Tulsa County, Oklahoma and was employed as a deputy with the Tulsa County Sheriff’s
Office (“TCSO”) during the time when the events giving rise to this case arose. At all
such times, Nuckolls was acting under color of law. Nuckolls is no longer employed by
the TCSO and has been prosecuted by the State of Oklahoma for, and found to be guilty
of, sexual battery and outraging public decency.
3. Defendant Stanley Glanz, at the time of the events giving rise to liability in this case, was
the Sheriff of Tulsa County. Glanz was the person with ultimate decision making
authority regarding the hiring, training, supervision and retention of Nuckolls, and with
general supervision and discipline duties over the Tulsa County deputies and other
employees working for the TCSO. Suit is brought against Glanz in both his individual
and official capacities for actions taken under color of law. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Glanz is liable for the failure to properly hire, supervise and train, among
others, Defendant Nuckolls, and for promoting an atmosphere among Glanz’s employees
which not only allowed sexual assaults and other constitutional trespasses against those
with whom contact was made by such employees, but protected those who engaged in
such improper conduct from appropriate consequences. Plaintiff asserts alternative
causes of action against Glanz. Glanz is alleged to have so completely failed to properly
hire, supervise and train Nuckolls (and others) such as to be considered a participant in
the constitutional violations of Plaintiff, or to have been so reckless or grossly negligent
in that hiring, supervision and training such that future misconduct by Nuckolls was
almost inevitable. Alternatively, if evidence of Glanz’s misconduct does not rise to the
level of that necessary to establish supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Glanz is
alleged to have engaged in negligence and recklessness for which he and Tulsa County
are liable under state tort law.
4. The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Tulsa (“County”) was the
employer of Glanz and Nuckolls with ultimate liability for both. The County is named as
parties solely based upon vicarious liability.
5. Whether the claims against Nuckolls and Glanz are deemed to have arisen under the
OGTCA, or as excessive force and improper search and seizure violations of Okla. Stat.
tit. 2, § 30, the TCSO and ultimately the County is liable for the below causes of action.
The TCSO and the County are liable vicariously for these causes of action under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. While the means utilized for carrying out the duties of
Nuckolls and Glanz were improper, both individual Defendants were carrying out their
official duties, and advancing the interests of their employers, at all times relevant to
these claims.
6. Venue and jurisdiction are proper in this Court. The primary actions giving rise to this
case took place in Tulsa County, Oklahoma.
7. On September 16, 2014, Nuckolls was acting under color of law as a deputy with the
TCSO. He was in uniform, carrying a firearm, wearing a badge and driving a vehicle
equipped with emergency lights and marked as belonging to the TCSO.
8. At approximately 4:00 a.m., Nuckolls, without notice or any just reason, blocked
Plaintiff’s driveway preventing those present from leaving, entered Plaintiff’s property,
and seized and/or arrested all present by detaining them for more than 90 minutes.
Nuckolls did not use handcuffs, but did threaten incarceration and other force if anyone
did not comply with his demands. This seizure, whether deemed an arrest or detention,
invoked and violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and under Okla. Const. Art. 2, § 30.
9. After coming onto Plaintiff’s property and using force to prevent others from leaving,
Nuckolls entered Plaintiff’s home and another structure upon Plaintiff’s property without
a warrant, permission or any other right of entry.
10. Nuckolls searched Plaintiff’s personal property within her home. Nuckolls read
Plaintiff’s personal mail (which was concealed inside of a drawer) and other papers,
searched the drawers containing Plaintiff’s underwear and other personal items, searched
Plaintiff’s bed and, generally, invaded the most private aspects of Plaintiff’s home.
11. After the intrusion into her home, Nuckolls forced Plaintiff to escort him into a separate
garage structure where a vehicle was parked. Before entering that structure, Nuckolls
unzipped his pants, removed his penis and urinated. Then, Nuckolls forced Plaintiff into
the garage structure claiming he was looking for drugs. Inside the structure, Nuckolls
removed his penis from his pants again, exposed himself to Plaintiff, and physically
groped Plaintiff’s breasts and other parts of her body while pulling at her dress.
12. At all times precedent to the physical attack, Plaintiff was fully dressed, wearing a
modest, full length dress, and did not engage in any statement or action which might have
suggested an interest in sexual contact from Nuckolls. Indeed, the opposite is true insofar
as Plaintiff repeatedly expressed objection to, and displeasure with, the very fact that
Nuckolls was on her property without any colorable reason. Plaintiff clearly, and without
any room for confusion, told Nuckolls to stop and demanded that he leave her property.
13. Nuckolls lacked probable cause to be at Plaintiff’s residence, to enter upon the property
of Plaintiff, and to enter any of the structures on that property. At no time before or
during Nuckolls’ invasion of Plaintiff’s home did he develop probable cause to believe
that there was criminal activity afoot, and at no time did Nuckolls witness any illegal
conduct. On information and belief, Nuckolls has not, since that date, written (or
otherwise made) a report or affidavit supporting the existence of probable cause for his
actions, or attempted to even suggest that he had probable cause at the time when he
engaged in the searches and seizures at issue.
14. The individuals present at the time when Nuckolls engaged in this conduct were, at all
times, on private property. None had been reported to have been engaged in illegal
conduct or other conduct which might give rise to legitimate law enforcement
involvement, none were engaged in any act of violence (towards one another or any other
person), none were the subject of warrants, none were in possession of drugs or other
contraband or using such drugs or contraband, and none were acting in any manner which
might suggest either the need for law enforcement to be present, or which might suggest
the permission of law enforcement to enter upon the premises. Moreover, though respect
of Nuckolls was by no means a requirement of any person present and while disrespect of
Nuckolls would by no means have justified his actions, none of those present made any
comments, gestures or other actions as might have been construed as vulgar, offensive,
aggressive or otherwise disrespectful of Nuckolls. Though undergoing a traumatic and
outrageous sexual assault, Plaintiff largely restrained her emotions in her repeated
demands for Nuckolls to leave her property.
15. Prior to Nuckolls arrival at Plaintiff’s home, and during the entire time Nuckolls was
present, there were no circumstances which would, or might, reasonably suggest any
emergency or exigent circumstances. The location was a calm, residential neighborhood,
there were no crowds or other individuals nearby other than Plaintiff and her two social
guests, the area was well enough lit to allow clear visibility, all individuals present were
unarmed, sober, polite and respectful. There was no basis for thinking that any
emergency circumstances might arise.
16. After completing his illegal search of Plaintiff’s house and garage and his sexual battery
of Plaintiff, Nuckolls finally agreed to leave Plaintiff’s premises. Nuckolls did not find
anything illegal, witness any illegal conduct, transport any of the arrestees to jail, or
report on any illegal activity. Instead, recognizing that Plaintiff’s social guests would not
be present on a permanent basis, he threatened Plaintiff that he would return later,
presumably with the intent to continue his sexual battery without witnesses. Nuckolls
had no request for, or legitimate basis for, a return to Plaintiff’s home at the time of his
threat.
17. Glanz was deliberately indifferent to the extreme risk posed by Nuckolls. In the two
years during which he was employed by the TCSO, Nuckolls had engaged in similar
misconduct prior to the incident with Plaintiff, and, on information and belief, that prior
misconduct has been the subject of complaints against Nuckolls. In one of those prior
events, Nuckolls forced an intoxicated woman to engage in oral sex, then left the scene as
other law enforcement officers arrived. The unwritten policy of concealing malfeasance
of Nuckolls (among other employees of the TCSO) was observed, however, and no
action was taken against Nuckolls. In fact, it is believe that Nuckolls has admitted to
having sexual contact with half a dozen women during traffic stops during those two
years, making no efforts to conceal his misconduct from others employed by the TCSO,
yet no adverse employment action was taken against him. It is further believed that the
unconstitutional search of Plaintiff’s property has never been investigated or the subject
of any adverse employment action against Nuckolls.
18. Plaintiff’s complaint to the TCSO was resisted by the TCSO when made. TCSO
investigators expressed skepticism over the allegations against a fellow deputy, attempted
to intimidate Plaintiff during her statement, and suggested that Plaintiff was at fault for
causing the sexual battery. It is believed that this resistance was a common tool utilized
by the TCSO to dissuade complainants from following through with requests for action
by Glanz. On information and belief, Glanz knew that Nuckolls represented a serious
threat of sexual assault and battery to women with whom he came into contact with while
acting in his capacity for the TCSO.
19. While it is not believed that a formal, written policy existed which compelled the
dissuasion of Nuckolls’ victims from making complaints, it is believed that the unwritten
policy was to deliberately turn a blind eye to Nuckolls’ (among other TCSO employees’)
sexual malfeasance and unconstitutional searches and seizures. This unwritten policy
was what allowed Nuckolls to ultimately harm Plaintiff as set out above. Glanz chose to
ignore conduct rather than to protect members of the public from the violent and
unconstitutional nature of Nuckolls.
20. On information and belief, Glanz has a history of failing to protect individuals from
violence, including sexual violence, committed by those whom he supervises. In 2010
Lindsey Dawn Shaver alleged repeated acts of sexual assault against her, and a history of
other similar incidents against others, by employees with the TCSO against women as the
result of Glanz’s failure to supervise employees and failure to have appropriate systems
in place to protect those who come into contact with TCSO employees. In 2010, LaDona
Poore made similar complaints. In 2011 Aleshia Cyrese Henderson reported having been
raped by a Sheriff’s deputy. Moreover, when reporting incidents of sexual abuse
investigated by the TCSO to the United States Department of Justice in 2012, Glanz and
the TCSO omitted multiple known instances of sexual abuse, demonstrating an intent to
conceal such conduct.
21. Glanz did not terminate Nuckolls from his position following the complaint by Plaintiff.
Additionally, with the exception of two cases involving Nuckolls covered widely by
media outlets, on information and belief, Glanz has not investigated the multiple other
cases in which Nuckolls admits to having engaged in sexual activities during traffic stops,
and has failed to seek other victims beyond those admitted by Nuckolls to exist. Nor has
Glanz investigated Nuckolls for his unconstitutional search of Plaintiff’s property.
22. Nuckolls violated Okla. Const. Art. 2, § 30 (“Section 30”) and the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution by engaging in an illegal search of Plaintiff’s property and
seizure of Plaintiff (as well as the others present), by using excessive and unjustified
force to do so, and by using his status as a law enforcement officer as a basis for placing
Plaintiff in a dangerous place where he sexually attacked her. At all times, Nuckolls’
actions were excessive, illegal, unauthorized and in violation of Plaintiff’s clearlyestablished
rights afforded by Section 30.
23. Nuckolls engaged in the torts of both assault and battery of Plaintiff. Nuckolls physical
contact, and attempts of physical contact, were unwanted and offensive, and undertaken
with malicious intent to engage in unwanted sexual contact with Plaintiff.
24. Nuckolls engaged in the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress.
Nuckolls engaged in conduct which is utterly outrageous in any civilized society and, in
fact, has been found guilty of the crime of public outrage. Nuckolls’ conduct did, in fact,
cause severe emotional distress. Plaintiff was so disturbed by the event that she fled her
own home in the middle of the night and determined not to return to that home to live.
25. Nuckolls’ actions constitute the tort of unlawful arrest. Nuckolls had no right or
justification for undertaking the arrest of Plaintiff for a period of more than ninety
minutes, or for any period. The use of force to accomplish the holding of Plaintiff (and
the others), and the length of time during which Plaintiff was held against her will,
exceed any parameters for a detention and rises clearly to the level of a full blown arrest.
Moreover, Nuckolls did not have any reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity
which might have justified a detention.
26. Nuckolls’ actions constitute negligence in his conduct as a law enforcement officer. A
law enforcement officer has a special dispensation from the duty of ordinary care not to
endanger others. A law enforcement officer’s duty is very specific: it is to use only such
force as a reasonably prudent police officer would use in light of the objective
circumstances confronting the officer. Here the objective facts demonstrate that the
degree and type of force employed by Nuckolls was excessive and inappropriate.
27. Glanz is liable in both his individual and official capacities for the conduct at issue.
Glanz failed in his duty of care during the hiring, training, supervision and retention of
Nuckolls. Glanz is vicariously liable for the violations at issue, and is directly liable for
violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under 42 USC § 1983.
28. Immediately following these events, Plaintiff reported Nuckolls’ misconduct to the
TCSO. The immediate and lasting reaction from the TCSO was resistance to Plaintiff’s
report. The TCSO acted skeptically to Plaintiff’s complaint, suggested that she invited
the sexual attack, attempted to bully her by interrogating her in a small room with three
search of Plaintiff’s home.
29. To the extent that it has any bearing on the claims at issue, Plaintiff has substantially
complied with the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 151 et
seq. Plaintiff made a full and complete disclosure to Glanz (through his investigators) in
September of 2014, made subsequent reports to the Tulsa County District Attorney’s
Office (at their request) more than 90 days from the filing of this case, and sent a formal
notice on July 1, 2015 to ensure no failure to comply could be alleged. The result of all
disclosures has been to wholly ignore Plaintiff’s damages and to make no effort to
address her claims, consistent with the resistance the TCSO showed to Plaintiff’s claims,
the skepticism expressed regarding her claims, and the suggestions that Plaintiff asked for
the sexual attack.
30. Plaintiff suffered damages caused by the actions of Defendants. These damages include
non-economic damages for physical trespass, pain, suffering, inconvenience, humiliation,
inconvenience, and severe emotional pain, suffering and distress.
31. The actions of Defendants Nuckolls and Glanz were willful, wanton, and malicious or, at
the least, reckless. These actions are the type of conduct which would naturally lead to
severe damages such as those at issue in this suit. For these reasons, Defendants’ conduct
should justify the submission to the jury of instructions allowing them to consider an
award of exemplary damages.
Prayer for Relief
For her causes of action, Plaintiff seeks a judgment against Defendants for actual and
exemplary damages, for all costs, expenses and attorney fees involved in this litigation, and for
such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Sheriff Glanz' answer stated the following:
COMES NOW the Defendant, Stanley Glanz, (hereinafter “Defendant” or
“Defendant Glanz”), by and through his attorney of record, Scott B. Wood, of the law
firm of Wood, Puhl & Wood, P.L.L.C., located in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and files his
answer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint herein. In answer to Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint Defendant Glanz alleges and states as follows:
1. Defendant is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the veracity
of the allegation in the first sentence contained in paragraph 1 of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint regarding the residency of the Plaintiff, and therefore it
is denied. Defendant Glanz denies the allegation of violations of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights alleged in the second sentence contained in paragraph 1
of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Defendant Glanz admits he was the
Sheriff of Tulsa County up until November 1, 2015.
2. The allegations contained in paragraph 2 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
are not directed toward this answering defendant, and therefore no response is
required. To the extent the Court determines a response is required, the
allegations are denied.
3. Defendant Glanz admits he was the Sheriff of Tulsa County prior to
November 1, 2015, and that he was responsible for the supervision and
discipline for Deputies and employees of the Tulsa County Sheriff’s
Department, and was the person with decision making authority regarding the
hiring, training, supervision and retention of Defendant Nuckolls, as alleged in
the first and second sentences of paragraph 3 of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint. The remaining allegations of paragraph 3 are denied.
4. The allegations contained in paragraph 4 are not directed toward this
answering Defendant, and therefore, no response is required.
5. The allegations contained in the first two sentences of paragraph 5 of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are denied. Defendant Glanz denies that
Nuckolls was carrying out official duties and advancing the interest of his
employer as alleged in sentence 3 of paragraph 5. Defendant Glanz denies
any of his actions were improper as alleged in the third sentence of paragraph
5.
