Date: 01-19-2016

Case Style: COMMONWEALTH vs. LAURIE ANN REDMAN

Case Number: 15-P-68

Judge: Mark V. Green

Court: COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT

Plaintiff's Attorney: Michael W. Streily, Amy E. Constantine

Defendant's Attorney: Helen Santoro

Description: Over objection by defense counsel, Officer Mulkerin was allowed to
testify at trial that, at the time Officer Gould attempted to
handcuff the defendant while placing her under arrest, the
defendant stated that she could not be arrested inside of her
home. The defendant contends that the statement constituted
improper evidence of prior bad acts. In response, the
Commonwealth contends that the statement illustrated
consciousness of guilt, as it displayed awareness by the
defendant that the reason for police presence at the scene was
in response to an assault and battery against the victim. We
need not reconcile the disagreement, since we can say that any
error in the admission of the statement "did not influence the
jury, or had but very slight effect." Commonwealth v. Flebotte,
417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). The statement arose in the context
of other testimony by Officer Mulkerin (to which the defendant
did not object) describing the defendant's angry and agitated
demeanor at the time of her arrest. Contrary to the contention
by the defendant, the testimony did not suggest that the
defendant had committed another uncharged offense or that she
had a propensity to commit assault and battery, nor did the
prosecutor make reference to it in his closing argument.1
2. Prosecutor's closing argument. Despite a ruling on the
defendant's motion in limine that the prosecutor should refrain
from use of the word "victim" to refer to the victim, the
prosecutor used that term multiple times during his closing
argument.2 The defendant objected and moved for a mistrial. We
discern no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in her
assessment that the references, though inappropriate following
During his closing, the prosecutor briefly referred to the defendant's demeanor at the time of her arrest, to suggest that an assault and battery had occurred. However, his argument on that point relied on other testimony by Officer Mulkerin describing her demeanor, to which the defendant did not object at trial. The prosecutor made no mention of the defendant's statement. 2 In her objection, the defendant asserted that the prosecutor used the term thirteen times, while on appeal she asserts that the prosecutor used it seventeen times. The precise number is immaterial.
the judge's ruling on the motion in limine, caused no undue
prejudice to the defendant. Cf. Commonwealth v. Krepon, 32
Mass. App. Ct. 945, 947 (1992) (no prejudice by judge's use of
"victim" rather than "alleged victim" in his instructions to the
jury). The judge repeatedly instructed the jury that closing
arguments are not evidence, and that the complaint is only an
accusation and not evidence of guilt.
Contrary to the defendant's separate contention, the
prosecutor did not impermissibly argue that the defendant's
dismayed reaction to her arrest was evidence of her propensity
to commit assault and battery. Instead, the prosecutor
suggested that the defendant's demeanor at the time of her
arrest (the evidence of which came in without objection) was a
result of the fact that an assault and battery had occurred.
We likewise do not view the prosecutor's description of the
victim's testimony as "candid" to constitute impermissible
vouching.

Outcome: In context, the jury would have understood the
prosecutor to have been arguing, from the evidence, that the
victim was credible, and not that he held independent or
superior knowledge of the victim's credibility.
Judgment affirmed.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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