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Date: 07-23-2016
Case Style: Brandon Lewis v. State of Indiana
Case Number: 49A02-1509-CR-1395
Judge: Edward W. Najam, Jr.
Court: COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Plaintiff's Attorney: Larry D. Allen
Deputy Attorney General
Defendant's Attorney:
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Description: In the recent past, Lewis and H.D. became acquainted after Lewis fathered
children with H.D.’s sister. Lewis and his girlfriend lived with H.D. and H.D.’s
children for a period of time in 2014, and Lewis and H.D. had a sexual
relationship for a period of time. On April 18, 2015, Lewis, H.D., and H.D.’s
two minor children went out to dinner together and then to a friend’s house for
a party. Lewis had spent the night with H.D. the night prior, and they may
have had consensual sexual intercourse at that time. The night of the party,
however, H.D. became annoyed with Lewis, and H.D. and her children left the
party without him. H.D. told Lewis not to come back to her house that night.
H.D. and her children went home and went to sleep.
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[3] At some point in the night, H.D., who had been sleeping in an upstairs
bedroom at her duplex, “heard banging” downstairs and “heard the blinds”
move in a window downstairs. Tr. at 64. H.D. called 9-1-1 to report that
someone was breaking into her house. While she was on the phone, she saw
Lewis walking up the stairs. H.D. walked downstairs past him and opened the
door to wait for the police to arrive. In the meantime, Lewis followed H.D.
and told her that she should not have called the police. Lewis took a gun out of
his pocket and showed it to her. As he took the gun out, he said that “he would
get locked up for a long time” and that “he would do anything that he had to
against anybody” to avoid jail. Id. at 68.
[4] When officers with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
(“IMPD”) arrived, they began to question Lewis, who told them to talk to H.D.
The officers then asked H.D., who was standing approximately six feet away
from Lewis during the questioning, whether she “needed them,” and she
responded in the negative. Id. at 70. H.D. did not tell the officers that she
wanted Lewis to leave. After the officers left, Lewis was “in and out of the
house,” and then Lewis and H.D. began to argue. Id. at 108. At some point,
Lewis threw H.D.’s phone against a wall, and it broke. While in an upstairs
bathroom, Lewis pushed H.D., and they started fighting. H.D. yelled out of the
open bathroom window, and Lewis closed the window. Lewis hit H.D. in the
face, and, at some point, H.D. lost consciousness for a brief time. When H.D.
regained consciousness, Lewis dragged her from the bathroom to her bedroom.
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[5] Once in the bedroom, Lewis told H.D. to take off her pants, but she refused.
While Lewis pulled off her pants, she struggled with him in an effort to stop
him. After her pants were off, Lewis “ripped” off her underwear. Id. at 81.
Lewis then picked H.D. up and put her on the bed. Lewis told H.D. to turn
over, which she initially refused to do, but then she turned over. Lewis started
having sexual intercourse with H.D., and she told him to stop. Lewis
continued having sexual intercourse with H.D., and she alternatively told him
to stop and told him that he could proceed. Finally, Lewis asked H.D. whether
he could “finish,” and she said yes. Id. at 126.
[6] Afterwards, one of H.D.’s children came into her bedroom and asked for
something to drink. Lewis went downstairs and returned with a drink, and
H.D. told him to leave. Lewis got angry and told H.D. that he was taking his
washing machine and dryer with him. When he was unable to unhook the
washing machine, he “just pulled it out of the wall.” Id. at 87. Lewis then
called his girlfriend, and H.D. went upstairs and went to sleep.
[7] The next evening,1 H.D. went to a nearby hospital and reported that she had
been beaten and raped, but she did not contact the police. Amanda Via-Smith,
the physician’s assistant treating H.D. at the hospital, observed bruises and
abrasions on H.D.’s body consistent with H.D.’s description of events the night
before. Via-Smith offered H.D. a consultation with a forensic nurse, and H.D.
1 The incident occurred on Saturday night or early Sunday morning, and H.D. went to the hospital that Sunday evening.
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agreed. However, a forensic nurse was not available that evening, and Via
Smith instructed H.D. to return to the hospital at a later date to see the forensic
nurse. On April 21, H.D. returned to the hospital, and a forensic nurse
conducted a rape kit examination. H.D. told the forensic nurse that Lewis had
beaten and raped her, and the nurse also observed injuries consistent with
H.D.’s narrative. After leaving the hospital, H.D. and her children moved to
the Julian Center. While at the Julian Center, H.D. stayed in touch with
Lewis, and he visited H.D. and the children on two occasions.
[8] On May 3, H.D. returned to her home and saw that it had been burglarized.
H.D. called 9-1-1. When officers arrived, a friend of H.D.’s named Cody was
also there, and Cody told the officers that, a few weeks prior, H.D. had told
Cody that Lewis had raped H.D. While the officers were talking about the rape
with H.D., Lewis arrived at H.D.’s house. After recovering H.D.’s ripped
underwear from her bedroom and taking photographs of H.D.’s home, the
officers arrested Lewis.
[9] The State charged Lewis with rape, as a Level 1 felony; burglary, as a Level 2
felony; criminal confinement, as a Level 3 felony; battery, as a Level 5 felony;
and criminal mischief, as a Class B misdemeanor. The State also charged
Lewis with being a habitual offender. Following a bench trial, the trial court
found Lewis guilty on all counts except for the burglary count, and the court
adjudicated him to be a habitual offender. The trial court entered judgment
accordingly and sentenced Lewis to an aggregate executed term of forty-three
years. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Defense Witnesses
[10] Lewis contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded three
proffered defense witnesses from testifying at trial. In particular, after the final
pre-trial hearing, Lewis added the following people to his witness list for the
July 13 trial: Kelly Abel-Raymond (June 11); Kiva Culbertson (June 26); and
Suprena Carter (July 8). In its motion to exclude those witnesses, the State
alleged that Abel-Raymond had twice failed to appear for scheduled
depositions; Culbertson had not appeared for a scheduled deposition; and the
State had been unable to schedule Carter for a deposition given the short notice.
[11] Trial courts have the discretion to exclude a belatedly disclosed witness when
there is evidence of bad faith on the part of counsel or a showing of substantial
prejudice to the State. Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644, 652 (Ind. 1999). In
light of a defendant’s right to compulsory process under the federal and state
constitutions, there is a strong presumption to allow the testimony of even late
disclosed witnesses. See U.S. Const. amend. 6; Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 13.
[12] Initially, as the State correctly points out, Lewis did not make an offer of proof
with respect to Abel-Raymond’s proposed testimony. As such, Lewis’
objection to the exclusion of Abel-Raymond’s testimony was not preserved on
appeal, and the issue is waived. Wiseheart v. State, 491 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Ind.
1986) (holding that when a defendant does not make an offer of proof, he has
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not adequately preserved the exclusion of witness’ testimony as an issue for
appellate review).
[13] With respect to the late notice that Culbertson and Carter were to testify on
Lewis’ behalf at trial, the State alleged bad faith and substantial prejudice.
However, the State did not move for a continuance, which generally is the
“appropriate remedy in this situation.”2 Cook v. State, 675 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ind.
1996). Regardless, a trial court’s exclusion of a witness’ testimony is subject to
a harmless error analysis. We will find an error in the exclusion of evidence
harmless if its probable impact on the factfinder, in light of all of the evidence in
the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the defendant’s substantial
rights. Williams, 714 N.E.2d at 652.
[14] In his offer of proof, defense counsel stated that Culbertson, Lewis’ girlfriend,
would have testified that
[Culbertson] had given some money to [Lewis] to give to [H.D.] to pay off possibly some drug dealers, which could explain why there was a burglary at [H.D.’s] house, or breaking in. Because [H.D.] was afraid of drug dealers. It also explains why [H.D.] alleged a rape so she could go to the Julian Center to get away from her home when the drug dealers were looking for her.
2 The State did not ask for a continuance either in its written motion to exclude witnesses or in open court at the beginning of trial. While Lewis’ defense counsel stated that he was not amenable to a continuance, the State had not requested one. And, as of the day of trial, there were three days left before the deadline for a speedy trial pursuant to Lewis’ request.
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Tr. at 7 (emphasis added). When pressed by the trial court, defense counsel
admitted that the only “admissible testimony” was that Culbertson gave Lewis
“some money to pay for drugs,” and he also admitted that the evidence was
“tenuous at best.” Id. As the proffered testimony was not relevant to H.D.’s
allegations of criminal confinement or rape or was otherwise pure speculation,3
we hold that any error in the exclusion of Culbertson’s testimony was harmless.
