Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.
Date: 02-28-2002
Case Number: 14-01-00353-CV
Judge: Charles W. Seymore
Court: Fourteenth Texas Court of Appeals
Plaintiff's Attorney: Todd Allan Edwards
Defendant's Attorney: Jack McKinley
Description: Bob Williamson’s daughter, Kimberly, visited the home of a friend. While she was there, the home was robbed by five young men, including Eddie Capetillo. During the robbery, Kimberly attempted to get away and Capetillo shot her with a .22 caliber pump rifle.1 She died at the scene. Kimberly’s father sued Capetillo for false imprisonment, among other claims, and a jury awarded him $100,000 for the false imprisonment claim. State Farm Lloyds refused to provide a defense in the action or pay the judgment.
* * *
In its motion for summary judgment, State Farm presented three grounds: (1) that the armed robbery and murder of Kimberly was not false imprisonment; (2) that if considered false imprisonment, the act was a willful violation of a penal statute and thus excluded from coverage; and (3) that public policy bars insurance coverage for intentional crimes. In his appeal, Williamson directs all points of error to the issue of whether the State Farm policy exclusion for willful violation of a penal statute bars coverage for false imprisonment. In his briefing, he also addresses State Farm’s public policy argument. When a trial court’s judgment rests upon more than one independent ground, as the general summary judgment does here, the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on the ground to which no complaint is made. Wright v. Fowler, 991 S.W.2d 343, 349 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); Bailey v. Rogers, 631 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, no writ). Because Williamson does not assign error to the first ground of State Farm’s motion, we affirm the summary judgment on that ground.
* * *
In his cross-motion for summary judgment, Williamson presented the following grounds: (1) collateral estoppel precludes reexamination of the jury’s verdict in the underlying case that Capetillo committed false imprisonment; (2) coverage for false imprisonment is not excluded by the policy; and (3) under proper contract interpretation, false imprisonment is covered by the policy and must be given effect.
* * *
“A party seeking to assert the bar of collateral estoppel must establish that (1) the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action; (2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first action.” Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1994). To satisfy the third prong, strict mutuality of parties is no longer required. Id. Instead, it is only necessary that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the first action. Id. An insurer and its insured do not share privity when they have a conflict of interest about the subject matter of the litigation. See Employers Cas. Co. v. Block, 744 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Tex. 1988), overruled on other grounds, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex. 1996).
A conflict of interest exists “when the injured person’s claim against the indemnitee [the insured] is such that it could be sustained on different grounds, one of which is within the indemnitor’s [the insurer’s] obligation to indemnify and another of which is not.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 58(2) (1982). “When an insurer and its insured take conflicting positions on the issue of coverage, they are not in privity.” Cluett v. Med. Protective Co., 829 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied). State Farm and Capetillo have a conflict of interest as to whether Capetillo’s conduct amounted to “willful detention or imprisonment” covered by the policy or whether it was robbery, murder, and the willful violation of a penal statute not covered by the policy. Accordingly, because there is a conflict of interest, and thus lack of privity, State Farm is not collaterally estopped from relitigating the existence of a false imprisonment. The trial court correctly overruled Williamson’s motion for summary judgment on this issue.
* * *
Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion.
Outcome: We have affirmed the summary judgment granted to State Farm on the ground that the insured’s conduct did not constitute false imprisonment. We have overruled Williamson’s complaint that the trial court erred in denying his cross-motion for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the “court of appeals may affirm the trial court’s summary judgment or reverse and render judgment on the non-prevailing party’s motion.” Holmes v. Morales, 924 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. 1996). The remaining issues in the appellate briefing and in the parties’ motions for summary judgment address whether false imprisonment was covered by the policy, and in light of our holdings, we need not consider them. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts: Unavailable
Defendant's Experts: Unavailable
Comments: None