Date: 11-20-2007

Case Style: Mel Jean Weber, Special Representative of the Estate of Tom Ruble, et al. v. Mobil Oil Corporation, et al.

Case Number: 06-6337

Judge: Tacha

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on appeal from the Western District of Oklahoma - Oklahoma Coutny

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Bob Tomlinson, Tomlinson & O’Connell, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Kenneth N. McKinney, Mary E. Nelson, and Toby M. McKinstry, Tomlinson & O’Connell, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Jeremy Thurman, Napoli Bern Ripka LLP, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Paul Napoli and Marc Jay Bern, Napoli Bern Ripka LLP, New York, New York, with him on the brief), appearing for Appellees.

Defendant's Attorney:

Jonathan D. Hacker, O’Melveny & Myers, LLP, Washington, D.C. (Charles E. Borden, O’Melveny & Myers, LLP, Washington, D.C., and Brian S. Engel, McGinnis, Lochridge & Kilgore, Austin, Texas, with him on the briefs), appearing for Appellants.

Description:

Defendants-Petitioners Mobil Exploration & Producing, U.S. ("MEPUS") and Mobil Natural Gas, Inc. ("MNGI") removed a putative class action filed in Oklahoma state court to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), Pub L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The District Court remanded the case to state court. MEPUS and MNGI then filed a petition in this Court for leave to appeal the remand order. Because we conclude that this action commenced prior to the effective date of CAFA, we do not have jurisdiction to hear the defendants' appeal and therefore deny their petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND

This case originated in May 2001, when J.C. Dobbins filed a class action petition in Oklahoma state court against Mobil Oil Corporation, Inc.1 and Mobil Exploration & Producing, North America.2 The current class definition3 includes owners of a "royalty interest" in the oil and gas underlying certain Oklahoma land on which ExxonMobil Oil Corporation operates oil and gas wells. The putative class sought damages for breach of contract, breach of plan unitization, conversion, fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and for a violation of the Oklahoma Production Revenue Standards Act. It also sought equitable relief in the form of an accounting and a constructive trust.

More than three years later, in October 2004, Colleen Mannering and two other individuals - all of whom were apparently included in the class definition outlined in the state action - filed a similar, though not identical, class action in federal district court against the same two defendants. That putative class also included royalty interest owners of oil and gas in the same Oklahoma land, but it was defined more broadly than the putative class in state court. Furthermore, in addition to raising the same claims for damages and equitable relief as the state action, the federal action also sought damages for breach of the implied duty to market and tortious breach of contract, as well as for declaratory judgment and a resulting trust.

In December 2004, the plaintiffs in the state-court class action filed a second amended petition adding MEPUS and MNGI as defendants. These entities were never named in the federal action.

The following year, in September 2005, the federal plaintiffs and the state plaintiffs reached an agreement whereby the plaintiffs in the federal class action voluntarily dismissed their complaint and filed a petition to intervene in the statecourt action. The plaintiff intervenors sought to assert class claims under its expanded class definition and to assert the additional claims for damages and equitable relief it raised in its federal petition. After hearing arguments, the statecourt judge allowed the intervention, but required the intervenors to accept the class definition and claims as pleaded in the second amended petition.

MNGI and MEPUS then removed the case to the Western District of Oklahoma under CAFA, which was enacted on February 18, 2005, and which extends the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to encompass putative class actions in which at least one plaintiff class member is diverse from one defendant and where the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1092 (10th Cir. 2005). The plaintiffs then moved to remand to Oklahoma state court, arguing that CAFA did not apply to the action.4 The District Court agreed and granted the motion. Weber v. Mobil Oil Corp., 2006 WL 2045875, at *3, *5 (W.D. Okla. July 20, 2006).

MEPUS and MNGI filed a timely petition with this Court for leave to appeal the District Court's remand order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c). A panel of this Court provisionally granted the petition but reserved the final disposition of the petition to this merits panel. We now deny the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

II. DISCUSSION

Generally, an order remanding a case to the state court from which it originated is not reviewable on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. §1447(d). MEPUS and MNGI, however, filed their petition seeking leave to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1), a provision of CAFA that gives the federal appellate courts discretionary jurisdiction to consider appeals of remand orders in certain types of class actions. Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1093. The provisions of CAFA, including 1453(c)(1), apply "to any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act." 119 Stat. at 14; Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1094. Our first - and, as it turns out, our last - task in this case is to determine whether this case "commenced" on or after the effective date of CAFA such that we may assert jurisdiction over this case pursuant to § 1453(c)(1). See Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1094 ("[F]ederal courts always have jurisdiction to consider their own jurisdiction."). As we explain below, we conclude that this action was commenced prior to the effective date of CAFA. Section 1453(c)(1) therefore does not provide a jurisdictional basis for considering the District Court's remand order.

* * *

http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2007/11/06-6337.pdf

Outcome: For the reasons explained above, we DENY the petition for leave to appeal.

Plaintiff's Experts: Unknown

Defendant's Experts: Unknown

Comments: None