[15] In his offer of proof regarding Carter’s proposed testimony, defense counsel
engaged in the following colloquy with the trial court:
Defense Counsel: I think the main thing she would say is, this all started at a party on Oakland Street. [Carter] was at that party. She witnessed drug use and alcohol consumption by the alleged victim. She’s also aware of a fight between the alleged victim and a woman named Megan that happened the day after these allegations, which would explain how [H.D.], the alleged victim, received bruises, and so she would testify in regard to that.
Court: She saw the fight?
Defense Counsel: I don’t think she saw the fight. But she— Megan, who is the woman who was in a fight with [H.D.] told her about the fight.
Court: So it would be arguably inadmissible?
3 To the extent the proffered testimony would have impacted H.D.’s credibility, the trial court heard evidence that H.D. had previously been convicted of theft, and she had admitted to smoking marijuana the night of the rape.
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Defense Counsel: And yes I suppose it would be admissible as impeachment if I ask [H.D.] about the fight and she denies it.
Id. at 4-5. First, at trial, H.D. admitted to drinking alcohol and smoking
marijuana at the party the night of the rape, so that part of Carter’s proffered
testimony would have been cumulative. Second, to the extent Lewis would
have used Carter’s testimony about the alleged fight between H.D. and Megan
to impeach H.D.,4 Lewis has not persuaded us that the probable impact of that
testimony on the factfinder, in light of all of the evidence in the case, affected
his substantial rights. Any error in the exclusion of Carter’s testimony was
harmless.
Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence
[16] In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do not reweigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Sharp v. State, 42 N.E.3d 512,
516 (Ind. 2015). Rather, we look to the evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom that support the judgment, and we will affirm the convictions
if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
4 If offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted rather than as impeachment evidence, that testimony would have been inadmissible hearsay.
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H.D.’s Testimony
[17] Lewis first contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
convictions because H.D.’s testimony was incredibly dubious. The incredible
dubiosity rule, which is only applied in limited circumstances, allows a court to
impinge upon the factfinder’s duty to judge witness credibility where a sole
witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or the
result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the
appellant’s guilt. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 755 (Ind. 2015). “‘The
testimony must be so convoluted and/or contrary to human experience that no
reasonable person could believe it.’” Id. at 756 (citing Campbell v. State, 732
N.E.2d 197, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).
[18] Lewis asserts that H.D.’s testimony was inherently inconsistent and equivocal,5
and he maintains that she had a motive to lie, “felt coerced,” and recanted her
5 H.D.’s testimony regarding whether she had consented to sexual intercourse with Lewis at the time of the alleged rape was equivocal, as she testified that she alternately consented and withdrew her consent throughout the incident. But IMPD Detective Laura Smith testified as follows with regard to H.D.’s testimony:
Q: . . . [B]ased on your training and your experience being a sex crimes detective is it uncommon for victims who are in a relationship with a person who raped them to be reluctant to testify? A: No, I would say that is common. Q: Okay. And is it uncommon for victims who are in a relationship with a person who raped them to minimize what happened to them later? A: I’d say that’s pretty common. Q: Okay. And what are the reasons why a person who is a victim of such a rape, why would they do that? A: Sometimes they worry a lot about like throwing a rock in a pond and watching it splash. Sometimes they have children in common, sometimes they have family dynamics, sometimes they feel threatened by others who they know in common. They feel—strangely they feel guilty afterwards like they are going to hurt them. That’s just the way the body heals. And when you have a personal relationship with someone and you care about them I think it’s difficult to turn that off and so it’s common for them to minimize.
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testimony after the trial.6 Appellant’s Br. at 19. Thus, Lewis contends that
H.D.’s testimony was incredibly dubious. But it is well settled that the
incredible dubiosity rule only applies where there is a complete lack of
circumstantial evidence. See id. And here, as Lewis acknowledges, there was
circumstantial evidence to corroborate H.D.’s testimony.
[19] Lewis asserts, however, that “the circumstantial evidence originates solely from
[H.D.] and is just as unreliable as her testimony.” Appellant’s Br. at 24. And
Lewis asks that we create an exception to the rule under such circumstances.
We decline Lewis’ invitation. H.D. testified that Lewis dragged her down a
hallway, beat her, knocked her unconscious, ripped off her underwear, and
raped her. H.D. reported the rape and assault to Via-Smith the next day, and
H.D. underwent medical examinations that revealed injuries consistent with the
events described by H.D. In addition, officers found H.D.’s ripped underwear
in her bedroom. Because the circumstantial evidence corroborates H.D.’s
testimony in this respect, the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply here.
Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 755. H.D.’s testimony and circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to support Lewis’ convictions.
Tr. at 227-28.
6 H.D. sent a notarized letter to Lewis’ counsel wherein she recanted her trial testimony, but, as the State observes, that letter was sent the same day that Lewis violated a no-contact order and spoke with H.D. by telephone. And Lewis does not present cogent argument to explain the letter’s relevance to his contention that H.D.’s trial testimony was incredibly dubious.
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Deadly Weapon Enhancement
[20] Finally, Lewis contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove
that he was armed with a deadly weapon during the rape and criminal
confinement of H.D. Lewis maintains that, without such evidence, those
convictions must be reduced from Level 1 and Level 3 felonies to Level 3 and
Level 6 felonies, respectively. We must agree.
[21] To support the enhancement of both the rape and criminal confinement
convictions as charged, the State was required to prove that Lewis committed
those offenses while armed with a deadly weapon, namely, a gun. Ind. Code §§
35-42-4-1(b), 35-42-3-3(a)(2)(A) (2014). Possession of a gun can be either actual
or constructive. See Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 835 (Ind. 1999). Actual
possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over the item. Id.
Constructive possession occurs when somebody has the intent and capability to
maintain dominion and control over the item. Id.
[22] As the State correctly contends, when a rape conviction is elevated due to the
use of a deadly weapon, it is not necessary for the State to show that the
weapon was held on the victim at all times. Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127,
1137 (Ind. 1997). In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim concerning
whether a defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, this court looks to such
factors as whether there was an initial show of deadly force with the weapon,
whether the intent was to intimidate the victim with the weapon, and whether
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the weapon was at least constructively under defendant’s control at all times.
Id.
[23] On appeal, Lewis maintains that, while the evidence showed that he was armed
with a gun prior to the criminal confinement and rape, there was no evidence or
inferences therefrom to show either actual or constructive possession of a gun
during the commission of those offenses. Indeed, H.D. testified that “the last
time [she] saw the gun was before the police got there,” and she testified that
Lewis was “in and out” of the house between the time the police officers were
there and the criminal confinement and rape occurred. Tr. at 108. There is no
evidence that H.D. felt threatened by Lewis’ possession of a gun during the
criminal confinement or rape. H.D. testified only that, when Lewis initially
displayed the gun to her while they were waiting for the police officers to arrive,
she understood that “[he] would do anything that he would have to not to get
locked up.” Id. at 68.
[24] And, notably, at the conclusion of trial, the trial court stated in relevant part as
follows:
I’m satisfied that a rape occurred. The challenge on appeal will be determining—we need better language and more clear language on what armed rape is. There is no doubt that [H.D.] knew the defendant routinely carried a gun. She saw it earlier that evening/morning. But there was no testimony that she saw it after the police arrived, for example. So we need that discussion.
Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
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[25] Lewis and H.D. were downstairs in her house, waiting for the police officers to
arrive, when Lewis showed her a gun. After the officers left, Lewis was in and
out of the house for a period of time. Later, when Lewis and H.D. were in an
upstairs bathroom, Lewis physically assaulted H.D., dragged her down the
hallway to a bedroom, and raped her. At no time during those events, which
took place upstairs in H.D.’s house, did H.D. see a gun.7 Thus, while the
evidence shows an initial show of force by Lewis with the gun and intimidation
of H.D. with respect to her 9-1-1 call, given Lewis’ movements in and out of the
house after that and the remoteness in time and location of the crimes from that
initial show of force, the evidence does not support that Lewis constructively
possessed a gun during the criminal confinement and rape. See Potter, 684
N.E.2d at 1137. We hold that, under these circumstances, the evidence is
insufficient to prove that Lewis committed the criminal confinement or rape
while armed with a deadly weapon.
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Defendant's Experts:
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