Date: 03-20-2013

Case Style: Mauna Loa Investments, LLC v. Anamaria Santiago

Case Number: 3D12-1825

Judge: Lagoa

Court: Florida Court of Appeal, Third District on appeal from the Circuit Court, Miami-Dade County

Plaintiff's Attorney: Dorothy F. Easley, for appellant.

Defendant's Attorney: Gregory A. Moore; Carlos Cruanes; Brannock & Humphries and Celene H. Humphries, Tracy S. Carlin and Sarah C. Pellenbarg, for appellee.

Description: Mauna Loa Investments, LLC (“Mauna”), appeals from a final judgment
entered in favor of Anamaria Santiago (“Santiago”) after a default was entered
against it and a jury trial conducted on damages. Because the complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Mauna, we reverse.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Santiago leased space for her business in a commercial warehouse property
located at 9325 Okeechobee Road, Hialeah Gardens (the “property”). In February
2010, Santiago filed suit against Mauna, alleging that she was injured on July 2,
2008, when she tripped and fell on the property “due to the walkway surface being
in an unsafe condition; specifically that the concrete walkway was allowed to be in
a condition of disrepair wherein holes and uneven areas where [sic] created and
caused the Plaintiff to lose her footing and fall.” Santiago alleged that Mauna
owned, maintained and/or controlled the property on the date of her injury. The
complaint was served on Mauna’s registered agent, Mawanphy Gil (“Gil”).

Although Gil gave the complaint to Mauna’s attorney, Mauna’s attorney never
filed an answer or response. Santiago filed a motion for entry of default on May 5,
2010, and the trial court entered a default against Mauna on May 13, 2010.
Mauna subsequently filed no fewer than five motions seeking to have the
default set aside; we address only one – Mauna’s Amended Motion to Set Aside
Default filed on November 11, 2011 (the “Amended Motion”). In the Amended

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Motion, Mauna argued that the default should be set aside because on the date of
Santiago’s injury Mauna did not own the property. Mauna asserted that on the
date of the injury the property was actually owned by Iberia, NV, LLC (“Iberia”).
In support of its argument, Mauna argued that in June of 2011, Santiago filed a
lawsuit against Iberia (the “Iberia Complaint”) seeking damages for the same
injury. Indeed, on September 20, 2011, the trial court consolidated the Iberia Case
with the instant case. In the Iberia Complaint, Santiago alleged that:

11. At the time of the accident, IBERIA and
MARMOL[1] were owners of the commercial property
and they were responsible to maintain and control the
commercial property located at 9325 Okeechobee Road,
Hialeah Gardens, Florida.

12. At all times material hereto, IBERIA and
MARMOL were responsible for the operation,
maintenance and safety of the premises, and had a duty to
maintain said premises in a safe condition.

. . . .

41. On October 6, 2008 IBERIA conveyed the
real property to MAUNA LOA by Special Warranty
Deed recorded in Official Records Book 26610 at page
1133 of the public records of Miami-Dade County.
(Attached as Exhibit “B”).

Mauna attached the Iberia Complaint to the Amended Motion. The Iberia
Complaint, in turn, attached a special warranty deed showing the transfer of the

1 Marmol was the son of the owner who passed away in February of 2008.

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property by Iberia to Mauna on October 6, 2008, three months after the date of
Santiago’s injury. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the
Amended Motion.2, 3

The matter proceeded to a jury trial on Santiago’s damages. The trial court
subsequently entered final judgment against Mauna in the amount of
$1,077,390.48. Mauna filed several timely post-trial motions, including a motion
to vacate the judgment as void because Mauna did not own the property on the
date of Santiago’s injury and therefore it was a judgment against the incorrect
party. The motion was denied. This appeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

“[T]he law is well-settled that a default judgment may not be entered against
a defendant on a complaint which wholly fails to state a cause of action against the
said defendant.” Sunshine Sec. & Detective Agency v. Wells Fargo Armored
Servs. Corp., 496 So. 2d 246, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); accord Moynet v. Courtois,
8 So. 3d 377, 378-79 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Morales v. All Right Miami, Inc., 755
2 Because the trial court’s order denied a motion to set aside a “simple default” on
liability rather than a final default judgment, the order was a non-final,
interlocutory ruling, which was not subject to appellate review until Mauna’s
appeal from the final judgment. See Westwood One, Inc. v. Flight Express, Inc.,
940 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Bruno v. A.E. Handy & Assocs., Inc., 787
So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Tieche v. Fla. Physicians Ins. Reciprocal, 431 So.
2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).

3 We note that the Amended Motion was denied by a prior, now-retired judge, and
not by the current trial judge.

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So. 2d 198, 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Ginsberg v. Lennar Fla. Holdings, Inc., 645
So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Becerra v. Equity Imports, Inc., 551 So. 2d 486
(Fla. 3d DCA 1989). A default judgment must be set aside where the complaint
fails to state a cause of action because “[f]ailure to state a cause of action, unlike
formal or technical deficiencies, is a fatal pleading deficiency not curable by a
default judgment.” Becerra, 551 So. 2d at 488. Moreover, “a motion to set aside a
default judgment requires no allegations or showing of excusable neglect where
the basis for the motion is that the allegations in the complaint do not entitle the
plaintiff to relief,” id. at 488-89; the trial court has no discretion, but is obligated to
vacate the default judgment. See Horton v. Rodriguez Espaillat y Asociados, 926
So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

At the time Mauna filed the Amended Motion, the trial court had before it
the special warranty deed, which was attached to the consolidated Iberia
Complaint. The special warranty deed established that, because Mauna did not
own the property on the date of Santiago’s injury, no relief could be granted
against Mauna. As the record before the trial court established that the complaint
failed to state a claim for relief against Mauna, the trial court had no discretion but
to grant the Amended Motion and set aside the default as void.4 Accordingly,

4 The fact that Santiago dismissed the Iberia Complaint pursuant to Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1) (2011) immediately prior to the hearing on Mauna’s
Amended Motion does not affect our analysis.

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because the final judgment was based upon the prior invalid default, the trial court
erred in failing to grant Mauna’s motion to vacate the judgment as void. See Juan
v. Fame Int’l Bay, Inc., 845 So. 2d 338, 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (where final
judgment was based upon invalid default, trial court erred in denying motion to set
aside default and default final judgment); Morales v. All Right Miami, Inc., 755
So. 2d 198, 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (reversing final default judgment where trial
court erred in denying motion to set aside default).

For the reasons stated, we reverse the order denying Mauna’s motion to
vacate the judgment as void, and remand with directions to vacate the default and
the final judgment and to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.

See: http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/Opinions/3D12-1825.pdf

Outcome: Reversed and remanded with directions.

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Defendant's Experts:

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