Date: 09-14-2009

Case Style: Martin Droz v. P.J. McCadden, State Trooper

Case Number: 08-0241-cv

Judge:

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on appeal from the Northern District of New York

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Defendant's Attorney:

Description: Defendant-Appellant State Trooper P.J. McCadden appeals
from an order of the district court (David N. Hurd, Judge)
denying his motion for summary judgment in this action against
him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on allegations of false arrest
and malicious prosecution. The grounds for the motion are that
McCadden was entitled to qualified immunity. We conclude that
the stipulated facts establish that McCadden reasonably believed
he was acting at the behest of Judge Shirley Herder. McCadden
therefore had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff Droz
for criminal contempt. In addition, in light of this reasonable
3
1 belief and McCadden's conversation with Judge Herder following
2 Droz's arrest regarding the offense with which Droz would be
3 charged, McCadden had probable cause to institute proceedings
4 against him. We therefore reverse the order of the district
5 court and remand the cause with instructions to grant the summary
6 judgment motion and dismiss the claims.
7 BACKGROUND
8 Plaintiff Droz was arrested and charged with violating
9 N.Y. Penal L. § 215.50(1) for "disorderly, contemptuous or
10 insolent behavior, committed during the sitting of a court, in
11 its immediate view and presence and directly tending to interrupt
12 its proceedings," after arriving at a courthouse and refusing to
13 show to Town Officer John C. Anderson what was in a brown paper
14 bag he was carrying. Anderson told Judge Shirley Herder about
15 the incident. The police were then summoned, and arrived, in the
16 person of McCadden. McCadden then arrested Droz. The subsequent
17 contempt charge against Droz was eventually dismissed. Droz then
18 brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Herder
19 and McCadden asserting, inter alia, causes of action sounding in
20 false arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy to commit
21 false arrest and malicious prosecution. Herder, having settled
22 the claims against her, is no longer a party to this appeal.
23 McCadden moved for summary judgment on qualified
24 immunity grounds, arguing that he had arguable probable cause to
25 arrest Droz inasmuch as he had been told by Herder -- a town
26 judge whose instruction would be sufficient to give probable
4
1 cause to arrest someone for contempt of court -- that he should
2 arrest Droz for contempt. McCadden also argued that he was
3 entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the malicious
4 prosecution claim because it was undisputed that he spoke with
5 Herder about what statute to charge Droz under following Droz's
6 arrest.
7 The district court denied McCadden's motion for summary
8 judgment, concluding that there was a material issue of fact as
9 to whether Herder personally instructed McCadden to arrest Droz,
10 and that, therefore, probable cause for the arrest had not been
11 established as a matter of law. The court also decided that
12 malice might be established to support the malicious prosecution
13 claim because McCadden had no other evidence that Droz had
14 committed criminal contempt, the charge that was brought against
15 him and then dismissed. McCadden brings this interlocutory
16 appeal from the denial of his motion for summary judgment.
17 DISCUSSION
18 I. Standard of review
19 "We review a district court's denial of summary
20 judgment de novo . . . ." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 313
21 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting, however, that unlike appeals
22 on qualified immunity issues, we typically undertake such review
23 only "when a final decision or other distinct district court
24 action has rendered the case appealable"). Summary judgment must
25 be granted to the movant "if the pleadings, the discovery and
26 disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there
While it is hard to know what to make of the use of the 1
word "alleged" in Droz's Statement of Material Facts, we conclude
that it does not take away from Droz's admission that McCadden
had some understanding that Herder had instructed him to arrest
5
1 is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant
2 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
3 56(c); Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008).
4 In an interlocutory appeal such as this one, "we may not review
5 whether a dispute of fact identified by the district court is
6 'genuine.'" Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004).
7 We may only resolve the summary judgment motion insofar as we