6. The allegations of paragraph 6 are admitted.
7. Defendant Glanz admits Defendant Nuckolls was employed as a TCSO
Deputy on September 16, 2014, as alleged in paragraph 7 of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. Defendant Glanz denies Defendant Nuckolls acted
under color of law during his contact with Plaintiff.
8. The allegations contained in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 13, 14, 15 and 16 of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are not directed toward this answering
Defendant, and therefore require no response. Should the Court determine a
response is required, Defendant Glanz states he is without sufficient
information to form a belief as to the veracity of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 13, 14, 15 and 16 of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, and therefore denies the same.
9. The allegations contained in paragraphs 17, 18, 19, and 20 of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint are denied.
10. Defendant Glanz admits he did not terminate Nuckolls, as Nuckolls resigned
his position on September 17, 2014, as alleged in the first sentence of
paragraph 21 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. The remaining allegations of
paragraph 21 are denied.
11. The allegations contained in paragraphs 22, 23, 24, and 25 of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint are not directed toward this answering Defendant, and
therefore require no response.
12. Defendant Glanz denies the allegations of paragraph 26 as the acts of
Nuckolls, upon information and belief were intentional acts constituting
criminal actions outside the scope and course of Nuckolls duties as a deputy.13. The allegations contained in paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint are denied.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1. The Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be
granted against this answering Defendant.
2. The Plaintiff’s state pendant claims brought pursuant to the Oklahoma
Governmental Tort Claims Act are barred, as Plaintiff failed to comply with
the notice provisions contained therein. 51 O.S. 151 et seq.
3. Defendant GLANZ affirmatively states that no constitutional violation took
place. Therefore, there can be no liability on the part of the GLANZ based on
42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
4. Defendant GLANZ affirmatively states that he is an improper party to
Plaintiff’s claim based on Art. 2 Sec. 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution and
Perry v City of Norman.
5. Defendant Glanz is entitled to qualified immunity.
6. Defendant GLANZ affirmatively states the Tulsa County Sheriff is immune in
tort actions for willful, malicious, or intentional acts by any employee or agent.
Further, the Tulsa County Sheriff is also immune from any judgment for
punitive damages.
7. Defendant GLANZ reserves the right to amend his answer and additional
affirmative defenses, as discovery continues.
WHEREFORE, having fully answered, Defendant Stanley Glanz prays for
judgment in his favor and for his costs, attorney fees, and such other and further relief as
Outcome: JUDGMENT
Now before the Court is plaintiff’s Motion to Enter Judgment Against Defendant Regalado (Dkt. # 93), pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion (Dkt.
# 93) is granted, and judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff, Ashley Aery, and against defendant, Vic Regalado, in his official capacity as Tulsa County Sheriff, in the amount of $25,000, inclusive of costs and fees now accrued, plus post-judgment interest at the rate of .67% from this
date until paid.
DATED this 28th day of October, 2016.
JUDGMENT
Now before the Court is plaintiff’s Stipulation to Enter Judgment (Dkt. # 107), plaintiff’s
Motion to Enter Judgment Against Defendant Gerald Nuckolls (Dkt. # 108), and Supplement to
Motion to Enter Judgment Against Defendant Gerald Nuckolls (Dkt. # 109). Defendant stipulates
to the entry of a judgment against him on the tort of assault and battery, with damages caused
thereby stipulated to be $150,000. Defendant also stipulates to the entry of a judgment against him on the negligence claim, with damages caused thereby stipulated to also be $150,000. The parties stipulate to the entry of a judgment in satisfaction of all claims in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant in the total amount of $300,000. Based on the stipulation, the Court will perform its ministerial duty to enter judgment thereon.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motions (Dkt.
## 108, 109) are granted. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff, Ashley Aery, and against defendant, Gerald Nuckolls, in the amount of $150,000 for the tort of assault and battery and $150,000 for negligence, in the total amount of $300,000, in satisfaction of all claims, plus postjudgment
interest at the rate of .72% from this date until paid.
DATED this 15th day of November, 2016.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: See: State of Oklahoma v. Gerald Nuckolls