Terrytown man sentenced to 40 years in prison for two rapes, sex with teen

Case Number: 17-KA-36

Judge: Susan M. Chehardy, Fredericka Homberg Wicker, and Jude G. Gravois

Court: FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL, STATE OF LOUISIANA

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Terry M. Boudreaux
Thomas J. Butler
James W. Myers

Defendant's Attorney:

Bertha M. Hillman

Description: On April 27, 2011, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of
information charging defendant, Arturio Rodriguez, with carnal knowledge of a
juvenile in violation of La. R.S. 14:80.1 Defendant pled not guilty at his
arraignment on May 5, 2011. On June 3, 2011, defendant filed omnibus motions
that were set for a hearing, but were never heard. On August 12, 2014, defendant
withdrew his not guilty plea and pled guilty as charged.2 That same date, the trial
court sentenced defendant to ten years imprisonment at hard labor, to run
concurrently with any other sentence defendant might be serving. Defendant was

1 The bill of information alleged that the offense occurred on or between May 1, 2010 and October 1, 2010, and defendant pled guilty as charged. During this period, La. R.S. 14:80 was amended to include provisions regarding the sale of personal property used in the commission of the offense. See La. R.S. 14:80(D)(2)(a) and (b); La. Acts. 2010, No. 763, § 1, effective August 15, 2010. These provisions are inapplicable to the instant matter. Moreover, the waiver of rights form indicates that the offense occurred on May 1, 2010, which was before the effective date of the amendment. Additionally, the trial court’s colloquy with defendant reflects the date of the offense was on or about May 1, 2010. 2 Also on August 12, 2014, defendant entered guilty pleas and was sentenced in district court case number 12-1863 to two counts of forcible rape and two counts of aggravated burglary. Defendant has also appealed those convictions, which have been docketed in this Court as case number 16-KA-606.


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ordered to register as a sex offender for fifteen years and to comply with the
requirements of registration and notification pursuant to La. R.S. 15:541.
On June 27, 2016, defendant filed a uniform application for post-conviction
relief and requested an out-of-time appeal in district court case number 12-1863,
arguing that he was denied a direct appeal. On June 29, 2016, the trial court
granted defendant an out-of-time appeal in district court case number 12-1863.
Thereafter, on November 10, 2016, upon motion of appellate counsel and after
review of the record in 16-KA-606, this Court discovered that defendant’s petition
requesting an out-of-time appeal in district court case number 12-1863 also
included his instant conviction for carnal knowledge of a juvenile. Accordingly,
this Court construed defendant’s petition filed in district court case number 12
1863 to be a timely request for an out-of-time appeal in the instant matter and
ordered that the trial court consider and rule, within twenty days of its order, on
defendant’s request for an out-of-time appeal on the carnal knowledge of a juvenile
conviction. On November 15, 2016, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for
an out-of-time appeal. Defendant’s appeal follows.
FACTS
Because defendant pled guilty, the underlying facts were not fully developed
at trial. Nevertheless, the State alleged in the bill of information that on or between
May 1, 2010 and October 1, 2010, defendant violated La. R.S. 14:80 in that he did
commit carnal knowledge of a known juvenile (D.O.B. 9-18-1994), by having
consensual vaginal/penile intercourse with the juvenile, who was thirteen years of
age or older but less than seventeen years of age, with defendant being nineteen
years of age or older, when the victim was not defendant’s spouse. Additionally,
during the colloquy, defendant stated that he had sex with a juvenile ex-girlfriend
when he was twenty years old in Jefferson Parish. He estimated that the victim
was fifteen or sixteen years old. The State provided that it would have proved at


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trial that defendant was twenty years old and that the victim was fifteen years old,
having a date of birth of September 18, 1994.3
ANDERS BRIEF
Under the procedure adopted by this Court in State v. Bradford, supra,
appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that she has thoroughly
reviewed the trial court record and cannot find any non-frivolous issues to raise on
appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to Anders v. California, supra, and State v. Jyles,
supra, appointed counsel requests permission to withdraw as counsel of record for
defendant.
In Anders, the United States Supreme Court stated that appointed appellate
counsel may request permission to withdraw if she finds her case to be wholly
frivolous after a conscientious examination of it. The request must be
accompanied by “‘a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal’” so as to provide the reviewing court “with a basis for
determining whether appointed counsel have fully performed their duty to support
their clients’ appeals to the best of their ability” and to assist the reviewing court
“in making the critical determination whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that
counsel should be permitted to withdraw.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 439, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902, 100 L.Ed.2d 440
(1988).
In Jyles, 704 So.2d at 241, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that an
Anders brief need not tediously catalog every meritless pretrial motion or objection
made at trial with a detailed explanation of why the motions or objections lack
merit. The court explained that an Anders brief must demonstrate by full
discussion and analysis that appellate counsel “has cast an advocate’s eye over the

3 When informing defendant of the provisions of the carnal knowledge of a juvenile statute, the trial judge stated that the offense occurred on or about May 1, 2010. The waiver of rights form reflects that the offense occurred on May 1, 2010.


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trial record and considered whether any ruling made by the trial court, subject to
the contemporaneous objection rule, had a significant, adverse impact on shaping
the evidence presented to the jury for its consideration.” Id.
When conducting a review for compliance with Anders, an appellate court
must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the appeal
is wholly frivolous. Bradford, 676 So.2d at 1110. If, after an independent review,
the reviewing court determines there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, it may
grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the defendant’s conviction
and sentence. However, if the court finds any legal point arguable on the merits, it
may either deny the motion and order the court-appointed attorney to file a brief
arguing the legal point(s) identified by the court, or grant the motion and appoint
substitute appellate counsel. Id.
ANALYSIS
Defendant’s appellate counsel asserts that after a detailed review of the
record, she could find no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. Counsel provides
that the trial court fully informed defendant of the legal consequences of changing
his plea to guilty and explained to defendant each of the rights necessary to ensure
a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Counsel avers that the trial court
advised defendant that he could receive a fine of not more than $5,000.00 and a
sentence of ten years at hard labor to run concurrently with any other sentence he
was serving. Counsel contends that defendant was sentenced pursuant to the plea
agreement and received ten years at hard labor. Counsel provides that defendant
was advised his conviction could not be set aside under La. C.Cr.P. art. 893, and
defendant is now restricted by law from appealing his sentence.
Appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of record for
defendant which states that she has made a conscientious and thorough review of
the trial court record and can find no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal.


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Counsel asserts that she has notified defendant of the filing of this motion and has
advised defendant of his right to file a pro se brief in this appeal. Additionally, this
Court notified defendant by certified mail that an Anders brief had been filed and
that he had until March 8, 2017 to file a pro se supplemental brief. As of the date
of the case’s submission for decision, defendant had not filed a brief with this
Court.
The State filed a response to defendant’s appeal, agreeing that counsel has
provided a diligent and complete procedural history of the case and found no non
frivolous issues to be raised on appeal. It submits that counsel has conformed with
the procedures set forth in Anders and Jyles. It contends that counsel’s motion to
withdraw should be granted, and it believes that there are no discoverable patent
errors on the face of the record.
An independent review of the record supports appellate counsel’s assertion
that there are no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal. The bill of
information properly charged defendant and plainly and concisely stated the
essential facts constituting the offense charged. It also sufficiency identified
defendant and the crime charged. See La. C.Cr.P. arts. 464-466. As reflected by
the minute entries and the commitment, defendant appeared at each stage of the
proceedings against him. As such, defendant’s presence does not present any
issues supporting an appeal.
Further, defendant pled guilty as charged to felony carnal knowledge of a
juvenile in violation of La. R.S. 14:80. When a defendant pleads guilty, he
normally waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up to the
guilty plea and precludes review of such defects either by appeal or post
conviction relief. State v. Wingerter, 05-697 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/14/06), 926 So.2d
662, 664. Defendant entered an unqualified guilty plea, and therefore, all non


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jurisdictional defects are waived. No rulings were preserved for appeal under State
v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976).4
A review of the record reveals no irregularities in defendant’s guilty plea.
Once a defendant is sentenced, only those guilty pleas that are constitutionally
infirm may be withdrawn by appeal or post-conviction relief. A guilty plea is
constitutionally infirm if it is not entered freely and voluntarily, if the Boykin5
colloquy is inadequate, or when a defendant is induced to enter the plea by a plea
bargain or what he justifiably believes was a plea bargain and that bargain is not
kept. State v. McCoil, 05-658 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/27/06), 924 So.2d 1120, 1124.
The record shows that defendant was aware he was pleading guilty to carnal
knowledge of a juvenile in violation of La. R.S. 14:80. Defendant was properly
advised of his Boykin rights. In the waiver of rights form, defendant placed his
initials next to a provision indicating that his attorney had advised him of his right
to a trial by jury, to confront his accusers, and his privilege against self
incrimination, indicating that he understood he was waiving these rights. During
the colloquy with the trial judge, defendant was again informed of these rights.
During the colloquy, defendant indicated that he understood that he was waiving
these rights.6
Defendant stated that he had discussed the matters fully with his attorney
and was satisfied with her representation of him. He denied being under the
influence of alcohol or any drugs and reported that he was twenty-four years old.
He stated that he had completed eleventh grade and knew how to read and write.
Defendant acknowledged that he had reviewed and read the waiver of rights form

4 The record indicates that defendant filed several omnibus motions, which do not appear to have been ruled upon prior to the time defendant entered his guilty plea. Nevertheless, defendant waived any argument regarding these outstanding motions by pleading guilty without raising the issue. See State v. Corzo, 04-791 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/15/05), 896 So.2d 1101, 1102. 5 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). 6 During the colloquy, defendant also indicated that he reviewed the Notification of Sex Offender document with his attorney, discussed the requirement that he register as a sex offender for fifteen years for his conviction of carnal knowledge of a juvenile, and signed the document.


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with his attorney, understood what he had read, and that his signature appeared on
the bottom of the form. He was advised of his right to an attorney, and his right to
appeal upon conviction or to appeal his sentence if it was not imposed pursuant to
the plea agreement. The trial judge explained that if defendant pled guilty, he was
waiving his right to assert any allegation of defect. Defendant suggested that he
understood this.
Defendant specified that he wanted to plead guilty and acknowledged that by
doing so, he was admitting that he committed the crime to which he was pleading
guilty. Defendant indicated that he believed the plea was in his best interest.
Defense counsel stated that she believed that the plea was knowingly, intelligently,
freely, and voluntarily entered by defendant and was in his best interest.7
Defendant indicated that he understood the nature of the charges against him
and the possible penalties and confirmed that neither he nor his family had been
forced, intimidated, coerced, threatened, or promised anything for entering his
guilty plea. The waiver of rights form reflects that the maximum sentence which
the court could impose was ten years with or without hard labor and a $5,000.00
fine. During the colloquy, defendant was informed of the penalty carried by a
conviction of carnal knowledge of a juvenile. Specifically, he was informed that
felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile was punishable by a fine of not more than
$5,000.00, or imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten
years, or both, and that his conviction would not be set aside or his prosecution
dismissed in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 893. Therefore, defendant was
advised of the maximum penalty.

7 In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), the Court held that “[a]n individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Although defendant agreed that the plea was in his best interest, he also admitted his guilt in this matter. This is therefore clearly not a guilty plea made pursuant to Alford.


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The waiver of rights form reflects that defendant would receive “10 yrs
concurrent w/ 12-1863 w/ CTS” if the court accepted his plea of guilty. Thus, the
waiver of rights form appears silent as to whether defendant’s sentence would be
served at hard labor. However, defendant was advised regarding the actual penalty
that would be imposed upon acceptance of his guilty plea. During the colloquy,
the trial judge advised defendant that if the court accepted his plea of guilty, he
would be sentenced to serve ten years at hard labor with the sentence to run
concurrently with any other sentence defendant was serving. The trial judge stated
that he was convinced that defendant understood the nature of the charge against
him and the possible penalty, found a basis for the plea, and accepted defendant’s
plea as knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily entered, in compliance with
La. C.Cr.P. art. 556.1(A)(1).
Defendant’s sentence does not present issues for appeal. His sentence falls
within the sentencing range prescribed by the statute. See La. R.S. 14:80. Further,
defendant’s sentence was imposed pursuant to and in conformity with the plea
agreement. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2(A)(2) precludes a defendant from seeking
review of a sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement which was set
forth in the record at the time of the plea. State v. Moore, 06-875 (La. App. 5 Cir.
4/11/07), 958 So.2d 36, 46; State v. Washington, 05-211 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/6/05),
916 So.2d 1171, 1173. As stated, in the waiver of rights form, defendant was
advised that his sentence would be “10 yrs concurrent w/ 12-1863 w/ CTS.” Prior
to accepting defendant’s guilty plea, the trial court informed defendant that he
would receive a ten-year sentence at hard labor concurrent with any other sentence
he was serving. The trial judge subsequently imposed the sentence as advised.
The trial judge failed to specifically order the instant sentence to run concurrently,
as specified in the waiver of rights form, with the sentence in district court case
number 12-1863 when imposing the sentence. Nonetheless, the trial judge stated


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that defendant’s sentence was to be served concurrently with any other sentence
defendant would be serving. Therefore, we find that defendant was sentenced in
accordance with the plea agreement.
Because appellate counsel’s brief adequately demonstrates by full discussion
and analysis that she has reviewed the trial court proceedings and cannot identify
any basis for a non-frivolous appeal, and an independent review of the record
supports counsel’s assertion, appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney of
record for defendant is hereby granted.
ERRORS PATENT REVIEW
The record was reviewed for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920,
State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975), and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175
(La. App. 5 Cir. 1990). No errors patent were discovered.

Outcome: