Date: 08-28-2015

Case Style: Aaron Willey v. Robert A. Kirkpatrick

Case Number: 13-699

Judge: Katzman

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on appeal from the Western District of New York (Erie County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: RYAN A. LEMA (Timothy W. Hoover and Michael S. Silverstein, on the
brief), Phillips Lytle LLP, Buffalo, New York, for Plaintiff‐
Appellant.

Defendant's Attorney: ROBERT M. GOLDFARB, Assistant Solicitor General, for Andrea Oser,
Deputy Solicitor General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor
General, and Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the
State of New York, Albany, New York, for Defendants‐Appellees.

Description: Plaintiff‐Appellant Aaron Willey alleges that, while incarcerated in New
York, he endured a cruel campaign of harassment at the hands of corrections
officers in retaliation for his refusal to provide false information against another
inmate. The course of retaliatory conduct he alleges included smaller indignities
like frequent harassment and a week’s worth of meals that were nutritionally
inadequate. But Willey also alleges that he was on three occasions exposed to
3
unsanitary conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
most grotesque exposure Willey alleges is that officers placed him in solitary
confinement with a Plexiglas shield restricting the airflow to his small cell and
then incapacitated his toilet, so that he was reduced to breathing a miasma of his
own accumulating waste. The two other alleged exposures to unsanitary
conditions involved Willey’s detention in an observation cell whose walls and
mattress were smeared with feces and stained with urine. Willey alleges further
retaliatory conduct including theft of his legal documents, malicious prosecution,
and false imprisonment.
Willey proceeded pro se below, naming as defendants several corrections
officers and their supervisors at the Wende Correctional Facility, in Alden, New
York, where Willey was incarcerated during the events alleged in his complaint.
When these defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim, the district court (Siragusa, J.) denied the motion in its entirety. Several
years later, the district court (Telesca, J.) granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, deciding in sum and substance that Willey’s amended
complaint failed to state a claim. The district court’s grant of summary judgment
4
in part on grounds not raised by the movants, without notice to Willey or an
opportunity for him to respond, conflicts with Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. As to those grounds that were raised by the defendants, the
district court’s conclusion that Willey’s complaint failed to state a claim rested on
an erroneous legal foundation.
In this opinion, we first reiterate the proper standard for granting summary
judgment on grounds not raised by the movant, which was not met here. Second,
we clarify the standard for a claim for unconstitutional retaliation. Third, we
disagree with the district court’s analysis of Willey’s claim for unsanitary
conditions. Fourth, we revive Willey’s claims for nutritionally inadequate meals,
theft of legal documents, harassment, malicious prosecution, and false
imprisonment. Finally, we suggest to the district court that on remand Willey
receive appointed counsel, an opportunity to take further discovery, and leave to
file a second amended complaint.
5
BACKGROUND
I. Willey’s Complaint
This summary of the relevant factual background we draw principally from
the allegations in Willey’s complaint, because, as we will explore further, the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment rested entirely on the legal sufficiency
of the allegations of the complaint and not on any evidence. Willey, pro se, filed
his original typewritten complaint on August 31, 2007, and filed his handwritten
amended complaint on April 7, 2010. Because they are substantively identical,
with one exception discussed below, this recitation cites to allegations in the
original complaint, all of which appear also in the amended complaint. Compare
Compl., J.A. 17–36, with Am. Compl., J.A. 158–172.
Beginning at age 18, Willey was incarcerated at the Wende Correctional
Facility in Alden, New York, from April 2004 until October 2006, although during
this period he was housed for five months at the Central New York Psychiatric
Facility. The events giving rise to this suit all occurred at Wende, and the
defendants are Wende corrections officers, hearing officers, and their supervisors
who were employed there during Willey’s incarceration. Willey alleges that, on
6
October 15, 2005, he was approached on his way to evening recreation by
Sergeant Scott Lambert, who stopped Willey and requested identification.
Corrections officer Taylor Roberts then performed a pat frisk of Willey, which
uncovered nothing unusual. Nevertheless, Roberts handcuffed Willey and
escorted him “into a room with no cameras or witnesses present.” J.A. 20. In this
room, Willey alleges, the following took place:
I was questioned by defendant LAMBERT about another prisoner
who was supposedly smuggling drugs into the prison. I explained
that I had no knowledge or recollection of involvement with this
person, nor did I even know who this person was. Defendant
LAMBERT then opened a desk drawer and pulled out what
appeared to be a weapon or piece of metal. Defendant LAMBERT
placed this piece of metal on the desk between us, and threatened me
by stating, “Either you work with us as an informant or you are
going to be charged with a weapon.” At this time I stopped talking
completely, to which defendant LAMBERT responded, “Have it your
way.” Corrections officers then took me to the WCF special housing
unit (solitary confinement) where I was in fact falsely imprisoned.
Id. 1
1 In this and subsequent quotations from Willey’s complaint, the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the district court decision, we
have taken the liberty of correcting typographical errors for clarity’s sake.
7
Two days later, on October 17, Willey “was issued a false misbehavior
report alleging false charges that [he] was in possession of a weapon/contraband.”
Id. At a hearing held on October 19, Willey was adjudged guilty of the shankpossession
charge, but he alleges that he was never told that the hearing was to
occur nor provided with the opportunity to attend or to present witnesses or
evidence. Willey appealed internally to the statewide Special Housing Unit
director in Albany, Donald Selsky, who reversed the finding of guilt and ordered
a new hearing. At the new hearing, Willey was allowed to appear, but the hearing
officer Martain Kerney allegedly threatened to beat Willey and called him a
“young punk.” Id. at 22. Kerney eventually ejected Willey and found him guilty in
absentia, sentencing him on December 28, 2005, principally to 180 days of solitary
confinement (also known as Special Housing Unit or the “S.H.U.”). Willey filed
another appeal with Selsky.
With his appeal pending, Willey remained in solitary confinement. Willey
alleges that he was “continuously harassed psychologically, emotionally,
verbally, and sexually by corrections officers but particularly by defendant A.
ALLESSANDRO.” Id. at 28. This conduct included, while watching Willey
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shower, Sergeant Allessandro “licking his lips and blowing kisses toward
[Willey].” Id. Just over a month into his time in solitary confinement, on
November 26, 2005, Willey alleges that he was escorted by Allessandro and
corrections officer M. Sztuk to the shower, and upon Willey’s return found his cell
“trashed, i.e., toilet flooded, water all over; legal paperwork, books, personal
letters scattered all over and out of their original places.” Id. at 23. That evening,
Willey asked Sztuk for a search contraband slip to document what happened, to
which Sztuk responded by threatening Willey with worse punishments if he
persisted.
Willey also allegedly learned from other inmates confined near his cell that
they had seen Sztuk removing Willey’s “rolled up legal paperwork.” Id. at 24.
Willey then shouted that he wanted to speak to a supervisor, to which
Allessandro replied that Willey should give it a rest or he would soon be moved
to the restricted side of solitary. “I’m not giving it a rest—you people stole my
legal paperwork,” answered Willey. Id. Sztuk then responded, “What’s that
Willey, you said you are going to ‘shit us down’?,” prison argot for throwing
feces or urine at a corrections officer. Id. Willey denied having made the threat.
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Because Allessandro and Sztuk said that Willey made this threat against
them, he was moved to the restricted side of solitary, and a Plexiglas cell shield
was placed over the bars, preventing air circulation. In Willey’s complaint, he
alleges:
For the entire duration of time I was behind the cell shields,
defendant A. ALLESSANDRO subjected me to various forms of
harassment including turning off my toilet water pressure, so that I
couldn’t flush my toilet, thereby forcing me to stay in a cell with
restricted air circulation and breathe in urine/feces odors. At all times
mentioned defendant JEFF JESZORSKI was the acting sergeant
supervising defendants A. ALLESSANDRO, M. SZTUK, and M.
OVERHUFF, and allowed them to harass plaintiff, and abdicated his
legal duty to stop and prevent above‐listed defendants from
harassing plaintiff; defendant JEFF JESZORSKI also participated in
harassing plaintiff.
Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
Sztuk issued Willey an allegedly false misbehavior report, on November 28,
2005, which stated that Sztuk had read Willey’s lips and that Willey had mouthed
a threat to throw his waste at Sztuk. After a hearing at which Willey testified and
cross‐examined Sztuk, Willey was found guilty and sentenced principally to 90
days of solitary confinement. Willey once again filed an appeal with Selsky.
10
On December 18, 2005, corrections officer M. Overhuff approached Willey’s
cell after dinner. Willey alleges:
I placed my cups, tray, and utensils on the feed‐up port so defendant
OVERHUFF could see I was turning everything in (this was my
usual practice). However, defendant M. OVERHUFF purposely with
intent to harass and annoy plaintiff refused to take my garbage. On
December 19, 2005, I was issued a false misbehavior report written by
defendant M. OVERHUFF alleging I refused to turn in my garbage
on December 18, 2005.
Id. at 26–27. For the week before the hearing on this misbehavior report, Deputy
Superintendent of Security M. Monahan placed Willey on a pre‐hearing restricted
diet that, Willey alleges, was “most definitely cruel and unusual punishment as
per it consists of nothing more than a loaf of bread (usually stale) and dried‐up
cabbage.” Id. at 27.
At the hearing for this misbehavior report on January 3, 2006, hearing
officer Tom Schoellkopfl allegedly refused to permit Willey to question a witness
and then removed Willey from the hearing. Schoellkopfl then allegedly told
Willey, “You are going to die in the S.H.U.—you young punk.” Id. at 28.
Schoellkopfl found Willey guilty and sentenced him on January 10, 2006,
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principally to 30 days of solitary confinement. As he had with each previous
finding of guilt, Willey filed an administrative appeal with Selsky.
Willey left solitary confinement on February 9, 2006:
All of the above‐noted harassments that I was being subjected to
resulted in my becoming severely depressed and attempting suicide
by swallowing numerous ibuprofen pills. . . . I was taken via
ambulance to Erie County Medical Center. While inside the
ambulance, I was strapped down to a gurney, handcuffed, and
shackled. Someone inserted a needle into my arm and someone
placed a gas mask over my face. From this point forward I don’t
remember anything until I woke up strapped to a bed in ECMC.
Id. at 29. Willey alleges that, before suffering the cruelty of Wende’s officers, he
“had no significant mental‐health issues and was not taking any mental‐health
medication.” Id. He attributes to the officers’ conduct “a significant amount” of
his mental‐health problems. Id.
When Willey returned from the hospital to Wende, he was placed “into a
mental‐health observation cell that was extremely filthy and smelled of
urine/feces.” Id. Willey remained “naked in the observation cell for 14 days”
before he was transferred to the Central New York State Psychiatric Center for
about five months. Id. When he returned to Wende, on July 28, 2006, Willey was
once again placed “into an extremely dirty observation cell,” which “had urine
12
stains on the floor and fecal stains on the walls and mattress. The smell in the cell
was extremely bad.” Id. at 30. Willey remained there until August 24, 2006, when
he was sent back to solitary confinement.
The final misbehavior report issued to Willey was served the next day and
alleged that he had “kicked a corrections officer while in handcuffs and feet
restraints on February 10, 2006,” while he was being returned to Wende from the
hospital. Id. Following a hearing, Schoellkopfl found Willey guilty and sentenced
him principally to 180 days of solitary confinement. Willey once again appealed
to Selsky.
Willey sent a letter to Wende Superintendent Robert A. Kirkpatrick on
September 17, 2006, which related Willey’s belief that he had been falsely charged
and unfairly sentenced to solitary confinement and also requested his release to
the general population within Wende. By letter dated October 4, 2006, Kirkpatrick
declined to take action. Willey also filed with the Attorney General of the State of
New York a Notice of Intention to File a Claim, see N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 10,
concerning Willey’s treatment in custody. Finally, on October 19, 2006, Willey was
transferred from Wende to the Attica Correctional Facility.
13
Many of the administrative appeals that Willey filed with Selsky met with
success. In addition to his first appeal, already mentioned, which prevailed on
procedural grounds, Willey’s appeal from his conviction for possession of the
shank was also successful—Selsky reversed that conviction on February 28, 2006.
That same day, Selsky also reversed the conviction related to dinner‐tray
collection. These decisions arrived a few weeks after Willey’s attempted suicide.
Selsky did affirm, on February 17, 2006, the conviction for Willey’s threatening to
throw feces or urine at Sztuk. Selsky also affirmed, on December 5, 2006, the
conviction for Willey’s kicking an officer, although Selsky halved the sentence
from six months of punishment to three months. Willey served this sentence at
Attica.
Willey learned, on November 28, 2006, after his transfer to Attica, that he
had been criminally charged in Alden Town Court for the same alleged
conduct—possessing a shank—for which he was originally punished with
solitary confinement and on which he prevailed in his first two administrative
appeals. The criminal charge was allegedly supported by a deposition from
Roberts attesting that Willey had possessed the shank at Wende. Willey again
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denied having ever possessed a shank, both in person and in a lengthy letter to
the presiding judge, Justice LaDuca, who dismissed the criminal charges on April
3, 2007.
II. Proceedings Below
All these alleged facts appeared in Willey’s complaint, which the
defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court (Siragusa, J.) denied the motion in its entirety,
finding that Willey’s allegations stated viable claims and that the defendants were
not entitled to qualified immunity. See J.A. 119–28, Decision and Order, Willey v.
Kirkpatrick et al., No. 07‐cv‐6484 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009). The district court noted
that, although false misbehavior reports generally do not give rise to a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they do when combined with a deprivation of due process
at the resulting hearing or when done in retaliation for the exercise of a
constitutional right. The district court observed “that it is unclear whether there is
a constitutional right ‘not to snitch.’ ” Id. at 125 n.2.
The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge for “nondispositive
pre‐trial matters.” Id. at 128. The defendants answered on October 23,
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2009, denying all of the complaint’s allegations and admitting only that they were
employed at Wende in 2005. Willey moved for partial summary judgment on
January 11, 2010. This motion was denied sua sponte by the district court without
prejudice to its reassertion after discovery concluded. Willey, with leave from the
district court, filed his amended complaint on April 7, 2010, and the defendants
filed an identical answer on June 14, 2010. The defendants answered
interrogatories but were not deposed. The defendants moved for summary
judgment on February 21, 2012. Willey opposed that motion and moved for
appointment of counsel on March 22, 2012. The district court denied Willey’s
motion for appointment of counsel on May 2, 2012. With the motion for summary
judgment fully briefed, Judge Siragusa ordered the case transferred to Judge
Telesca on January 24, 2013. Eleven days later, Judge Telesca granted summary
judgment to the defendants in a 26‐page decision, the decision from which Willey
takes this appeal. See J.A. 656–81, Decision and Order, Willey v. Kirkpatrick et al.,
No. 07‐cv‐6484 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2013).
The defendants’ Rule 56 statement in support of their motion for summary
judgment was unusual, spanning only ten paragraphs of facts about which, they
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contended, “there is no genuine issue to be tried.” J.A. 607. The first two
paragraphs of the Rule 56 statement recited that Willey was incarcerated at
Wende and that the defendants worked there. The next seven paragraphs
recounted some of the allegations Willey made in his complaint, and the final
paragraph noted that the defendants denied all the claims in their answer. See id.
at 607–09. The defendants attached as evidence only Willey’s Certified Inmate
Record. See id. at 614–23.
The defendants’ brief in support of their motion for summary judgment
was similarly unorthodox. In its telling, the defendants:
move[d] for summary judgment on a variety of grounds: that the
plaintiff has nothing more than his own subjective belief that he has
been subjected to unlawful harassment stemming from false
misbehavior reports, and [that] the alleged incidents do not amount
to a legally cognizable claim upon which relief can be granted as a
matter of law.
Id. at 624–25. In keeping with this framing, the brief argued that various of the
claims in Willey’s complaint were legally insufficient, e.g., “Claim[s] against
defendants Lambert and Roberts fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted as a matter of law.” Id. at 626. The defendants’ brief characterized the
claims in Willey’s complaint as seeking redress for (1) being placed in mechanical
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restraints; (2) being ejected from a hearing; (3) having his cell “trash[ed]” and
property stolen; and (4) being confined behind cell shields, being issued false
misbehavior reports, and receiving inadequate nutrition. See id. at 626–30. The
defendants also urged that respondeat superior was an insufficient basis on which
to sustain a constitutional claim against Superintendent Kirkpatrick. See id. at 630.
Willey opposed the motion with an eight‐page document that contained
both legal arguments and factual averrals. He styled the document as a
declaration, writing, “I, Aaron Willey, do hereby declare under penalty of perjury
that all of the foregoing information is true to the best of my knowledge and
belief.” Id. at 651. Willey’s declaration pointed out that the defendants’ brief
covered only some of his claims, stating that “there are other events not described
by the defendants that constituted violations of the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights,” including malicious prosecution and unsanitary conditions of
confinement. Id. at 645.
The district court’s February 4, 2013 decision and order (Telesca, J.), from
which this appeal is taken, began with a recitation of facts “drawn from the
pleadings and discovery documents on file,” and viewed in the light most
18
favorable to Willey. Id. at 657. The decision recounted five principal incidents
alleged in the complaint: (1) the October 2005 misbehavior report for possessing a
weapon and the resulting solitary confinement; (2) the November 2005
misbehavior report for threatening to attack officers with human waste and the
resulting cell shields and water shut‐off; (3) the December 2005 misbehavior
report for refusing to turn in a food tray and the resulting restricted diet; (4) the
harassment in solitary confinement and the resulting suicide attempt and
confinements in the mental‐health observation cells; and (5) the August 2006
misbehavior report for kicking an officer. See id. at 658–63.
In its analysis, the district court first noted that “to maintain an actionable
claim against correction[s] officers for filing a false misbehavior report, the inmate
must be able to show either (1) that he was disciplined without adequate due
process as a result of the report; or (2) that the report was issued in retaliation for
exercising a constitutionally protected right.” Id. at 666–67. The district court
analyzed only the first of these options, stating, “Willey ha[d] not alleged that the
misbehavior reports were issued in retaliation for his exercise of a constitutionally
protected right.” Id. at 667. The district court reasoned that although Willey’s
19
exclusion from the disciplinary hearing “was violative of Willey’s state regulatory
rights . . . , his federal constitutional rights were not violated thereby.” Id. at 669.
Turning to the alleged destruction of Willey’s property, including legal
documents, the district court stated that “even the intentional destruction of an
inmate’s property by a prison officer does not violate the Due Process Clause if
the state provides that inmate with an adequate post‐deprivation remedy.” Id.
Accordingly, Willey’s claim that Sztuk and Allessandro “stole legal documents
from his cell, and destroyed his personal property” failed to state “an actionable
constitutional claim because New York state law provides him with an adequate
post‐deprivation remedy, i.e., § 9 of the Court of Claims Act.” Id. at 669–70.
Regarding the claim of harassment, the district court reasoned that because
Willey did not allege “uninvited physical or sexual contact” by Allessandro, his
“annoying conduct and comments, unaccompanied by physical threats or attacks,
do not amount to a constitutional violation.” Id. at 671.
The district court then analyzed Willey’s claim for unsanitary conditions of
confinement, notwithstanding that the defendants “failed to address [it] in their
motion for summary judgment.” Id. Canvassing our precedents and those of sister
20
circuits, the district court discerned a circuit split “[w]here an inmate’s exposure
to waste lasts for three or four days.” Id. at 674 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The district court found Willey’s allegations insufficient:
Especially because Willey has adequately pleaded maliciously willful
conduct by C.O. Allessandro, rather than mere negligence, the
alleged shut‐off of the running water to Willey’s toilet for several
days places this case on the borderline between the levels of
discomfort to be expected in prison and unacceptable, inhumane
conditions. After reviewing the cases cited above, however, the Court
concludes that on the particular facts presented here, Willey’s
conditions‐of‐confinement claim cannot withstand summary
judgment. First, Willey is vague as to the dates that the alleged shutoff
occurred, and has made conflicting allegations about the duration
(“extensive lengths of time” versus “seven days” versus the time
between December 1, 2005, and January 10, 2006). Second, Willey has
not claimed that human waste from his toilet overflowed into his cell.
Third, Willey has not claimed that he suffered sickness or other ill
effects as a result of the malodorous atmosphere caused by the water
shut‐off.
Id. at 675–76 (citations omitted).
Finally, the district court also found insufficient Willey’s claim for
inadequate nutrition while placed on a restricted diet for one week by Monahan.
“Courts in this Circuit routinely have dismissed claims similar to Willey’s, finding
that the inmate failed to establish that he experienced a sufficiently serious
deprivation for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 677–78. Accordingly,
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the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
dismissed Willey’s Amended Complaint in its entirety. This appeal timely
followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review and Summary Judgment
Our standards of review are familiar. We review de novo a dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and we must reverse if the complaint
contains sufficient factual matter that, accepted as true, states a plausible claim for
relief. See Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 711 F.3d 261, 267 (2d Cir. 2013). We employ the
same standard of review for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). See
Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010). And we review de novo a
grant of summary judgment under Rule 56, construing all evidence in the light
most favorable to the non‐moving party. See Ruggiero v. Cty. of Orange, 467 F.3d
170, 173 (2d Cir. 2006). We affirm summary judgment only where “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Because Willey was pro se below, we must
22
interpret his papers liberally “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”
Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
The parties disagree about the standard we should use to review the
decision below. Willey, who is counseled on appeal, argues that we should
review the decision as having been made under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c)
because it “essentially accepted the facts as alleged in Mr. Willey’s complaint, and
dismissed each claim for failure to state a claim based on those allegations.”
Appellant’s Br. 19. The defendants, by contrast, urge us to review the decision as
a routine grant of summary judgment. “The fact that the district court found that
certain of plaintiff’s allegations, even with evidentiary support, failed to state
viable claims at all does not alter the procedural context of the court’s order—a
duly interposed motion for summary judgment by defendants . . . .” Appellees’
Br. 12.
It is true, as Willey contends, that the district court’s decision rested entirely
on its view that Willey’s complaint failed to state a claim for which relief may be
granted. Without engaging in any consideration of facts produced by the limited
discovery in this case, the district court nominally granted summary judgment
23
under Rule 56 but was in effect granting judgment as a matter of law on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c). Cf. Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 n.2 (7th Cir.
1989) (“Without expressly saying so, the district court by granting summary
judgment, effectively on the pleadings, treated the motion as one to dismiss under
[Rule] 12(b)(6).”). But the distinction is immaterial to our standard of review,
which we conduct de novo in either case, and we see no reason why legal issues
may not be decided at summary judgment.
But a grant of summary judgment must comport with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 56 does permit a sua sponte grant of summary judgment
dismissing a claim—but only under certain conditions. Entitled “Judgment
Independent of the Motion,” Rule 56(f) permits a district court to grant summary
judgment “on grounds not raised by a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2). But a district
court may do so only “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time to respond.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Because the district court did not provide Willey with notice
that it would consider grounds not raised in the defendants’ brief in support of
their motion, we must vacate the judgment to the extent that it exceeded the
grounds raised in that motion.
24
The motion was threadbare. The district court itself acknowledged that it
was providing more to the defendants than their motion sought, writing that the
defendants “failed to address this conditions‐of‐confinement claim in their
motion for summary judgment.” J.A. 671. For this reason alone, we would
reinstate Willey’s claim for unsanitary conditions of confinement. Some of the
claims that the defendants did cursorily address in their motion were
nevertheless decided by the district court on grounds not raised in the motion. To
do so without notice and an opportunity to respond runs counter to Rule 56(f).
The defendants did address, for example, Willey’s claim for theft of his
legal documents, but their only argument was a non sequitur: Willey “alleges no
facts tending to show that, in an ordinary random cell search, property is not
seized and cells are not turned upside down and inside out.” J.A. 628. The district
court wisely declined to dismiss Willey’s claim on that reasoning. Instead, the
district court held that there could be no claim even for intentional deprivation of
property where the state provides an adequate post‐deprivation remedy, here,
section 9 of the New York Court of Claims Act. Even if it were true that this
generic property‐deprivation law provides an adequate remedy for the theft of
25
legal documents, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on that
claim, without notice to Willey or an opportunity for him to respond, on grounds
that appeared nowhere in the defendants’ moving papers.
Accordingly, we cannot affirm the judgment of the district court as to those
parts of its decision that rested on grounds not raised by the defendants. Those
parts include the claim for unsanitary conditions, the claim for theft of legal
documents, and the claim for harassment. See J.A. 626–30. They also include
Willey’s claims for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, which went
unmentioned both in the motion and the decision, and which we discuss further
below. This conclusion does not end our discussion, because we identify a
number of critical legal errors, which the district court, we respectfully conclude,
committed in analyzing the sufficiency of several of Willey’s allegations.
II. Retaliation
The first of the many allegedly false misbehavior reports that Willey
received charged him with possession of a shank. In general, a “prison inmate has
no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused
of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”
26
Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986). The district court correctly
noted two exceptions to this rule: when an inmate is “able to show either (1) that
he was disciplined without adequate due process as a result of the report; or (2)
that the report was issued in retaliation for exercising a constitutionally protected
right.” J.A. 666–67 (citing Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951–53, and Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d
584, 589–90 (2d Cir. 1988)). The district court analyzed only the first of these
exceptions, reasoning that “Willey has not alleged that the misbehavior reports
were issued in retaliation for his exercise of a constitutionally protected right.” Id.
at 667.
In considering whether Willey received adequate due process, the district
court noted that in New York an inmate has the right to “ ‘be present at the
hearing unless he refuses to attend, or is excluded for reason of institutional
safety or correctional goals.’ ” Id. (quoting N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 7,
§ 254.6(a)(2)). Accordingly, “it was violative of Willey’s state regulatory rights to
be excluded” from the hearings from which he was ejected or of which he was not
informed. J.A. 669. But “a claim under state law does not necessarily provide a
viable due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. at 668. The district court
27
stated that Willey’s “right to be personally present” at the hearing was not
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974)).
Our reading of Wolff does not comport with the conclusion that the
Constitution permits wholesale exclusion of an inmate from a disciplinary
hearing. The plaintiffs in Wolff brought a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
Nebraska’s prisoner‐discipline process. The Supreme Court sought an
“accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of
the Constitution that are of general application,” rejecting Nebraska’s argument
that “the interest of prisoners in disciplinary procedures is not included in that
‘liberty’ protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556–57.
Accordingly, serious prison discipline like Willey’s punishment in solitary
confinement must meet “the minimum requirements of procedural due process
appropriate for the circumstances.” Id. at 558.
The Supreme Court elaborated that among those requirements are
“advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement of the
factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary
28
action taken.” Id. at 563. Additionally, “the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings
should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his
defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to
institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id. at 566. Yet the Court declined to
require the full panoply of procedural protections prescribed for parole
revocation by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1974). Specifically, Wolff
declined to extend to internal prisoner‐discipline hearings the rights of
“confrontation and cross‐examination[, which] present greater hazards to
institutional interests.”418 U.S. at 567. The Court was particularly sensitive to the
possible harm that could result from permitting cross‐examination of an inmateinformant,
acknowledging that the risks of cross‐examining guards “may be less.”
Id. at 568–69. The Court thus declined to require prisons to permit crossexamination
“at the present time,” leaving open the possibility that “[p]erhaps as
the problems of penal institutions change and correctional goals are reshaped, the
balance of interests involved will require otherwise.” Id. at 568.
Even assuming that the last forty years have not altered this balance to
require that an inmate has the right to cross‐examine guards who accuse that
29
inmate of misconduct, we read Willey’s due‐process claim to concern those rights
that Wolff did establish. Indeed, Willey’s first administrative appeal prevailed
because Wende failed to afford him his right to “advance written notice of the
claimed violation,” id. at 563, and his complaint alleges, “I was never informed
that a hearing was taking place or ever asked if I wanted to attend,” J.A. 21.
Willey further alleges:
In this situation I was never given the opportunity to appear at the
tier hearing, or call witnesses, or present rebuttal evidence, nor was I
ever made aware that any hearing was being commenced. In
addition I was not given a written disposition by the fact finders as to
the evidence relied upon for their decision.
Id.
These alleged procedural infirmities are, if true, repugnant not only to New
York regulations but also to the Due Process Clause as construed by Wolff. And
although not specifically mentioned in Wolff, the threats of physical abuse or new
criminal charges allegedly made by hearing officers to Willey in an effort to
induce him to plead guilty, see id. at 22, are incompatible with any notion of due
process. Furthermore, Willey’s ejection from several hearings may be actionable
to the extent that it implicates his right to call witnesses and present evidence
30
rather than any right to cross‐examination. The district court conflated these
distinct concepts in characterizing Willey’s complaint as alleging a violation of
“the right to be personally present.” Id. at 668. Nevertheless, we do not conclude
on this record that Willey’s procedural rights were infringed or address whether
the administrative appeals process with which he eventually found some success
adequately cured any infringements.
An error of omission also affected the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on Willey’s claim for retaliation. The district court acknowledged that a
false misbehavior report was actionable if done in retaliation for the exercise of a
constitutional right but concluded, without elaboration, that “Willey has not
alleged that the misbehavior reports were issued in retaliation for his exercise of a
constitutionally protected right.” Id. at 667. This analytical leap is somewhat
surprising in light of the previous district judge’s decision on the motion to
dismiss, which noted “that it is unclear whether there is a constitutional right ‘not
to snitch.’ ” Id. at 125 n.2. The previous district judge correctly noted that we have
previously left unresolved the question of whether such a right—the right to not
become an informant—exists. See Allah v. Juchnewioz, No. 93‐cv‐8813, 1999 WL
31
562100, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1999) (holding that the plaintiff’s “claimed
conduct—his refusal to snitch when asked in the presence of other inmates—is
protected”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Allah v. Juchenwioz, 176 F. App’x 187,
189 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to reach question of whether “a prisoner enjoys a
constitutional right not to become an informant”).
Construing Willey’s complaint in its most favorable light, it alleges that the
first misbehavior report for possessing a weapon was issued to him in direct
retaliation for his refusal to provide false information to Roberts and Lambert
about an inmate whom Willey did not know. See J.A. 20. The only inference we
need draw to reach this conclusion is that Willey was telling the truth when he
said he knew nothing about the alleged smuggler of contraband and that the
officers pressed him to tell them what they wanted to hear notwithstanding
Willey’s actual lack of knowledge.
Was this refusal constitutionally protected? In the context of deciding
whether substantive due process protects a right that is deeply rooted in our
traditions, the Supreme Court has counseled that we should analyze “the most
specific level at which . . . the asserted right can be identified,” Michael H. v. Gerald
32
D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion), and we have said that the “first
step . . . is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed,” Pabon v.
Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 252–53 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
271 (1994)). Although the intransitive verb “to snitch” does not yet merit a
mention in Black’s Law Dictionary, we understand it to signify the act of
providing information to a person in authority about another’s wrongdoing.
“Snitching” carries a connotation, if not the denotation, of providing truthful
information that inculpates the wrongdoer. Accordingly, we think that “the right
not to snitch,” as the previous district court judge labeled it, perhaps
misconstrues—but certainly fails to identify at its most specific level—the right
Willey allegedly exercised in refusing to tell officers the lies he claims they
wanted to hear about his knowledge of a suspected smuggler’s activities.
On appeal, Willey urges that his “right to refuse to perjure himself or give
false information about another (and to testify truthfully, if he testified), is
constitutionally protected.” Appellants’ Br. 38. But it may be that the most specific
level at which to identify the putative right protecting Willey’s refusal is the right
of an inmate to refuse to provide false information to a corrections officer. Cf.
33
Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 241 (2d Cir. 2011) (identifying as protected by the
First Amendment a citizen’s “right to reject governmental efforts to require him to
make statements he believes are false”). In any event, the existence of that specific
right is inadequately presented by the briefing, so we decline to resolve it.
Whether such a right exists under the First, Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth
Amendments, and whether it was not clearly established such that officers who
may have violated it should be entitled to qualified immunity, are questions we
leave to the district court to decide in the first instance.
III. Unsanitary Conditions of Confinement
Willey alleged three periods of confinement in unsanitary conditions: in
solitary confinement with a cell encapsulated by a Plexiglas cell shield; in a
mental‐health observation cell where he was left naked for two weeks in February
2006; and again in another observation cell from July 28 to August 24, 2006. The
district court discussed only the first of these in its decision granting summary
judgment. The district court found this allegation insufficient for three reasons: (1)
“Willey is vague as to the dates that the alleged shut‐off occurred, and has made
conflicting allegations about the duration,” from seven days to about seven
34
weeks, (2) “Willey has not claimed that human waste from his toilet overflowed
into his cell,” and (3) “Willey has not claimed that he suffered sickness or other ill
effects as a result of the malodorous atmosphere caused by the water shut‐off.”
J.A. 675–76.
We reject this constrained conception of the Eighth Amendment’s
protections against unsanitary conditions of confinement. A brief tour of the
applicable case law, as ably canvassed by the district court, will aid our
discussion. The Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons,”
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), but prisons nevertheless “must
provide humane conditions of confinement,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994). A claim under for violations of the Eighth Amendment requires (1) an
“objectively, sufficiently serious . . . denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities” and (2) a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” on the part of the
responsible official. Id. at 834 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Our most recent opinion in this area is Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156 (2d
Cir. 2001), which reinstated an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim for exposure to
human waste. In that case, the plaintiff had alleged that “on several days the area
35
directly in front of [his] cell was filled with human feces, urine, and sewage
water.” Id. at 161. The district court found that these conditions “were neither
severe nor protracted enough to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation,” but we reversed because we were “unwilling to adopt as a matter of
law the principle that it is not cruel and unusual punishment for prison officials
knowingly to allow an area to remain filled with sewage and excrement for days
on end.” Id. at 162, 166.
This sentiment was in keeping with our decision from a generation earlier,
LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1974). There, an inmate spent five days
in a cell whose toilet was a grate‐covered hole in the floor, which could be flushed
only from outside the cell. “Causing a man to live, eat and perhaps sleep in close
confines with his own human waste is too debasing and degrading to be
permitted. The indecent conditions that existed in this . . . cell seriously
threatened the physical and mental soundness of its unfortunate occupant.” Id. at
978. And even before LaReau, we found an Eighth Amendment violation in part
because the cell in which the plaintiff was confined for a month was “fetid and
reeking from the stench of the bodily wastes of previous occupants which . . .
36
covered the floor, the sink, and the toilet.” Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 522
(2d Cir. 1967).
Our sister circuits are broadly in accord. See, e.g., McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d
1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 2001) (vacating in part dismissal where the plaintiff alleged
that he was forced to live “in squalor—more specifically, a feces‐covered cell—for
three days”); Sperow v. Melvin, 182 F.3d 922, 1999 WL 450786, at *2 (7th Cir. June
24, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (reversing dismissal where inmate was
“subjected to appalling conditions for three full days” including feces and urine
on the walls and mattress); Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 365 (3d Cir. 1992) (“It
would be an abomination of the Constitution to force a prisoner to live in his own
excrement for four days in a stench that not even a fellow prisoner could stand.”),
superseded on other grounds by Pub. L. No. 104‐134, 100 Stat. 1321 (1996); McCord v.
Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 846–47 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an inmate’s sleeping for
two years on the floors of “roach‐infested, windowless, unlighted cells[,] into
which rain water and backed‐up sewage leaked” on occasion, established
unsanitary‐conditions claim); Williams v. Adams, 935 F.2d 960, 961–62 (8th Cir.
1991) (reversing summary judgment where verified complaint alleged that during
37
13‐day period “the toilet in the cell did not work, and that it continually ran over
and leaked onto the cell floor and the floor stayed filthy with its waste” (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted)). But see Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265,
269 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment to defendants where plaintiff
alleged “an overflowed toilet in his cell for four days”).
From this body of case law, the district court discerned a circuit split
“[w]here an inmate’s exposure to waste lasts for three or four days.” J.A. 674
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although locating this durational divide
around three or four days’ exposure to human waste, the district court
38
nevertheless found that Willey’s complaint, which alleged, at a minimum,2 seven
days’ exposure, failed to state a claim. We disagree.
Indeed, we find erroneous each of the three apparently independent
grounds given by the district court for dismissing Willey’s claim for unsanitary
conditions of confinement. The first two aim to set a minimum duration and
minimum severity of an exposure for it to reach the level of a constitutional
violation. We agree that there are many exposures of inmates to unsanitary
conditions that do not amount to a constitutional violation, but we reject the
district court’s conclusion that there is any bright‐line durational requirement for
2 The parties dispute whether Willey should be held to a particular sentence
in his original complaint summarizing his claims against Allessandro, who
“purposefully shut plaintiff’s toilet water and drinking water off for extensive
lengths of time, and plaintiff’s toilet water was turned off for a period of seven (7)
days, forcing plaintiff to stay in a cell with a Plexiglas shield (no air circulation)
and breathe in air smelling of urine/feces from a non‐flushable toilet in direct
violation of the 8th Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Compl. ¶ 87,
J.A. 34. This sentence was omitted from Willey’s hand‐written amended
complaint, which was otherwise substantively identical. See Am. Compl. ¶ 87, J.A.
171. Even if the operative pleading were not the amended complaint or Willey
were held to the omitted sentence alleging only seven days’ exposure, we would
still find that he stated a claim for which relief can be granted. Accordingly, we
need not reach this issue. Willey’s recovery on this claim at trial, if any, will be
bound by the admissible evidence he adduces showing his exposure to
unsanitary conditions, whether for seven days, seven weeks, or otherwise.
39
a viable unsanitary‐conditions claim. Nor is there some minimal level of
grotesquerie required, which goes unmet by an inmate’s accumulating human
waste that fills a toilet but does not “overflow[] into his cell.” Id. at 675.
Instead, our decisions and those of other circuits evaluate the product of
these two components—whether exposure to human waste is cruel and unusual
depends on both the duration and the severity of the exposure. Where, for
example, an exposure to human waste lasts merely ten minutes, but that exposure
takes the form of working in a well while facing “a shower of human excrement
without protective clothing and equipment,” a jury may find an Eighth
Amendment violation. See Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1151 (8th Cir. 1990).
Spending three days in that well was not required to state a claim. Likewise, a less
severe exposure may be constitutionally permissible if rectified in short order but
may become cruel and unusual with the prolonged passage of time. See McCord,
927 F.2d at 846–47 (holding that occasional sewage backup onto cell floor on
which inmate slept over two‐year period, among other conditions, violated
Eighth Amendment).
40
The severity of an exposure may be less quantifiable than its duration, but
its qualitative offense to a prisoner’s dignity should be given due consideration.
Here, the district court’s analysis did not appear to consider the effect that the cell
shields would have in exponentially amplifying the grotesquerie of the odor of
the accumulating waste. Another relevant consideration increases the severity of
Willey’s second alleged exposure, which the district court did not discuss. Over
those fourteen days in a filthy cell, Willey alleges that he was kept naked and
without access to clothing. We do not mean to set out any precise formula—we
do not say, for example, that this 14‐day exposure without clothing was more or
less grave than the later 28‐day exposure with clothing—but any analysis must
consider both the duration and the severity of an inmate’s experience of being
exposed to unsanitary conditions.
Finally, the district court’s imposition of a third requirement—that an
inmate “claim[] that he suffered sickness or other ill effects” to establish a
violation, J.A. 676—fares no better. Although the seriousness of the harms
suffered is relevant to calculating damages and may shed light on the severity of
an exposure, serious injury is unequivocally not a necessary element of an Eighth
41
Amendment claim. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992). Even if such
harm were required, Willey plainly alleged that his mental‐health problems and
attempted suicide followed the campaign of retaliation of which the unsanitary
conditions of his confinement were a prominent part.
For these reasons, independent of the reaching of grounds not raised by the
movants without notice and an opportunity to respond, we vacate the dismissal
of Willey’s claim for unsanitary conditions of confinement.
IV. Additional Claims Reinstated
A. Nutritionally Inadequate Food
The Eighth Amendment requires “nutritionally adequate food that is
prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate
danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume it.” Robles v.
Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The district court acknowledged that Willey’s complaint alleges that
“the bread was usually stale and the cabbage usually rotten.” J.A. 676.
Accordingly, notwithstanding that “[c]ourts in this Circuit routinely have
dismissed” inadequate‐nutrition claims, id. at 677, Willey’s claim is not that all
42
restricted diets are unconstitutional, but that the particular food he received was.
Especially in light of the liberality courts must show to pro se pleadings, we find
that Willey adequately pleaded this claim by alleging that his restricted diet was
unusually unhealthy.
B. Theft of Legal Documents
As with the claim for unsanitary conditions, we have already explained
that we must revive Willey’s claim for theft of legal documents because the
district court dismissed it on grounds not raised in the defendants’ motion. We
write further to clarify how to consider this claim on remand. The district court
dismissed this claim “because New York state law provides him with an adequate
post‐deprivation remedy, i.e., § 9 of the Court of Claims Act.” Id. at 669–70. In
support of this conclusion, the district court cited the Supreme Court’s holding
that “even the intentional destruction of an inmate’s property by a prison officer
does not violate the Due Process Clause if the state provides that inmate with an
adequate post‐deprivation remedy.” Id. at 669 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 536 (1984)).
43
If Willey’s claim were for the destruction of his television or jewelry, this
analysis would suffice. But nowhere does the district court distinguish between
replaceable consumer goods and possibly irreplaceable legal documents. Legal
documents have characteristics that differentiate them from mere “property”
whose destruction can be adequately remedied by a generic property‐deprivation
state law. Their theft or destruction, for example, may irrevocably hinder a
prisoner’s efforts to vindicate legal rights. On remand, the district court should
consider this claim as one for impeding access to the courts:
It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a
constitutional right of access to the courts. This Court recognized
that right more than 35 years ago when it struck down a regulation
prohibiting state prisoners from filing petitions for habeas corpus
unless they were found “ ‘properly drawn’ ” by the “ ‘legal
investigator’ ” for the parole board. We held this violated the
principle that “the state and its officers may not abridge or impair
petitioner’s right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus.”
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821–22 (1977) (citations omitted).
C. Harassment
We also vacate the dismissal of Willey’s claim for harassment, again
because the defendants did not mention it in their motion for summary judgment.
44
See J.A. 626–30. On remand, the district court has an opportunity to analyze this
claim afresh under our recent decision in this area. See Crawford v. Cuomo, No. 14‐
969, 2015 WL 4728170, at *2–6 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2015). Crawford gives new
guidance on the meaning of Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997),
our Circuit’s leading Eighth Amendment case on harassment and abuse that
leaves no physical injury. The district court may also consider whether Willey’s
psychological pain and resulting suicide attempt constitute an “appreciable
injury” that makes actionable the various forms of harassment Willey allegedly
suffered. See Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
D. Malicious Prosecution and False Imprisonment
Willey’s claims for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment went
unmentioned in the district court’s decision, in the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, and in the briefing on appeal.3 Willey’s complaint featured
some of the ambiguities and inartful allegations typical of a pro se filing, which
3 Waiver is an equitable doctrine, and we find more equitable the
reinstatement of these claims than the act of attributing to Willey’s appointed pro
bono appellate counsel the knowing and voluntary relinquishment of them in
light of their going unmentioned in the district court’s decision.
45
we must liberally construe. But we have no trouble concluding that his complaint
stated, at a minimum, pendent state‐law claims for both malicious prosecution
and false imprisonment.
Willey even emphatically underlined his malicious‐prosecution claim in his
amended complaint: “Plaintiff was threatened and maliciously prosecuted with
false charges and outside criminal charges of allegedly possessing contraband in
the form of a weapon because plaintiff refused to act as an informant for security
staff.” J.A. 170 (emphasis in original). The elements of a claim for malicious
prosecution in New York are: “ ‘(1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal
proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff’s favor;
(3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice
as a motivation for defendant’s actions.’ ” Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d
149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 947 (2d Cir. 1997)).
To make out a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in addition to a state‐law
claim, “a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth
Amendment and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim
under state law.” Id. at 160–61 (citations omitted).
46
Willey alleged these elements. First, a prosecution was initiated against
Willey in Alden Town Court for his alleged possession of a shank while
incarcerated at Wende, the same conduct for which he was initially sentenced to
solitary confinement. Second, those charges were dismissed. Third, Willey’s
allegation is that Taylor and Lambert fabricated the allegation as retaliation for
his refusal to provide false information to corrections officers, so he plainly
pleaded lack of probable cause. Fourth, also because he alleges the prosecution
was initiated in retaliation, Willey sufficiently alleges actual malice. We cannot
say from the record or briefing whether the prosecution caused a violation of
Willey’s Fourth Amendment rights so as to permit a claim under § 1983.
Likewise, Willey’s complaint alleges the elements of a claim for false
imprisonment within solitary confinement. This claim, too, he did not hide: “I
was in fact falsely imprisoned.” J.A. 20. In New York, “[t]o establish this cause of
action the plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2)
the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to
the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.”
Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1975). To succeed on the fourth
47
element, a plaintiff complaining of false imprisonment within solitary
confinement must have “sufficiently pleaded that he had been subjected to
punitive segregation for no legitimate reason and without the rudimentary
protections of due process.” Gittens v. State of New York, 504 N.Y.S.2d 969, 972
(N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1986). Willey alleged, first for his punitive segregation in solitary and
then for the more‐punitive segregation behind cell shields, that the confinement
was intentional, that he was conscious of it, that he did not consent to it, and that
it was not privileged because it was done for an illegitimate reason and without
due process. As with the malicious‐prosecution claim, it is unclear on this record
whether Willey stated a federal claim in addition to a state‐law claim for false
imprisonment.
IV. Further Proceedings
The district court (Siragusa, J.) denied Willey’s first motion for appointment
of counsel, invoking the balancing test used in our Circuit. See J.A. 654–55 (citing
Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1997)). Later, the district court
(Telesca, J.) denied as moot Willey’s reasserted motion for appointment of counsel
in the same decision granting summary judgment to the defendants. Willey’s able
48
pro bono appellate counsel did not request that Willey be appointed counsel on
remand or raise an argument concerning the decision denying as moot Willey’s
reasserted motion. But we encourage the district court, on remand, to seriously
consider affording Willey appointed counsel: Not only do Willey’s claims “seem[]
likely to be of substance,” but each of the other relevant factors may support such
an appointment. See Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1986)
(listing other factors including “indigent’s ability to investigate the crucial facts,
whether conflicting evidence implicating the need for cross‐examination will be
the major proof presented to the fact finder, the indigent’s ability to present the
case, the complexity of the legal issues and any special reason in that case why
appointment of counsel would be more likely to lead to a just determination”).
Moreover, we suggest that the district court consider whether to permit the
parties, on remand, to take further discovery about Willey’s claims and that
Willey receive leave to file a second amended complaint. The district court
(Siragusa, J.) referred management of discovery to a magistrate judge, but none of
the defendants was deposed and no evidence produced by discovery was
submitted in connection with the motion for summary judgment.
49
Should Willey be appointed counsel and permitted to take discovery, the
district court may well winnow several of his claims before trial. For example, we
earlier identified claims for which these defendants may be entitled to qualified
immunity. As another example, Willey’s complaint does not name the officers
responsible for the unsanitary conditions of his confinement in his second and
third alleged exposures, in the mental‐health observation units. Willey may yet be
able to name them in a second amended complaint, but if not, those incidents do
not deserve a jury’s attention. We show a “special solicitude,” Graham v. Lewinski,
848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988), toward Willey as a pro se litigant by keeping
alive, for now, these claims for unsanitary conditions of confinement, which we
would dismiss in a counseled complaint for failing to identify the responsible
officers who acted with the requisite culpability. But of course we leave
management of discovery and trial to the sound discretion of the district court.

Outcome: For all these reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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