8 rely "on stipulated facts, or on the facts that the plaintiff
9 alleges are true, or on the facts favorable to the plaintiff that
10 the trial judge concluded the jury might find." Id. "A district
11 court's mere assertion that disputed facts exist . . . is[,
12 however,] not enough to preclude an immediate appeal." Id.
13 II. Analysis
14 Irrespective of whether Herder and McCadden actually
15 spoke to one another before Droz's arrest -- a fact the district
16 court found was "genuinely" in dispute -- McCadden is entitled to
17 qualified immunity, because we conclude, as a matter of law, that
18 he reasonably believed he was acting at Herder's behest. While
19 Droz contests whether such a personal conversation between Herder
20 and McCadden ever took place, he admits that "McCadden . . .
21 relied upon his alleged understanding of Herder's direction to
22 him to arrest Droz for criminal contempt." Droz Statement of
23 Material Facts ¶ 4. Droz concedes, then, that McCadden thought 1
Droz.
6
1 he was operating at the direction of Herder when he arrested
2 Droz.
3 The stipulated facts also establish as a matter of law
4 that this belief was reasonable. Droz concedes that Herder
5 agreed with Town Supervisor Anderson that Droz's actions in the
6 courthouse should be reported to the police. Id. at ¶ 12. The
7 police department, in the person of McCadden, were then summoned
8 by telephone to the courthouse by the town supervisor. Id. at ¶
9 13. While Droz does not explicitly agree that McCadden was told
10 during or as a result of that phone call that Herder was
11 instructing him to come to the courthouse to arrest Droz, for
12 McCadden to have had any "alleged understanding," Droz Statement
13 of Material Facts ¶ 4, that Herder had directed him to arrest
14 Droz -- assuming as we must that he did not have a direct
15 conversation with Herder -- McCadden could only have been told
16 that as a result of what the town supervisor told the police.
17 Regardless of whether there is a triable issue of fact as to
18 whether McCadden had a personal conversation with Herder prior to
19 the arrest, then, for McCadden to have understood that Herder
20 directed him to arrest Droz, he must have been told so directly
21 or indirectly on or as a result of the call -- the basis for a
22 reasonable belief that it was so.
23 "Arguable probable cause [which establishes qualified
24 immunity with respect to a false arrest claim] exists when a
25 reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and
7
1 possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question
2 could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the
3 light of well established law." Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d
4 344, 369 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)
5 (emphasis in original). Based on the stipulated facts, as a
6 matter of law, McCadden reasonably believed Herder instructed him
7 to arrest Droz. This belief was sufficient to establish arguable
8 probable cause for the arrest. McCadden is therefore entitled to
9 qualified immunity on the false arrest charge.
10 Similarly, McCadden is entitled to qualified immunity
11 on the malicious prosecution claim. "To state a claim . . . for
12 malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the
13 defendant commenced or continued a criminal proceeding against
14 him; (2) that the proceeding was terminated in the plaintiff's
15 favor; (3) that there was no probable cause for the proceeding;
16 and (4) that the proceeding was instituted with malice." Kinzer
17 v. Jackson, 316 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2003). It is undisputed
18 that after having arrested Droz, McCadden spoke with Herder to
19 determine what charges were to be brought. Inasmuch as McCadden
20 arrested Droz on the reasonable belief that Herder instructed him
21 to do so, and he spoke with Herder to determine the charge to be
22 brought against Droz, we conclude that there was probable cause
23 as a matter of law for instituting the proceeding. McCadden is
24 therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
25 Because neither of the underlying section 1983 causes
26 of action can be established, the claim for conspiracy also
8
1 fails. See Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d
2 Cir. 1995).

* * *

See: http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/5f4c487d-89a1-45cf-9aae-c93eaa8856bd/1/doc/08-0241-cv_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/5f4c487d-89a1-45cf-9aae-c93eaa8856bd/1/hilite/

Outcome: 4 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
5 court is reversed and the cause remanded to the court with
6 instructions that the motion for summary judgment be granted and
7 Droz's remaining claims against McCadden be dismissed.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: