Date: 04-16-2015

Case Style: In the Interest of K.L.P. and H.D.P., Children

Case Number: 10-14-00299-CV

Judge: Al Scoggins

Court: Texas Court of Appeal, Tenth Court of Appeal from 21st District Court of Burleson County

Plaintiff's Attorney: Joseph J. Skrivanek III for Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Services

Defendant's Attorney: Chris Branson and Crystal Prise for Crystal Prise

Description: Crystal P. appeals from a judgment that terminated the parent-child relationship
between her and her children, K.L.P., and H.D.P. In presenting this appeal, counsel has
filed an Anders brief in support of his motion to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). We grant counsel's motion and affirm.
The procedures set forth in Anders v. California are applicable to appeals of orders
terminating parental rights. In re E.L.Y., 69 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002,
order) (per curiam) (applying Anders to parental termination appeals). See also Taylor v.
Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646-647 (Tex. App.—Austin
2005, pet. denied). In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has
In the Interest of K.L.P. and H.D.P., Children Page 2
conducted a conscientious examination of the record and, in his opinion, the record
reflects no potentially plausible basis to support an appeal. Counsel certifies he has
diligently researched the law applicable to the facts and issues and candidly discusses
why, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296,
297 (Tex. 1998). Counsel has demonstrated he has complied with the requirements of
Anders by (1) providing a copy of the brief to Crystal and (2) notifying her of her right to
file a pro se response if she desired to do so. Id. Crystal filed a pro se response to the
Anders brief.
The order of termination recites that Crystal:
knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional
well-being of the children pursuant to § 161.001 (1) (D), Texas Family
Code;
engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who
engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional wellbeing
of the children, pursuant to § 161.001 (1) (E), Texas Family Code;
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically
established the actions necessary for the mother to obtain the return of the
children who had been in the permanent or temporary managing
conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for
not less than nine months as a result of the children's removal from the
parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse and neglect of the children,
pursuant to § 161.001 (1) (O), Texas Family Code;
used a controlled substance as determined by Chapter 481, Health and
Safety Code, in a manner that endangered the health and safety of the
children, and (1) failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse
treatment program; or (2) after completion of a court-ordered substance
abuse treatment program continued to abuse a controlled substance,
pursuant to § 161.001 (1) (P), Texas Family Code;
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (O), and (P) (West 2014).
In the Interest of K.L.P. and H.D.P., Children Page 3
In the Anders brief, counsel analyzes the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support termination. Counsel acknowledges that only one statutory
ground is necessary to support an order of termination in addition to a finding that
termination is in the children's best interest. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex.
2003). Counsel further evaluates the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support a finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. Counsel's
brief evidences a professional evaluation of the record for error, and we conclude that
counsel performed the duties required of an appointed counsel.
Due process requires application of the clear and convincing standard of proof in
cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
263 (Tex. 2002). Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof
which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the
truth of the allegations sought to be established. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007
(West 2008). See also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26 (Tex. 2002).
The Family Code permits a court to order termination of parental rights if the
petitioner establishes one or more acts or omissions enumerated under subsection (1) of
the statute and also proves that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the
best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2012); Holley v.
Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976). We agree with counsel's evaluation that there is
clear and convincing evidence to support termination.
Notwithstanding the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination under
section 161.001(1), we must also find clear and convincing evidence that termination of
In the Interest of K.L.P. and H.D.P., Children Page 4
the parent-child relationship was in the children's best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(2). Evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination
may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child's best interest.
See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. There is a long-standing non-exhaustive list of factors for
a court to consider in deciding the best interest of a child in a termination case. See
Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.
We agree with counsel's evaluations that there is clear and convincing evidence
under the appropriate legal and factual sufficiency standards for the jury to have
determined that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interest of
K.L.P. and H.D.P.
Upon receiving a "frivolous appeal" brief, this Court must conduct a full
examination of all proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. See
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 349-50, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); see also In
re M.A.R., No. 10-10-00237-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 3596, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco May
11, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). After our review of the entire record, and counsel's brief,
and Crystal’s pro se brief, we agree with counsel that there are no plausible grounds for
appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Motion to Withdraw
In accordance with Anders, counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. See Anders,
386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.17 (Tex.
In the Interest of K.L.P. and H.D.P., Children Page 5
Crim. App. 2008). We grant counsel's motion to withdraw.1 Within five days of the
date of this Court's opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and
judgment to Crystal and to advise her of her right to pursue a petition for review in the
Texas Supreme Court. See In re K.D., 127 S.W.3d 66, 68 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

Outcome: The motion to withdraw is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: