Date: 10-09-2009
Case Style: John Aczel v. Leonard Labonia and Ethan Mable
Case Number: 08-2741-cv
Judge: Leval
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on appeal from the District of Connecticut
Plaintiff's Attorney: KEITH STURGES, Goldstein and Peck, P.C., Bridgeport, CT (William J. Kupinse, Jr., on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Defendant's Attorney: TOM GERARDE, Howd & Ludorf, LLC, Hartford, CT (Beatrice S. Jordan, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.
Description: 14 Plaintiff John Aczel appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the
15 District of Connecticut (Dorsey, J.) granting judgment to Defendant, Police Officer Leonard
16 Labonia, on Plaintiff’s claim of use of excessive force. The case presents an unusual procedural
17 history. The jury answered interrogatories in a special verdict form, finding that Plaintiff had
18 proved that Labonia used excessive force and that $12,078.61 in damages were proximately
19 caused by Labonia’s acts but that Labonia was entitled to qualified immunity because he had an
20 objectively reasonable belief that his conduct was justified under the circumstances. Treating the
21 jury’s factual finding that $12,078.61 in damages were proximately caused by Defendant’s
22 excessive force as if it were a general verdict awarding damages under Rule 49(b), Fed. R. Civ.
23 P., which would be inconsistent with the jury’s finding that Defendant was entitled to qualified
24 immunity, the district court initially rejected the verdict and ordered a new trial. Both sides
3
1 appealed. Upon remand by this court, which left the district court free to reconsider its initial
2 ruling, the district court granted Labonia’s motion for reconsideration and for judgment.
3 Plaintiff appealed again. Because the jury unanimously found that Defendant was entitled to
4 qualified immunity and there was no flaw in the finding that required the court to reject it, the
5 district court acted within its discretion in entering judgment for Defendant and denying
6 Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. We therefore affirm the judgment.
7 BACKGROUND
8 Aczel brought this action against Labonia and Ethan Mable, both police officers of the
9 city of Danbury, Connecticut, alleging inter alia federal constitutional claims of false arrest and
10 use of excessive force and state law claims of assault, false imprisonment, and abuse of process.
11 The matter was tried before a jury in the district court. Plaintiff testified that he did not act
12 improperly at any time. He contended that the defendants had no justification for arresting him
13 on charges of interfering with a police officer and breach of the peace in violation of Connecticut
14 General Statutes §§ 53a-167a and 53a-181 and that, while arresting him, the defendants choked
15 him, kneed him in the head, and kicked him repeatedly. Defendant Labonia offered evidence that
16 Aczel was intoxicated and resisted arrest and that the officers took necessary incremental steps to
17 restrain and subdue him.
18 The court instructed the jury what facts Plaintiff needed to prove to establish that a
19 defendant had violated his rights. Then, on the subject of qualified immunity with respect to
20 Plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims, the court properly instructed the jury, in accord with the
21 Supreme Court’s ruling in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), and without objection
22 from Plaintiff, to the effect that a defendant had an absolute defense to liability if, at the time of
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1 his interaction with Plaintiff, the defendant had an objectively reasonable belief that his actions
2 were justified under the circumstances.
3 With respect to damages, the court instructed as follows,
4 The fact that I charge you as to damages should not be taken as a suggestion that you
5 should reach the question of damages. I do so only in case you decide the question of
6 liability; that is, in favor of the plaintiff. You should not consider the question of
7 damages unless and until you decide the issue of liability in one or more respects in favor
8 of the plaintiff.
9 (Emphasis added).
10 With the consent of the parties, the court distributed to the jurors a special verdict form,
11 in accordance with Rule 49(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. This was in the form of a questionnaire, which
12 asked the jurors to answer specific factual questions from which the ultimate verdict and
13 judgment might be derived. In Part A, as to each of Plaintiff’s claims, the form asked whether
14 Plaintiff had proved the facts necessary to establish a violation of his rights. As to each claim of
15 violation of a federal constitutional right that the jury found Plaintiff had established, the form
16 asked whether Defendant had proved entitlement to qualified immunity. For example, as to the
17 claim of use of excessive force, question A2(a) asked whether Defendant had proved entitlement
18 to qualified immunity by proving “a reasonable and objective belief that the force used was
19 reasonable under the circumstances at the time of the arrest.” Consistent with its oral instructions
20 to consider the question of damages if the jury decided the issue of liability in one or more
21 respects in favor of the plaintiff, Part B then instructed the jury to state the amount of
22 compensatory damages that were proximately caused by the acts of Defendant for any claim as to
23 which the jury had answered “Yes” to the interrogatory in Part A. Thus, under the directions of
24 the questionnaire, the jurors were required to state the compensatory damages proximately
5
1 caused by a defendant’s wrongful conduct notwithstanding a finding of qualified immunity as to
2 such claim.
3 After a period of deliberations, the jury announced that it had reached a decision and
4 returned the verdict form, signed by the foreperson. The jury completely exonerated the
5 defendant Mable. It exonerated Labonia on every claim except use of excessive force, answering
6 “Yes” to question A2, thus indicating its finding that Labonia violated Plaintiff’s right under the
7 Fourth Amendment to be free of excessive force. As to this claim, however, the jury also
8 answered question A2(a) stating that Labonia “proved . . . entitlement to qualified immunity by
9 proving [his] reasonable and objective belief that the force used was reasonable under the
10 circumstances at the time of the arrest.” Consistent with the instruction to answer question B1 on
11 proximately caused damages if the jury gave a “Yes” answer to any question in Part A, the jury
12 entered $12,078.61 as the “amount of compensatory damages [Plaintiff has] proved were
13 proximately caused by” Labonia’s wrongful acts.
14 The court then polled the jurors and, on the basis of the jury’s “No” answers as to every
15 claim other than the claim of excessive force against Labonia, accepted the verdicts as resolving
16 these other claims. As for the claim that Labonia used excessive force, each juror affirmed that it
17 was the juror’s intention to answer that Labonia violated Plaintiff’s right to be free from
18 excessive force and that Labonia was entitled to qualified immunity for the claim of excessive
19 force on the basis of his objective and reasonable belief that the force he used was reasonable in
20 the circumstances. The court then instructed the jury that no damages could be awarded against
21 Labonia if he proved an entitlement to qualified immunity. The court told the jurors to return to
22 their deliberations to assure themselves that they had answered the pertinent questions correctly.
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1 Treating the jury’s answer to question B1 as if it represented a general verdict (an award of
2 $12,078.61 in damages) rather than the answer to a special verdict question asking the factual
3 question what damages were proximately caused by Defendant’s use of excessive force,
4 irrespective of Defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity, the court instructed the jury to
5 strike the answer to B1 if Labonia was entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of excessive
6 force.
7 The jury then sent the court a note stating, “We were trying to compromise among very
8 rigid positions - wanted expenses incurred paid to Mr. Aczel and the policeman absolved of
9 liability. Now we believe we can’t do both - is this true?” The district court confirmed that the
10 jury could not do both. The jury’s note also asked whether the jurors could reopen claims their
11 verdict had resolved, which the court refused. The court instructed the jury to resume
12 deliberations on the excessive force claim. When the jurors advised that they could go no
13 further, the court discharged the jury. As the jury had made no change to its findings on the
14 verdict form, it continued to report the findings that Labonia used excessive force, that his use of
15 excessive force caused damage to Aczel in the amount of $12,078.61, and that Labonia had
16 proved entitlement to immunity.
17 Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, and Plaintiff moved for a new trial as
18 to all claims, contending the verdicts should be voided by reason of inconsistency. The district
19 court denied Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and granted Plaintiff’s motion
20 for a new trial. Both parties appealed.
21 During pendency of that first appeal, the district court issued an additional order
22 clarifying and articulating the reasons for its decisions on the parties’ motions for judgment and
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1 new trial. The district court explained that the new trial was granted only with respect to
2 Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force against Labonia and Labonia’s entitlement to qualified
3 immunity. The district court also noted that the verdicts on excessive force and on qualified
4 immunity were not inconsistent. Potential inconsistency existed only because, as the court
5 viewed it, the jury awarded compensatory damages. Expressing second thoughts on the wisdom
6 and propriety of its new trial order, the court further stated, “In retrospect, it may have been more
7 proper for the Court to simply have accepted the verdict as to the excessive force and qualified
8 immunity claims and to have rejected the damages award, thereby eliminating the inconsistency.”
9 On March 27, 2008, this court issued an unpublished summary order, which affirmed the
10 denial of Labonia’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, dismissed the remainder of the
11 appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction due to lack of a final judgment, and remanded the case
12 to the district court. Aczel v. Labonia, 271 Fed.Appx. 73 (2d Cir. 2008). As for the denial of
13 judgment based on qualified immunity, we explained that, once the court had vacated the jury’s
14 decision on this issue, it was left with a record of conflicting evidence and no jury finding, which
15 precluded judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 75. However, noting the district court’s interim
16 expression of misgivings about its resolution of the case, we hinted, “Nothing in this decision
17 bars the district court from revisiting its earlier ruling as to whether the verdict form responses
18 can be reconciled.” Id.
19 Labonia then moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for reconsideration and for judgment as a
20 matter of law. The district court concluded that its proper course of action was to accept the
21 jury’s finding that Labonia was entitled to qualified immunity, and on this basis enter judgment
22 in Labonia’s favor. Plaintiff brought this appeal.
8
1 DISCUSSION
2 I. Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial
3 Plaintiff contends the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The jury,
4 however, found facts which entitled Defendant to qualified immunity. Unless some flaw in the
5 proceedings necessarily invalidated that finding, the district court acted within its discretion in
6 relying on it to grant judgment to Defendant.
7 Plaintiff argues that the jury’s verdict cannot be sustained or relied on in any respect
8 because it exhibited internal inconsistency in awarding damages while at the same time finding
9 that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. He relies on Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F.2d
10 817 (2d Cir. 1990), in which this court vacated a judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict due
11 to the irreconcilability of the jury’s findings. His reliance on Finnegan is unjustified, as the facts
12 here are quite different. In Finnegan, the jury found that the defendant police officer was entitled
13 to qualified immunity because he “reasonably believed that he was acting in good faith.” Id. at
14 819. The following day, however, the jury awarded punitive damages against that officer finding
15 that he acted “maliciously or wantonly or oppressively.” Id. We explained that the latter finding
16 plainly contradicted the former. We therefore remanded for a new trial. Id. at 821.
17 Although there is superficial similarity, the difference between this case and Finnegan is
18 crucial. The Finnegan jury’s finding that the defendant “reasonably believed that he was acting
19 in good faith” could not be reconciled with its finding that he acted “maliciously or wantonly or
20 oppressively.” By definition, one who acts “maliciously” does not reasonably believe he is
21 “acting in good faith.” Because the finding of the defendant’s reasonable belief that he acted in
22 good faith was contradicted by the jury’s finding that he acted maliciously, the finding of good
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1 faith could not be credited, so that no basis remained for finding qualified immunity. The finding
2 of malice was similarly undermined by the finding of good faith. Upon invalidation of the jury’s
3 mutually contradictory findings, there were no surviving facts found by the jury that mandated
4 any resolution of the case. Accordingly retrial was the solution.
5 Here, in contrast, there was no inconsistency in the jury’s factual findings. Those factual
6 findings were (a) that Labonia used excessive force and (b) that Plaintiff suffered some damages
7 caused by that use of excessive force, but that (c) Labonia reasonably believed his conduct was
8 justified in the circumstances and was therefore entitled to qualified immunity. There is no
9 inconsistency in those findings. If a police officer uses excessive force in violation of a
10 plaintiff’s constitutional rights, it is to be expected that the victim will suffer harm proximately
11 caused by the excessive force. If, however, the police officer proves the facts that entitle him to
12 qualified immunity, under Harlow judgment must be entered in his favor, notwithstanding his
13 having violated the plaintiff’s rights and caused damages.
14 The crucial finding was of facts that entitle Lebonia to immunity. If the jury’s findings to
15 that effect are credited, under Harlow they mandate judgment in favor of Defendant, regardless
16 of whether Defendant violated Plaintiff’s rights and caused him damages. In Finnegan, we ruled
17 that the comparable finding could not be credited because it was contradicted by the jury’s
18 finding of malice. Here, the jury made no inconsistent finding to cast doubt on whether it had
19 truly found entitlement to immunity.
20 In his effort to persuade us that the jury’s finding of entitlement to immunity was
21 contradicted and should not be credited, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the verdict form and the
22 specific questions and instructions written on it. Plaintiff characterizes the answer to B1 as if it
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1 were a general verdict, awarding compensatory damages to Plaintiff. His argument runs,
2 essentially: The jury was told that Defendant could not be held liable for damages if Defendant
3 acted with a reasonable good faith belief which entitled him to qualified immunity. Thus, the
4 jury’s award of a general verdict giving damages to Plaintiff necessarily implies a finding that
5 Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. That finding necessarily contradicts,
6 discredits, and invalidates the finding that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity, and, as
7 in Finnegan, requires a new trial.
8 The problem with Plaintiff’s argument is that it is based on a mischaracterization of the
9 jury’s answers on the verdict form. Question B1 did not call for a general verdict. The question
10 was not whether the jury found Defendant liable to Plaintiff, much less what compensatory
11 damages it awarded on the basis of that liability. The verdict form given by the court to the jury
12 called for a special verdict asking the jury to determine the facts, as authorized by Rule 49(a).
13 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (“The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the
14 form of a special written finding on each issue of fact.”); also Black’s Law Dictionary 1696-97
15 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “general verdict” as “A verdict by which the jury finds in favor of one
16 party or the other, as opposed to resolving specific fact questions” and “special verdict” as “A
17 verdict in which the jury makes findings only on factual issues submitted to them by the judge,
18 who then decides the legal effect of the verdict”). The form instructed the jury to state the
19 amount of damages proximately caused by Defendant’s use of excessive force. According to the
20 form, the jury was to follow that instruction regardless of whether the jury found Defendant
21 entitled to qualified immunity. The jury’s filling in of a dollar amount representing harm caused
22 by the excessive force therefore in no way contradicted the jury’s finding that Defendant was
1 It is not surprising that Plaintiff has misconstrued the jury’s verdict in view of the fact
that, at least temporarily, the district court did so as well. On receipt of the verdict form, the
court was apparently surprised to receive an answer stating Plaintiff’s damages together with an
answer finding qualified immunity that required judgment in favor of Defendant. The court
failed at that point to recognize that its instructions written on the verdict form called for an
answer to the damages question by reason of the “Yes” answer as to the use of excessive force,
notwithstanding the finding of Labonia’s entitlement to qualified immunity.
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1 entitled to immunity. The jury’s answer represented a finding of fact as to the damages caused
2 by Labonia’s use of force and not an award of damages, which the verdict form did not request or
3 call for. The finding that Labonia’s use of excessive force caused damage to Aczel in the amount
4 of $12,078.61 did not contradict the finding of facts which entitled Libonia to immunity from
5 judgment. They addressed different issues.1
6 Nor is this conclusion affected by the jury’s note responding to the court’s supplemental
7 comments. In its note, the jury expressed frustration arising from conflicting objectives which
8 the jury wished to compromise. The jury said it wanted to reimburse Plaintiff for expenses he
9 incurred but wanted also to absolve Officer Labonia. The jury recognized in its note that it could
10 not do both, and ultimately made no change in its verdict form. The fact that the jury expressed a
11 desire to reimburse Aczel’s expenses did not discredit its finding that Labonia was entitled to
12 qualified immunity, which each juror confirmed upon the polling of the jury, and which the jury
13 left untouched when the court offered the opportunity to change the findings.
14 Judge Pooler, in her dissenting opinion, argues first that, contrary to what was
15 unmistakably written on the verdict form, we should construe the answer to Question B1 as a
16 general verdict awarding damages because the court’s instructions to the jury occasionally
17 referred to an award. If the jury wanted to award damages to Plaintiff and tried to do so in
18 entering the figure $12,078.61, Judge Pooler argues, that contradicts its finding of qualified
12
1 immunity because the jury had been told that Plaintiff could not win a verdict if Labonia was
2 entitled to qualified immunity.
3 We reject her argument for two reasons. As a first response, Judge Pooler’s contention
4 that the answer to Question B1 expressed an anomalous award of damages, rather than the
5 answer to a factual question put by the form is mere speculation. An appellate court should not
6 invalidate a judgment entered on the basis of a facially valid and proper jury verdict and require a
7 costly and wasteful retrial merely because of a speculative possibility that facially consistent jury
8 findings might have represented an inconsistency. See Akermanis v. Sea-Land Serv., 688 F.2d
9 898, 906 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[A]bsent obvious inconsistencies” in the special verdict, a court should
10 presume the jury acted lawfully and should not order a retrial.).
11 Judge Pooler’s argument suffers from a further flaw. Even if we viewed the answer to
12 Question B1 as expressing the jury’s desire to award damages, that would not necessarily
13 contradict and invalidate its finding of the facts supporting Lebonia’s immunity, which each juror
14 reconfirmed when polled. The case would still be different from Finnegan, where one crucial
15 jury finding was unreconcilably contradicted by another. At most, by awarding damages in
16 circumstances where the court had explained to the jury that Defendant could not be liable, the
17 jury would have raised a possibility that it did not really find the facts underlying immunity as
18 stated in its answer to question A2(a). It would be at least equally likely, however, that the jury
19 found the facts which gave rise to qualified immunity, as it said it did, but nonetheless out of
20 sympathy hoped to make an award that would reimburse Plaintiff’s expenses. The jury’s desire
21 to award damages in spite of its finding of Defendant’s entitlement to immunity would be
22 contrary to law. The district court could properly strike it and enter judgment on the basis of the
13
1 factual findings which entitled Defendant to immunity.
2 The Rules expressly provide that when a general verdict is inconsistent with the jury’s
3 findings in the special verdict, among the options available to the court is to approve an
4 appropriate judgment according to the facts established by the special verdict answers,
5 notwithstanding the general verdict. Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b)(3)(A). Where the circumstances raise
6 no more than a speculative possibility of incompatible inconsistency in the jury’s verdict and the
7 trial judge has concluded that the explicit finding of facts establishing entitlement to qualified
8 immunity should be credited, the judge surely acts within the permissible scope of discretion in
9 sustaining the jury’s finding and entering judgment on it, rather than scrapping the results of the
10 trial and ordering that the case be retried. If the jury’s award of damages may represent a desire
11 on the jury’s part to make an award of damages that was not justified by the law or the court’s
12 instructions, there is no impropriety or abuse of discretion in the district court’s striking of the
13 illegal award and entering judgment in favor of the defendant based on the jury’s finding of
14 entitlement to qualified immunity. See Gallick v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119
15 (1963) (Courts should harmonize a jury’s special verdict answers “if it is possible under a fair
16 reading of them.”); also Turley v. Police Dep’t of City of N.Y., 167 F.3d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir.
17 1999) (When faced with inconsistent special verdicts, a court generally should try to interpret the
18 verdict in a manner which allows reconciliation and upholding of the jury’s verdict, if possible.).
19 An instructive, if improbable, analogy might be found if a district court judge, at a bench
20 trial, found that the defendant was not liable to the plaintiff but nonetheless awarded damages
21 based on the judge’s perception that the defendant had behaved nastily (although not illegally)
22 toward the plaintiff. On appeal, in all likelihood, we would not order a new trial by reason of the
14
1 inconsistency, but would merely strike the illegal damages award and direct the entry of
2 judgment in favor of the defendant. The answer should not be different where a jury
3 unanimously makes factual findings which require judgment in the defendant’s favor but
4 nonetheless insists on making a legally baseless award of damages to the plaintiff.
5 Judge Pooler asserts that this analogy to a trial judge is not apt because, unlike the case of
6 the judge who makes fact findings but renders a verdict that is not compatible with the facts he
7 has found, the jury here found no facts, but rather compromised the conflicting views of different
8 jurors. Judge Pooler’s insistence that the jurors, contrary to their answers on the verdict form and
9 to the court’s poll, were really in disagreement on Labonia’s entitlement to immunity is based on
10 nothing more than speculation. It is indeed possible that the verdict represented a compromise
11 between jurors who believed Labonia had proved entitlement to immunity and others who
12 believed he had not. In fact, that possibility exists in virtually every case in which a plaintiff
13 receives a jury award of less than the plaintiff was seeking. One never knows for sure what has
14 happened in the secrecy of jury deliberations. Judge Pooler’s speculation, however, is not the
15 only possible explanation, nor even the most likely explanation for the jurors’ answers. We see
16 no reason to consider it more likely than that the jurors were merely following the instructions on
17 the special verdict form, answering each question as instructed; nor is it more likely than that the
18 jury unanimously found Labonia’s entitlement to immunity, but nonetheless wanted to give some
19 compensation to the abused plaintiff. While it is indeed possible that certain jurors lied when
20 recording and reporting their finding that Labonia had proved entitlement to immunity, the
21 district judge did not believe this to be the case, and we see no reason to reject his analysis. If
22 new trials were required whenever a possibility exists that jurors with conflicting views had
15
1 compromised, trial would become a hopeless and ineffectual way to settle disputes.
2 In support of her assertion that the verdict represented an improper compromise between
3 jurors who disagreed on Labonia’s entitlement to immunity, Judge Pooler relies heavily on the
4 fact that the jury sent the judge a note saying, “We were trying to compromise among very rigid
5 positions - wanted expenses incurred paid to Mr. Aczel and the policeman absolved of liability.”
6 Judge Pooler reads the use of the word “compromise” as necessarily meaning that the
7 compromise in question was between jurors who disagreed whether Labonia was entitled to
8 immunity. While the word “compromise” is often used in the context of resolving disagreements
9 among different persons, that is not its only meaning. A single individual can seek a compromise
10 as among conflicting desires, and so can a unanimous jury, notwithstanding its unanimity on a
11 crucial factual finding. The jury’s note neither said, nor suggested, that some jurors wanted to
12 rule for Plaintiff and others for Defendant. Rather, on its face, the note appears to say that the
13 jury (as a whole) was struggling to find the proper compromise between the jury’s desire to cover
14 Plaintiff’s expenses and to absolve the police officer, while recognizing that, under the law
15 explained by the judge, it could not do both. Judge Pooler’s contention that the jury note
16 revealed an illegal compromise between jurors who would award damages to Plaintiff and jurors
17 who would exonerate Defendant is based on mere speculation and does not justify our mandating
18 a retrial. See Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. Indus. Plants Corp., 569 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir.
19 1977) (Even if juror misconduct such as a compromise verdict is a possibility in a given case, a
20 new trial cannot be sustained when “there is an equally reasonable and perhaps even better
21 explanation which involves no jury misconduct.”).
22 In summary, the district court credited the jury’s finding of facts that entitle Defendant to
16
1 immunity and entered judgment on that basis. We see no illogic or abuse of discretion in that
2 action. Based on a pyramid of speculations, Judge Pooler contends the court could not lawfully
3 credit the jury’s finding of facts supporting Lebonia’s immunity. She speculates that, contrary to
4 the express terms of the jury’s findings, these findings really expressed an award. She further
5 speculates that the jury’s “award” of damages cannot be understood as a desire to reimburse
6 Plaintiff’s expenses notwithstanding Defendant’s entitlement to immunity but must be
7 understood as representing findings that contradict the jury’s expressly stated finding of the facts
8 giving rise to Labonia’s immunity. Finally, Judge Pooler invokes the further speculation that the
9 jurors were never in agreement on Labonia’s immunity but improperly compromised their
10 differences. We express no view on whether the district court would have acted within its
11 discretion if it had regarded Judge Pooler’s speculations as sufficiently likely to adhere to its
12 initial ruling ordering a new trial. The district court instead credited the jury’s findings at face
13 value and entered judgment on that basis. There was no abuse of discretion in that decision. In
14 fact, it was eminently sensible.
15 II. Motion for Reconsideration
16 Plaintiff also argues that the district court erred procedurally and substantively in granting
17 Labonia’s motion for reconsideration. We disagree. A motion for reconsideration may be
18 granted for “any . . . reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The Supreme Court
19 has noted that this catch-all provision of Rule 60(b) allows courts to vacate judgments whenever
20 necessary to accomplish justice, although such relief should be granted only in extraordinary
21 circumstances. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988). “A
22 motion seeking such relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the district court with appellate
17
1 review limited to determining whether that discretion has been abused.” Nemaizer v. Baker, 793
2 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1986).
3 Plaintiff first contends that Labonia’s motion for reconsideration should have been denied
4 as untimely. A motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) “must be made within a
5 reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). The district court denied the Defendants’ prior post-
6 trial motion for judgment as a matter of law on September 22, 2006 and Defendants timely
7 appealed this ruling. While the appeal was pending, the district court was without jurisdiction of
8 the case. Fort Knox Music Inc. v. Baptiste, 257 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2001). This court
9 remanded the case to the district court on March 27, 2008. Four days later, on March 31, 2008,
10 Labonia filed his motion under Rule 60(b) for reconsideration. The motion was made within a
11 reasonable time and was therefore timely.
12 Plaintiff next contends that the district court erred in granting the motion because Labonia
13 did not establish extraordinary circumstances, as required by Liljeberg. We disagree. While
14 Defendants’ initial appeal was pending in this case, the district court issued an order in which the
15 district court expressed that “[i]n retrospect, it may have been more proper for the Court to
16 simply have accepted the verdict as to the excessive force and qualified immunity claims and to
17 have rejected the damages award, thereby eliminating the inconsistency.” This court then
18 remanded the case to the district court and stated, “Nothing in this decision bars the district court
19 from revisiting its earlier ruling as to whether the verdict form responses can be reconciled.”
20 Aczel, 271 Fed.Appx. at 75. In light of the district court’s reconsideration while the appeal was
21 pending, this court’s explicit permission to the district court to revisit its earlier ruling, and the
22 very unusual facts of this case, the district court was within its proper range of discretion in
18
1 considering the circumstances sufficiently extraordinary.
* * *
See: http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/0f606b0f-a44b-43a9-8143-107658ba9a66/1/doc/08-2741-cv_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/0f606b0f-a44b-43a9-8143-107658ba9a66/1/hilite/
Outcome: 3 The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:
