Date: 08-09-2017

Case Style:

Case Number: 16-2255

Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on appeal from the District of New Mexico (Bernalillo County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: Eva Mae Fontanez, Paul Mysliwiec

Defendant's Attorney: Darrell Allen

Description: Two months after his release from prison, Alonzo Williamson was accused
of violating the terms of his supervised release. After two hearings, the district
court revoked Williamson’s supervised release and imposed additional jail time
followed by another term of supervised release. On appeal, Williamson
challenges the revocation, arguing the government presented insufficient evidence
that he committed the New Mexico crimes of aggravated burglary and receiving
or transferring a stolen vehicle.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Given the
preponderance of evidence standard employed at revocation of supervised release
hearings, we conclude the district court did not err in finding Williamson
knowingly in possession of the stolen vehicle police discovered him in.
I. Background
Williamson began his three-year term of supervised release on June 2,
2016. Less than two months later, the Probation Office filed a petition for the
revocation of his supervised release. The petition alleged six violations of
Williamson’s conditions of supervised release: (1) failing to keep an appointment
with his probation officer; (2) failing to submit to required drug testing on two
separate occasions; (3) possessing alcohol; (4) violating state law by committing
misdemeanor battery; (5) violating state law by committing felony receiving or
transferring a stolen vehicle and felony criminal damage to property; and (6)
violating state law by committing felony aggravated burglary.
At the first revocation hearing, the district court found by a preponderance
of the evidence that Williamson had violated his conditions of supervised release
as alleged in violations 1–5 of the petition. The court also ordered supplemental
briefing on violation 6, the aggravated burglary. At the second hearing, the court
made several additional factual findings and concluded that Williamson had also
violated the terms of his supervised release as alleged in violation 6 of the
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Probation Office’s petition. The district court sentenced Williamson to 21 months
in prison followed by a one-year term of supervised release.
II. Analysis
A district court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated a condition of his supervised release. United States v. Disney,
253 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001). Defendants on supervised release are not
free citizens at the time of their alleged violations, and do not enjoy: “the
presumption of innocence, the right to have [their] guilt adjudicated beyond a
reasonable doubt, or many of the procedural protections associated with a formal
trial.” United States v. Acosta, 480 F. App’x. 923, 925 (10th Cir. 2012)
(unpublished) (quoting United States v. Waters, 158 F.3d 933, 939 (6th Cir.
1998)).1 On appeal, we review a district court’s decision to revoke supervised
release for abuse of discretion and review legal questions related to the revocation
de novo. Disney, 253 F.3d at 1213.
Williamson presents two challenges to the district court’s revocation of his
supervised release: first, he argues the government presented insufficient evidence
that he committed aggravated burglary; and second, he argues the government
presented insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed a stolen vehicle.
Williamson agrees that he must succeed on both of his challenges in order to
1 We, of course, cite unpublished decisions only for their persuasive value.
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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change the appropriate sentencing guidelines range. Oral Arg. at 1:40–1:58.
Since we conclude the government presented sufficient evidence that Williamson
committed the crime of receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, we need not
reach the aggravated burglary claim.
New Mexico’s statute criminalizing the receipt or transfer of stolen
vehicles requires knowing possession of the stolen vehicle:
Receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle or motor vehicle
consists of a person who, with intent to procure or pass
title to a vehicle or motor vehicle as defined by the Motor
Vehicle Code that the person knows or has reason to
believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken, receives or
transfers possession of the vehicle or motor vehicle from
or to another or who has in the person’s possession any
vehicle that the person knows or has reason to believe has
been stolen or unlawfully taken. . . .
N.M.S.A. § 30-16D-4 (emphasis added). Williamson argues that the government
failed to establish that he knew the vehicle at issue was stolen, a required element
of the crime. He points out that he made no statements that would have led the
officers to believe that he knew the car was stolen or had information relating to
the carjacking. He also cites United States v. Lopez, No. 14-CR-2207 JP, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114445 (D. N.M. June 18, 2015), a District of New Mexico case
involving the same statutory provision in which the court concluded there was
insufficient evidence that the defendant knowingly possessed a stolen vehicle.
(The judge in Lopez was also the same district court judge who decided this case.)
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In Lopez, the court recognized that the defendant’s post-arrest statement
that he purchased the vehicle in question for $1,000 “strain[ed] credulity,” but
there was “no corroborating evidence in the record—such as the make and model
of the vehicle—that shows Defendant should have been on notice that the $1,000
price tag was a literal steal,” and there was no evidence refuting the defendant’s
story about purchasing the vehicle. Id. at *7. The court stated, “[w]hile the
government need only prove Defendant knew the vehicle was stolen by a
preponderance of the evidence, that does not mean it need not provide any
evidence of knowledge whatsoever.” Id. (emphasis added).
But Lopez is distinguishable. Here, the government presented evidence that
Williamson knew or had reason to believe the vehicle in question was stolen.
Indeed, the government made the argument that Williamson knew the vehicle was
stolen because Williamson himself committed the carjacking. The facts
supporting that inference are as follows. The vehicle in question had been
reported stolen in a carjacking. There was a temporal and locational nexus
between Williamson’s battery of his neighbor (violation 4) and the
carjacking—Williamson battered his neighbor at 9:54 p.m. on July 23, 2016 at an
apartment located on the same street, just eight blocks away from the carjacking,
and the carjacking occurred only twenty minutes after the battery. The victim
stated the carjacker was a black male who punched him in the face. Williamson
was described by his neighbor as a “baldheaded black gentleman,” Aple. Br. at
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16, and was in an agitated state when he assaulted the neighbor. Days later,
police found Williamson asleep in the stolen vehicle with the key in the ignition,
the engine running, and his foot on the brake. Finally, the vehicle was heavily
damaged on both the passenger’s and driver’s sides and had broken headlights,
scratches and dents, and a broken passenger-side door handle.
The district court found by a preponderance of evidence that Williamson
knew the vehicle in question was stolen. After reviewing the facts presented, and
the legal issue de novo, we see no error in that conclusion. The district court’s
inference of knowing possession is a reasonable interpretation of Williamson’s
presence in the stolen car, and no other explanation has been offered. Since
Williamson has failed to persuade us on one of his two arguments, his challenge
to the revocation of his supervised release fails.

Outcome: The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding by a preponderance
of the evidence that Williamson violated the terms of his supervised release by
knowingly possessing a stolen motor vehicle. We therefore AFFIRM.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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