Date: 05-30-2003

Case Style: Maria Cristina Quintanilla De Sanchez, et al. v. Marta Verges De Quintanilla

Case Number: 04-03-00099-CV

Judge: Alma L. López

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Julio A. Garcia, Laredo, Texas for Appellant

Defendant's Attorney:

C.M. Zaffirini of Zaffirini & Castillo, Laredo, Texas

James L. Branton and Sonia M. Rodriguez of Branton & Hall, P.C., San Antonio, Texas

Description:

Marta Vergés de Quintanilla ("Marta") and her husband, Marcelo Quintanilla Soberanes ("Marcelo") were married in 1977. Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra are Marcelo's adult children from his first marriage. Marta and Marcelo had two additional children.

In May of 2001, Marcelo, who was eighty-eight years old, suffered injuries after he fell while bathing. Marta, Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra jointly decided to transfer Marcelo to a hospital in Houston, Texas for physical therapy. When Marcelo was discharged from the Houston hospital, Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra urged Marta to transfer Marcelo to a hospital in Laredo, Texas. Marta believed that Marcelo's stay at the Laredo hospital was a temporary arrangement to enable Marcelo to obtain additional therapy. Marcelo was admitted to the hospital's inpatient rehabilitation facility.

Marta alleges that she was a stranger to the City of Laredo and without financial support. Accordingly, Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra kept Marta in an apartment, and Marta alleges that she was only permitted to leave when she was escorted by them to visit Marcelo in the hospital. When Marta was returned to her apartment, Marta alleged that the door was locked behind her.

On June 25, 2001, Marta alleges that no one arrived to escort her to the hospital. On that day, Cristina filed an application for temporary guardianship of Marcelo's person in County Court at Law No. 2, Webb County, Texas. In the application, Cristina alleged that Marcelo was incompetent to care for himself and immediate dangers necessitated the appointment of a guardian. Cristina's application failed to disclose that Marcelo had a spouse, Marta, who was entitled by statutory preference to the appointment.

After Cristina was appointed temporary guardian, Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra moved Marcelo from the hospital to a private residence in Laredo, Texas. After moving Marcelo, Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra allegedly went to the apartment where Marta was staying and informed her that Marcelo had been released from the hospital and that Marta would never see her husband again. Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra allegedly evicted Marta from the apartment, offering her a plane ticket to Mexico.

On July 27, 2001, Marta reported Marcelo's abduction to the Laredo Police Department and the Mexican Consulate. Upon returning to Mexico, Marta sought the assistance of the National Human Rights Commission and filed criminal charges against Cristina for theft of legal documents from her home in Acapulco, Mexico. Marta then retained attorneys in Mexico and the United States to assist her.

On September 12, 2001, Marta filed a contest to the appointment of Cristina as guardian, and the trial court heard evidence of alleged bad faith and misrepresentation to the court by Cristina. Marta contended that she was the proper guardian for Marcelo. The court refused to rule on the contest but ordered that Marta be allowed unlimited visitation with Marcelo. That evening, Marta went to the residence in Laredo, Texas where Marcelo had been staying. Marta was not permitted to visit with Marcelo by herself. Marcelo allegedly told Marta that he had been told that Marta was dead and then later that she had abandoned him. When Marta attempted to explain to Marcelo what had occurred, she allegedly was verbally attacked by Cristina and ordered to leave the residence. As she was leaving, Marta allegedly was struck by Sandra in the mouth and nose.

On September 13, 2001, Marta returned to the trial court with an emergency motion for the immediate removal of Cristina as guardian and a request for a restraining order. The court refused to rule on the guardianship issue but ordered that Marta be permitted to visit with Marcelo alone that evening and that Marcelo remain in Webb County. The trial court indicated that it would hear additional testimony on September 20, 2001.

On September 20th and 21st, the trial court heard additional testimony and took the matter under advisement, stating that it would make "some type of ruling" later that day. No ruling was forthcoming. On September 26, 2001, Cristina's attorney filed a motion to withdraw. On September 28, 2001, Marta filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this court seeking an opinion that she was statutorily entitled to guardianship of Marcelo and the trial court abused its discretion in appointing Cristina. Before the trial court could issue its ruling in the guardianship proceeding and before this court could rule on the petition for writ of mandamus, Marta alleges that Cristina "absconded with Marcelo into Mexico." Cristina's new attorney subsequently filed a motion to terminate the guardianship proceeding. On October 9, 2001, the trial court terminated the temporary guardianship on the basis that "all the parties [had] left the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt." The trial court's order was appealed to this court. Marta further alleges that Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra had Marcelo execute a will while Cristina served as temporary guardian, and the will interferes with Marta's inheritance and testamentary rights.

On October 29, 2001, Marta sued Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra. Marta's live pleading at the time of the special appearance hearing alleged the following causes of action: (1) tortious interference with the husband-wife relationship; (2) false imprisonment; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) assault and battery by Sandra; (5) securing execution of document by deception; (6) fraudulent destruction, removal, or concealment of writing; (7) interference with inheritance rights; and (8) conspiracy. Cristina, Carlos, Miguel and Sandra appeal the trial court's order denying their special appearances.

Specific Jurisdiction

Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law; however, a trial court frequently must resolve questions of fact in resolving the question of law. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); French v. Glorioso, 94 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, no pet.). If the trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with its special appearance ruling, we presume that the trial court resolved all factual disputes in favor of its judgment. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795; French, 94 S.W.3d at 743-44. When the record includes both the reporter's and clerk's records, the trial court's implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795; French, 94 S.W.3d at 744. In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, the no evidence challenge fails if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795; French, 94 S.W.3d at 744. In reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we set aside the trial court's decision only if its ruling is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. French, 94 S.W.3d at 744. The legal conclusions the trial court draws from its findings are reviewed de novo to determine their correctness. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794. If a conclusion of law is erroneous, but the trial court rendered the proper judgment, the erroneous conclusion of law does not require reversal. Id.

A Texas court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795; French, 94 S.W.3d at 744. A defendant's contacts with Texas can give rise to either general or specific jurisdiction. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795-96; French, 94 S.W.3d at 744. Specific jurisdiction is established when the defendant's alleged liability arises from or is related to an activity conducted in the forum. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 796.

The plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading allegations sufficient to bring a nonresident defendant within the provisions of the Texas long-arm statute. French, 94 S.W.3d at 746. Upon filing a special appearance, however, the nonresident defendant assumes the burden to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Id.

The Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who commits a tort in whole or in part in Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.042(2) (Vernon 1997); see also BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 796-97. Under the "commission of a tort" provisions of the Texas long-arm statute, a plaintiff meets his jurisdictional burden when: (1) he alleges the defendant is an author of an act or omission within this state; and (2) his petition states a cause of action in tort arising from such conduct. French, 94 S.W.3d at 746. Defendant's act or omission within the state is a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to determine whether the act or omission gives rise to liability in tort. Id. However, where jurisdiction rests upon the fact the defendant committed a tortious act, the specially appearing defendant can defeat the exercise of jurisdiction by proving that he did not do the alleged act. Id.

At the special appearance hearing, the trial court had before it the parties' pleadings and live testimony. Cristina testified that Marta was not escorted each day to the hospital. Cristina testified that she decided to file the application for guardianship, her brother initially paid the legal fees, but then Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra all agreed to share in the fees and expenses. Cristina stated that she did not remember if she informed the trial judge that Marcelo was married to Marta. Cristina admitted that she took Marcelo from the hospital to a private residence in Laredo. Cristina stated that she did not know who owned the house, but Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra all occupied the house at the time. Cristina admitted that Marta was not permitted to visit with Marcelo alone after the trial court ordered that Marta be permitted to visit with Marcelo. Cristina admitted that during the course of the visit, voices became elevated. Cristina stated that she did not see Marta being struck in the face as she was leaving, and Cristina did not discuss the possible altercation with her siblings after Marta left. Cristina denied that she took her father from the country before the hearing in the guardianship proceeding, stating Marcelo voluntarily decided to leave with his aide. Miguel testified that he paid for a room to be added to the house in Laredo for Marcelo. Miguel testified that the house is owned by a Texas corporation of which he, his wife, and two sons are the owners. Miguel stated that the corporation had not engaged in any business. Miguel testified that none of the family members pay rent to the corporation when they stay at the house. Miguel stated that he paid servants to help with the house while his father was staying there. The trial judge asked Miguel if his family had knowledge that Miguel's corporation owned the house. Miguel responded that he does not tell his sister his business.

Carlos testified that he was present when Marta visited with Marcelo at the house. Carlos stated that he did not see any assault, but he heard discussions.

Sandra denied striking Marta. Sandra admitted that during Marta's visit, there was a disagreement. Sandra stated that Marta attempted to strike her, so she stopped her hand. Sandra denied seeing Marta bleeding and denied that Marta's eyeglasses were broken.

In this case, the trial court impliedly found that Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra acted together in fraudulently obtaining a temporary guardianship over Marcelo, intentionally preventing Marta from visiting with Marcelo, and removing Marcelo from the country. The trial court also impliedly found that Sandra assaulted Marta. Although Cristina denied that Marta was required to be escorted to and from her apartment each day, the trial court could have disbelieved her.

In view of the evidence presented, the trial court did not err in denying the special appearance. The trial court could have concluded that the evidence presented by Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra was not sufficient to prove that they did not engage in the tortious acts as alleged in the petition. Contra French, 94 S.W.3d at 747 (upholding the trial court's order granting special appearance where trial court could have found that appellees did not engage in tortious acts). Accordingly, the trial court could have concluded that Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra did not negate specific jurisdiction based on their commission of torts within the state.

With regard to whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, we consider the following factors: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Pessina v. Rosson, 77 S.W.3d 293, 298 (Tex. App.--Austin 2001, pet. denied), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1203 (2003). When the defendant is a resident of another nation, the court must also consider the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by a state court as well as the federal government's interest in its foreign relations policies. Id. Only in rare cases will the exercise of jurisdiction not comport with fair play and substantial justice when the nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum state. Id. at 298-99.

In this case, Texas's interest in adjudicating the dispute is significant. The tortious acts occurred in Texas and may have been assisted by the fraudulent use of the Texas judicial system. In addition, Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra have a rent-free residence in which to stay during the trial. Finally, Cristina, Carlos, Miguel, and Sandra do not contend that the procedural and substantive policies of other nations or the federal government's foreign relations policies will be affected by the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. See id. Accordingly, the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

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Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion.

Outcome: The trial court's order is affirmed.

Plaintiff's Experts: Unknown

Defendant's Experts: Unknown

Comments: Reported by Kent Morlan