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Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com. Date: 01-16-2002 Case Style: Paul Kohler v. Kline and Kline, Inc. Case Number: 2002 OK CIV APP 4 Judge: Tom Colbert Court: Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals Plaintiff's Attorney: Babette Patton of Breathwit & Patton, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Defendant's Attorney: Douglas L. Jackson and Grant M. Lucky of Gungoll, Jackson, Collins, Box & Devoll, P.C., Enid, Oklahoma Description: 1 Plaintiff, Paul Kohler, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a summary judgment granted in favor of Defendant, Kline & Kline, Inc. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the summary judgment. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, a law firm, in May 1999, claiming that Defendant was negligent in representing him in a bankruptcy proceeding. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to appear at a bankruptcy hearing on his behalf and that, as a result, the bankruptcy court entered a default judgment on behalf of his creditors. Defendant raised several affirmative defenses in its answer, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, estoppel, laches, waiver, and statute of limitations. 3 On July 28, 2000, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that "Plaintiff did not have a contractual relationship with the Defendant and therefore has no basis for a claim seeking damages against the Defendant." In its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendant asserted that, although it represented Kohler Ranch, Inc. in a bankruptcy proceeding, it never represented Plaintiff in a bankruptcy matter, and was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on September 7, 2000. 4 Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment on October 2, 2000. Plaintiff's motion merely alleged the following: "1. That the Court entered a Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant, Kline and Kline, Inc. on September 1, 2000. 2. Questions of fact exist concerning this matter. 3. Plaintiff states a legal claim for relief against Defendant." 5 Defendant objected on the ground that Plaintiff failed to show "sufficient cause for this Court to vacate the Judgment rendered in favor of the Defendant" under 12 O.S. Supp. 2000 § 1031.1. Plaintiff responded with a supplement to his motion to set aside the summary judgment. Represented by a new attorney, Plaintiff asserted that his previous attorney had failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment and had also failed to appear at the hearing. Plaintiff further asserted that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was based upon the fact that he was not the real party in interest. 6 In its objection, Defendant argued that the trial court did not dismiss the cause of action based upon a real party in interest claim, but in fact granted summary judgment because it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant further asserted that Plaintiff had failed to allege any sufficient grounds for vacating the judgment under 12 O.S. Supp. 2000 § 1031. The trial court entered an order on December 5, 2000, denying Plaintiff's motion to set aside the summary judgment. * * * 9 In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion, we must determine whether the trial court's grant of summary judgment was proper. "Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions or other evidentiary materials establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Davis v. Leitner, 1989 OK 146, 9, 782 P.2d 924, 926. Although a trial court considers factual matters when deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, its ultimate decision is purely legal, "whether one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there are no material disputed factual questions." Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, 2, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053. "On appellate review, all inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the record should be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment." Rose v. Sapulpa Rural Water Co., 1981 OK 85, 2, 631 P.2d 752, 754. Our standard of review is de novo, meaning that we have "plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to re-examine a trial court's legal rulings." Polymer Fabricating, Inc. v. Employers Workers' Compensation Ass'n, 1998 OK 113, 8 & n.6, 980 P.2d 109, 113 & n.6. * * * Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion. Outcome: ¶19 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to vacate its order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The trial court's grant of summary judgment was proper because Defendant presented uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiff could not establish the material elements of a legal negligence action. ¶20 AFFIRMED. Plaintiff's Experts: Unknown Defendant's Experts: Unknown Comments: Kent Morlan |
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