Date: 08-24-2016

Case Style: Peter L. Vasquez v. Dax K. Lewis; Richard Jimerson

Case Number: 14-3278

Judge: Lucero

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas (Shawnee County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: Johnny Lombardi and Chris Joseph

Defendant's Attorney: Dwight R. Carswell, Assistant Solicitor General (M. J. Willoughby, Assistant Attorney General, with him on the brief), Office of the Attorney General Derek Schmidt, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellees.

Description: This case asks us to determine whether, under the totality of circumstances,
Kansas Highway Patrol Officers Richard Jimerson and Dax Lewis (the “Officers”)
had reasonable suspicion to detain and search the vehicle of Peter Vasquez. In
particular, this case presents the question of what weight to afford the state
citizenship of a motorist in determining the validity of a search. Vasquez alleges that
after stopping him for a traffic violation, the Officers detained him and searched his
car without reasonable suspicion. As justification, the Officers assert, among other
indicators detailed herein, Vasquez was a citizen of Colorado, driving alone on
Interstate 70 from Colorado through Kansas, in the middle of the night, in a recently
purchased, older-model car.
The district court concluded the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity
because Vasquez’s asserted right was not clearly established. We disagree. We
conclude that the Officers acted without reasonable suspicion and violated clearly
established precedent. In particular, we conclude that the Officers impermissibly
relied on Vasquez’s status as a resident of Colorado to justify the search of his
vehicle. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand to
the district court for further proceedings.
I
On December 16, 2011, the Officers saw Vasquez’s 1992 BMW sedan driving
eastbound on I-70 in Wabaunsee County, Kansas. Jimerson could not read Vasquez’s
temporary tag, which was taped to the inside of the car’s tinted rear window.
Because of this, Jimerson turned on his emergency lights and Vasquez pulled to the
side of the road. Jimerson approached the car, noted that Vasquez was its sole
occupant, and observed blankets and a pillow in the front passenger seat and back
seat of the car. Based on the arrangement of the back seat, Jimerson thought
something large was obscured under the blankets, and he asked Vasquez if anyone
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else was in the car. Vasquez told him no. Jimerson then asked Vasquez where he
was heading and Vasquez responded, “Elkton, Maryland.” Vasquez also told
Jimerson that he was from Colorado originally, but had just moved to Maryland.
Jimerson asked whether Vasquez had any family in Maryland to which Vasquez
responded, “Just my daughter.” Jimerson then took Vasquez’s driver’s license and
proof of insurance and returned to the patrol car.
In the car, Jimerson told Lewis that Vasquez was notably nervous and that
there were items covered in the front and back seat of the car. Jimerson sent Lewis to
check on Vasquez, to “see how nervous he [was]” and to “get a feel for him.” Upon
returning, Lewis told Jimerson that Vasquez “look[ed] all scared to death.” Jimerson
then checked Vasquez’s proof of insurance which indicated Vasquez also had
insurance for two newer cars. Jimerson, suspecting Vasquez was transporting illegal
drugs, called Trooper Jason Edie to bring a trained drug dog.
Lewis returned to Vasquez and asked where he worked. Vasquez responded
“We own a store called Boutiques at Brighton.” Lewis also asked why Vasquez was
not driving one of the newer cars listed on his proof of insurance. Vasquez stated
that he bought the newest car for his girlfriend. Further, Vasquez told Lewis that he
was moving to Maryland, which prompted Lewis to ask “Where’s all the stuff if
you’re moving?” Vasquez replied that he already had moved most of his belongings.
After issuing a warning and walking away, but before getting back into his
patrol car, Lewis returned and inquired if he could ask a couple more questions, to
which Vasquez consented. Lewis asked if there were any drugs in the vehicle, which
4
Vasquez denied. Lewis then asked if he could search the car and Vasquez refused.
After the refusal, Lewis said that he suspected Vasquez was “probably involved in a
little criminal activity here” and detained him. Trooper Edie arrived with the drug
dog about fifteen minutes later. The Officers’ subsequent search of the vehicle did
not reveal anything illegal.
On February 28, 2012, Vasquez filed this lawsuit against the Officers under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining
him and searching his car without reasonable suspicion. The district court initially
denied the Officers’ motion to dismiss, concluding that Vasquez had stated sufficient
facts in his complaint to properly allege a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
However, after discovery, the district court granted the Officers’ motion for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. It held that Vasquez failed to show that
the Officers’ conduct violated clearly established law, and as such, he could not
overcome their immunity from suit. Vasquez timely appealed.
II
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Yousuf v. Cohlmia, 741 F.3d 31, 37
(10th Cir. 2014). To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show: (1) a
defendant violated his constitutional rights; and (2) it was clearly established at the
time of the violation that such actions violated that right. Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d
1416, 1424 (10th Cir. 1997).
5
A
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the
Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or
vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273 (2002) (quotation omitted). To determine whether a traffic stop constituted an
unreasonable seizure, we consider: (1) whether the stop was justified at its inception;
and (2) whether “the officer’s actions during the detention were reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” United
States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997).

An investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope must be carefully tailored to its
underlying justification. Id. Absent the detainee’s valid consent, the scope or
duration of an investigative detention may be expanded beyond its initial purpose
only if the detaining officer, at the time of the detention, has “a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”
United States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1069 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted).
The existence of reasonable suspicion of illegal activity does not depend upon any
one factor, but on the totality of the circumstances. Id. Officers may rely on
common sense and ordinary human experience, and we avoid second-guessing a law
enforcement officer’s judgment. United States v. Melendez–Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046,
1052 (10th Cir. 1994).


6
1
This Court has repeatedly admonished law enforcement that once an officer
has been assured that a temporary tag is valid, he “should . . . explain[] to Defendant
the reason for the initial stop and then allow[] her to continue on her way without
requiring her to produce her license and registration.” United States v. Edgerton, 438
F.3d 1043, 1051 (10th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d
1048, 1055 (10th Cir. 2009) (the discovery of facts resolving the initial purpose of a
stop “wholly dispel[s] . . . reasonable suspicion”); United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d
558, 561-62 (10th Cir. 1994) (officers improperly detained a driver and searched a
vehicle long after the initial purpose of a stop was completed).
The Officers argue their observations other than the car’s license plate justified
extending the length of the seizure. See United States v. Clarkson, 554 F.3d 1196,
1201 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The traffic stop may be expanded beyond its original purpose
if during the initial stop the detaining officer acquires reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.” (quotation omitted)). But Vasquez challenges only the drug dog
sniff and subsequent search of his car. Therefore, we consider only whether
Vasquez’s continued detention after he refused the search and the subsequent search
of his car violated his constitutional rights.
2
We now turn to whether the Officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the
search of Vasquez’s car. They argue the following factors created reasonable
suspicion: (1) Vasquez was driving alone late at night; (2) he was travelling on I-70,
7
“a known drug corridor”; (3) he was from Colorado and was driving from Aurora,
Colorado, “a drug source area”; (4) the back seat did not contain items the Officers
expected to see in the car of someone moving across the country; (5) the items in his
back seat were covered and obscured from view; (6) he had a blanket and pillow in
his car; (7) he was driving an older car, despite having insurance for a newer one; (8)
there were fresh fingerprints on his trunk; and (9) he seemed nervous.1 Such
conduct, taken together, is hardly suspicious, nor is it particularly unusual.2

Though we analyze these facts under the totality of the circumstances, Arvizu,
534 U.S. at 273, we first note which factors have less weight in our analysis. We
start with the most troubling justification: Vasquez’s status as a resident of
Colorado. The Officers rely heavily on Vasquez’s residency because Colorado is
“known to be home to medical marijuana dispensaries.” But we find this
justification, in isolation or in tandem with other considerations, unconvincing. As
we have said previously, “that the defendant[] [was] traveling from a drug source

1 The Officers also argue that Vasquez gave vague or inconsistent answers to
questions about his travel plans. However, the Officers do not explain what these
answers were or why they were contradictory. On reviewing the record, which
contains a video recording of the interactions between the Officers and Vasquez, we
cannot find anything even arguably inconsistent in Vasquez’s answers.
2 Neither the dissent nor the Officers explain how these factors, taken together,
indicate suspicious behavior. The Officers instead recite them as a list of unrelated
facts. But officers must explain why the factors, together, create “a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”
Lambert, 46 F.3d at 1069 (quotation omitted). As the Supreme Court has reminded
the circuit courts, we should not and cannot review these factors in isolation. Arvizu,
534 U.S. at 273. Thus, officers must explain why the factors considered together are
suspicious, and not simply recite isolated factors, leaving it to the courts to glean how
they create reasonable suspicion.
8

city—or . . . a drug source state—does little to add to the overall calculus of
suspicion.” United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 787-88 (10th Cir. 2007). Such
a factor is “so broad as to be indicative of almost nothing.” Id. at 787. Moreover,
our fellow circuits have concluded the state of residence of a detained motorist is an
“extremely weak factor, at best” in the reasonable suspicion calculus because
“interstate motorists have a better than equal chance of traveling from a source state
to a demand state.” United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1138 & n.3 (8th Cir.
1998) (collecting cases and noting that the government has argued that almost every
major city in the United States is a drug source area). Currently, twenty-five states
permit marijuana use for medical purposes, with Colorado, Alaska, Oregon,
Washington, and Washington, D.C. permitting some recreational use under state
law.3 Thus, the Officer’s reasoning would justify the search and seizure of the
citizens of more than half of the states in our country. It is wholly improper to
assume that an individual is more likely to be engaged in criminal conduct because of
his state of residence, and thus any fact that would inculpate every resident of a state
3 See Alaska Stat. §§ 17.37 et seq., 17.38 et seq.; Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 36-2801
et seq.; Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-43.3-101 et
seq., 18-18-406.3, 25-1.5-106; Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(3); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§
21a-408 et seq.; Del. Code. tit. 16 §§ 4901a et seq.; D.C. Code §§ 7-1671.01 et seq.,
48-9043.01; Haw. Rev. Stat. §§329-121 et seq.; 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. 130/1 et seq.;
Me. Stat. 22 § 2383-B; Md. Code, Health-Gen. §§ 13-3301 et seq.; Mass. Gen. Laws.
ch. 94C, §§ 1-2 et seq.; Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 333.26421 et seq.; Minn. Stat.
§§ 152.21 et seq.; Mont. Code §§ 50-46.301 et seq.; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 40.453A et
seq.; N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 126-X et seq.; N.J. Stat. §§ 24:6I et seq., 45:1-45.1; N.M.
Stat. §§ 26-2b et seq.; N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 3360 et seq.; Ohio Rev. Code
§§ 3796.19 et seq. (effective Sept. 8, 2016); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 475.300 et seq.,
475.864; 21 R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28.6 et seq.; 35 Pa. Stat. §§ 10231.101 et seq.; Vt.
Stat. tit. 18, §§ 4472 et seq.; Wash. Rev. Code. §§ 69.51A et seq., 69.50.4013.
9
cannot support reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, it is time to abandon the pretense
that state citizenship is a permissible basis upon which to justify the detention and
search of out-of-state motorists, and time to stop the practice of detention of
motorists for nothing more than an out-of-state license plate.

And we cannot think of a scenario in which a combination of otherwise
innocent factors becomes suspicious because the individual is from one of the
aforementioned twenty-five states or the District of Columbia. Even under the
totality of the circumstances, it is anachronistic to use state residence as a
justification for the Officers’ reasonable suspicion. Absent a demonstrated
extraordinary circumstance, the continued use of state residency as a justification for
the fact of or continuation of a stop is impermissible.

Some other factors also weigh little in our totality of the circumstances
analysis. “[W]e have repeatedly held that nervousness is of limited significance in
determining reasonable suspicion and that the government’s repetitive reliance on . . .
nervousness . . . as a basis for reasonable suspicion . . . must be treated with caution.”
Wood, 106 F.3d at 948 (quotation omitted). Moreover, the Officers’ reasoning is
contradictory at points. Officer Jimerson claimed that Vasquez’s car contained items
that were covered by blankets, but Officer Lewis found suspicious that the car was
uncharacteristically empty and lacking in sundries common for someone moving
cross-country. We do not give much weight to these seemingly contradictory facts.

And that Vasquez was driving on I-70 does not make his otherwise innocent conduct
suspicious. I-70 is a major corridor between Colorado and the East Coast. It could

10

equally be said that it is suspicious to not drive from Colorado to Maryland along I-
70.

In sum, Vasquez’s conduct does not create reasonable suspicion. What we
have here is a driver traveling from Colorado to Maryland, on a major interstate; in
an older car despite owning a newer car; with blankets and a pillow obscuring items
in the back seat; who did not have items visible that an officer expected to see; and
who was and continued to be nervous when pulled over by officers late at night.
Such conduct does not raise an inference of reasonable suspicion. Thus, we conclude
that the Officers violated Vasquez’s Fourth Amendment rights in searching his car.

B

We next turn to whether it was clearly established, at the time of the incident,
that the Officers’ actions violated Vasquez’s constitutional rights. “A right is clearly
established if it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful
in the situation.” Maresca v. Bernalillo Cty., 804 F.3d 1301, 1308 (10th Cir. 2015)
(quotation omitted). Generally, “this means that there must be a Supreme Court or
Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from
other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Id. (quotation
omitted).

We have previously held, under strikingly similar circumstances, that an
officer—in fact, one of the officers before us now—did not have reasonable
suspicion to further detain a defendant after issuing a speeding warning. Wood, 106
F.3d at 944, 948. In Wood, Officer Jimerson stopped Wood for a routine traffic

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violation. Id. at 944. After issuing a warning, Jimerson told Wood he was free to
leave, but then quickly inquired if he could ask Wood a few questions, to which
Wood agreed. Id. Jimerson asked if Wood had any narcotics or weapons, and was
told no. Id. Despite this, Jimerson asked for Wood’s consent to search the car, and
after it was denied, Jimerson “detain[ed] the car and its contents in order to subject it
to a canine search.” Id. Jimerson justified his detention of Wood based on his
observation that the he was “extremely nervous,” that the car had “trash on the floor,
including sacks from fast-food restaurants” and “open maps in the passenger
compartment,” that the car was rented, and that Wood previously had been arrested
for drug possession. Id. at 944, 946-48. Jimerson also found Wood’s travel plans
suspicious because the car was rented in a different city than the one Wood indicated,
and because, even though Wood was unemployed, he stated he was returning from a
vacation in California. Id. at 946-47. Jimerson additionally raised some concern
about California being a drug source state. Id. at 947. We held that Jimerson’s stated
reasons did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, and thus detaining Wood
after issuing the warning violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 948.

In both cases, Jimerson detained an individual because: he thought the car was
unusual (Vasquez’s older car and Wood’s rented car); the car had “unusual” but
typical items in it (Vasquez’s items covered by blankets and Wood’s trash wrappers
and maps); and the driver was nervous, leaving a drug source state, and passing
through Kansas. The facts of these cases are almost indistinguishable.

12

The district court erred in concluding that the differences between Wood and
this case were significant.4 Wood “place[s] the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate” and provides “contours [that] are sufficiently clear that a reasonable
offic[er] would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Carroll v.
Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014). Thus, at the time of the detention, it was
clearly established that the Officers did not have reasonable suspicion based upon the
articulated circumstances.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgement of the district court
and REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.5

4 In the alternative, the Officers argue Wood was overruled by the Supreme
Court in Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266. Specifically, they cite an unpublished opinion of this
court, United States v. $49,000.00 in U.S. Currency, More or Less, 208 F. App’x 651
(10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished), to claim we recognized this change in the law. But
this is incorrect. As we said in $49,000 in U.S. Currency, “the Supreme Court in
[Arvizu] reemphasized that reviewing courts must look at the totality of the
circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Id. at 656 (quotation omitted)
(emphasis added). Arvizu did not change our Fourth Amendment analysis. Further,
the panel in $49,000 in U.S. Currency did not conclude that Wood had been
overruled, but distinguished it on specific relevant facts. Compare id. at 655 (“[T]he
facts in the instant case are quite similar to the facts in Wood. However, . . . there
are additional facts . . . which justified . . . denial of appellant’s motion to
suppress.”), with id. (“Because I find this case indistinguishable from [Wood], I
respectfully dissent.” (Lucero, J., dissenting)). Arvizu did not alter our analysis, and
we continue to abide by the totality of the circumstances test, as we did in Wood.
See 106 F.3d at 946.

5 The Officers also argue Vasquez’s appeal is frivolous, and he made a false
declaration of poverty. As we reverse the district court, this appeal clearly is not
frivolous. And the Officers admit they do not have access to Vasquez’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis. Thus, the Officers cannot know whether Vasquez’s

13

declaration of poverty was truthful, and we reject their assertion that Vasquez’s
declaration was false.
14-3278, Vasquez v. Lewis

TYMKOVICH, C.J., dissenting.

This case presents a close call on reasonable suspicion. But the essence of
qualified immunity is to give government officials protection in resolving close
calls in reasonable ways. Because the majority employs a divide-and-conquer
analysis specifically rejected by the Supreme Court and because Vasquez cannot
identify clearly established law necessary to overcome qualified immunity, I
respectfully dissent.
When the defense of qualified immunity is raised, we require the plaintiff
to demonstrate (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and
(2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.
Vasquez challenges that his detention beyond the original traffic stop violated the
Fourth Amendment. But such detention is permissible where the officer has an
“objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity has occurred
or is occurring . . . .” United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th
Cir. 1994).
“[R]easonable suspicion is not, and is not meant to be, an onerous
standard.” United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting
United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206, 1219 (10th Cir. 2011)). An officer need
only have “a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting’ criminal conduct
under a totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)).
The majority, in effect, takes the district court finding and concludes that 0
+ 0 + 0 cannot = reasonable suspicion. Of course, a series of completely innocent
conduct does not create reasonable suspicion. But the Supreme Court instructs us
not to employ a “divide-and-conquer analysis” and requires us to consider the
“totality of the circumstances.” See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
In Arvizu, a particularly instructive case, the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s determination that a border patrol agent had no reasonable suspicion to
detain a minivan. The Ninth Circuit had independently examined ten factors
supporting reasonable suspicion and determined that seven of them should not be
given much weight because those factors were each readily susceptible to
innocent explanation. Id. at 274. In rejecting this approach, the Court held that
even if each factor is consistent with innocent travel, factors when taken together
can warrant further investigation. Our cases agree. See, e.g., Pettit, 785 F.3d at
1380 (“We evaluate each of the factors supporting reasonable suspicion separately
and in aggregate.”); United States v. Padilla-Esparza, 798 F.3d 993, 999 (10th
Cir. 2015); United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1133–34 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Quintana-Garcia, 343 F.3d 1266, 1270–71 (10th Cir. 2003).
Under this analysis, no factor can be given a constant weight of zero in a
reasonable suspicion equation. See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275–76 (“We think
it quite reasonable that a driver’s slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure
to acknowledge a sighted law enforcement officer might well be unremarkable in
2
one instance (such as a busy San Francisco highway) while quite unusual in
another (such as a remote portion of rural southeastern Arizona).”). Vasquez’s
story struck the officers as unusual, and when a police officer encounters a series
of unusual facts, each factor no longer carries a weight of zero; together they may
provide a “particularized and objective basis” to suspect illegal activity. Id. at
273 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18 (1981)).1
But even assuming a lack of reasonable suspicion, I would still affirm the
district court because Vasquez has not pointed to clearly established law. While
the precise conduct in question need not have been previously held unlawful,
“‘the contours of the right’ must be ‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official’
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Romero v. Story, 672
F.3d 880, 889 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185,
1206 (10th Cir. 2012)). The Supreme Court has recently emphasized that the
dispositive question is whether the violative nature of
particular conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a
1 The majority particularly objects to giving weight to a driver’s route from
a drug-source area to a drug-market area, especially in the aftermath of legalized
marijuana. I appreciate this concern. Standing alone, traveling from a drugsource
area is simply insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion and we have
held it is “at best, a weak factor” in contributing to reasonable suspicion. United
States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 2001). Although here I would
not find travel from a state that had legalized marijuana suspicious, we should
recognize, especially near borders where smuggling is common, law enforcement
can discern patterns in drug trafficking. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275–76
(reasoning that driver and passenger behavior near the Mexican border may be
assessed with regard to location).
3
broad general proposition. Such specificity is especially
important in the Fourth Amendment context, where . . . it is
sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the
relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation
the officer confront[ed].
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (internal brackets, citations, and
quotations omitted).
Vasquez points to no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case with sufficiently
analogous facts. He and the majority rely on a case where we held the police
lacked reasonable suspicion where the driver “had fast food wrappers and other
trash in his car, he had open maps out, he misidentified the place where he picked
up his rental car, and he described somewhat expensive travel plans despite being
temporarily employed.” United States v. Toledo, 139 F.3d 913 (10th Cir. 1998)
(unpublished table opinion) (describing the holding of United States v. Wood, 106
F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1997)).
I disagree that Wood clearly defines the absence of reasonable suspicion
here, especially given the multiple times we have affirmed district court decisions
finding reasonable suspicion while citing and distinguishing Wood. Consider
three examples:
(1) United States v. $49,000.00 in U.S. Currency, More or Less, 208 F.
App’x 651 (10th Cir. 2006). Officers pulled over an afternoon driver on
Interstate 70 in Kansas. The driver lived in Los Angeles but rented a car from
4
Detroit, was nervous, and had a prior arrest for possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute.
(2) Toledo, 139 F.3d 913. Officers also pulled over an afternoon driver on
Interstate 70 in Kansas. The driver gave inconsistent accounts of his travel plans
to explain why he was headed to North Carolina but the rental car needed to be
returned in California. The car smelled of air freshener, the defendant had a prior
drug conviction, and acted nervously.
(3) United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2001). Again, this
case involved an afternoon driver on Interstate 70 in Kansas. The driver was
nervous, had a two-way, short-range radio despite attesting to be traveling alone,
was not named in the rental agreement, and was traveling from a drug-source
area.
Our treatment of Wood in this line of cases “reveal[s] the hazy legal
backdrop,” against which Officers Jimerson and Lewis acted. Mullenix, 136 S.
Ct. at 309. The officers encountered a sufficiently different factual scenario than
in Wood, especially in light of almost twenty years of cases distinguishing it.
Most notably, the two cases differ in the degree of unusual travel plans.
The court in Wood declined to give any weight to Wood’s “unusual” travel plans
– driving a rental car from Sacramento to Topeka. 106 F.3d at 946–47. As a
preliminary matter, this reasoning puts Wood on shaky ground. In Wood, we
“stripp[ed] away the factors which must be disregarded because they are
5
innocuous,” 106 F.3d at 948, which is precisely what the Supreme Court warned
against in Arvizu. Regardless, Vasquez’s travel plans are sufficiently distinct as
to allow a reasonable officer to be more suspicious. Vasquez asserted he was
moving, but no items in his car aligned with his story. Vasquez was driving in
the middle of the night, apparently sleeping in his car. Vasquez was driving a
newly-purchased twenty-year-old car, despite owning a new car, and had a flimsy,
even implausible, explanation as to why.2
Because reasonable officers may differ regarding whether Vasquez’s
detention violated the Fourth Amendment, I would affirm the district court’s
finding of qualified immunity.
2 The majority characterizes that Vasquez told Trooper Lewis he bought
the newer car for his girlfriend, which explains why he was driving the older one.
But the transcript shows that Vasquez told Trooper Lewis he bought the older car
for his girlfriend, which raised Trooper Lewis’s suspicions.
[Trooper Lewis]: So, you have a 2011 Chevy Malibu too?
[Vasquez]: Yeah.
[Trooper Lewis]: Okay. And how come you’re driving the older car
across the country?
[Vasquez]: What’s that?
[Trooper Lewis]: How come you’re driving the older one across the
country?
[Vasquez]: Because I bought it for my girlfriend.
[Trooper Lewis]: This? Oh, okay.
R., Vol. I at 25–26.
6

Outcome: Reversed and remanded

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