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Date: 08-22-2017
Case Style:
Case Number: 03-16-00281-CV
Judge: Melissa Goodwin
Court: Texas Court of Appeals, Third District on appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4, Williamson County
Plaintiff's Attorney: Pro Se
Defendant's Attorney: Terence M. Davis and Jay D. Smith
Description: In this appeal from a suit to modify the parent-child relationship, Elicia Bailey, acting
pro se, appeals from the trial court’s final order that appointed Jeremy Gasaway the sole managing
conservator of the parties’ child, appointed Bailey possessory conservator with child support
obligations, and limited Bailey’s access and possession of the child to supervised visitation at
specified times. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s final order.1
Pending 1 before this court is Elicia Bailey’s motion to admit evidence. She seeks to admit
evidence concerning DNA test results from the Williamson County Sheriff’s Department. We deny
her motion and do not consider the purported evidence. See Sabine Offshore Serv., Inc. v. City of
Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam) (explaining that “[a]ffidavits outside the
record cannot be considered by the Court of Civil Appeals for any purpose other than determining
its own jurisdiction”); see also Carlton v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 32 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (confining review to evidence in appellate record and
observing that it is “improper for parties to rely on matters outside the record in making arguments
to the court”). For the same reason, we do not consider the exhibits attached to Bailey’s brief as they
are not part of the appellate record.
Background
The parties were divorced in 2011. After the divorce, the parties’ only child, who was
two years old at the time of the divorce, lived with Gasaway. In the final decree of divorce, the trial
court appointed the parties joint managing conservators of the child, ordered Bailey to pay child
support to Gasaway of $500 per month, and awarded Bailey possession of the child pursuant to a
standard possession schedule after she completed an anger management class and an alcohol
assessment approved by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. Bailey appealed
the final decree of divorce, but her appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. See Bailey
v. Gasaway, No. 03-11-00373-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 449, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin
Jan. 19, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
This appeal is from Gasaway’s suit to modify the parent-child relationship, which he
filed in August 2014. See Tex. Fam. Code § 156.001 (authorizing court with continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction to modify orders providing for conservatorship, support, possession of, or access to
child). In his petition, he sought to be appointed sole managing conservator of the child and to limit
Bailey’s possession and access to the child. He also sought temporary orders. See id. § 156.006
(authorizing temporary orders in suit for modification). He alleged that Bailey had violated the terms
of possession in the final divorce decree, including by refusing to return the child to Gasaway on
August 1, 2014, when one of Bailey’s periods of possession had ended. The trial court granted a
temporary restraining order against Bailey and held a hearing in October 2014 on Gasaway’s request
for temporary orders.
2
At the October 2014 hearing, the parties, Bailey’s sister, and a Child Protective
Services (CPS) investigator testified about two incidents leading up to Gasaway’s petition to
modify—a CPS investigation and the parties’ subsequent dispute concerning Bailey’s return of the
child to Gasaway. The CPS investigation was initiated after Bailey filed a report in July 2014
alleging that Gasaway had sexually abused the child. Bailey’s report was based on her sister’s
observations of the child when she and her children were staying with Gasaway at the beginning of
July. The sister testified that, on the morning of the incident, she observed the child “getting up with
no panties on and crying” and “asking where her dad was.” The sister testified that Gasaway had
left for a few hours to go to work, the child was sleeping in Gasaway’s bed and that, after the child
woke up and was crying, the sister found the panties in the bed and that they had a “very nasty sexual
smell.” In his testimony, Gasaway did not deny that the child had been sleeping in his bed without
wearing panties, but he explained that the child was “having accidents at that time” and would get
out of her own bed, remove her panties when she had an accident, and “then climb in bed” while he
was asleep but that she “did have on her nightgown and everything.” The CPS investigator testified
that the allegation in the report was “ruled out” and that there were no concerns with the child being
with Gasaway from the “CPS standpoint.” She also testified about her beliefs that Gasaway
was a good father and that it was in the best interest of the child for him to be the sole
managing conservator.
The other incident leading up to Gasaway’s petition to modify occurred in
August 2014 when Bailey had possession of the child. After Bailey refused to return the child to
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Gasaway or communicate with him, Gasaway was able to locate them some days later at a store.2
When Bailey saw Gasaway, she called the police and told them that Gasaway was “stalking” her.
The witnesses testified consistently that, after the police and the CPS investigator arrived at the store,
the CPS investigator assisted with returning the child to Gasaway.
Gasaway also testified that Bailey’s visitation with the child had been inconsistent
after the divorce and that she had failed to pay child support. In 2013, Gasaway had released over
$13,000 in unpaid child support that Bailey owed to him, and she was unemployed and owed
approximately $1,720 in additional child support at the time of the October 2014 hearing. Gasaway
further testified about Bailey’s history of violent behavior, including that she had assaulted him and
another person, and described the therapy that the child received because of the child’s diagnosis of
autism. Bailey testified that she “[didn’t] think [the child]’s autistic,” that the child was “fine” when
she was around Bailey, and that Bailey “could care less about a court order when it comes to the
safety of [her] child.” She admitted to various violations of the trial court’s orders—including
failing to comply with child support obligations and drug testing as ordered—and to smoking
marijuana, “probably about three or four months ago.”
Following the hearing, the trial court entered temporary orders appointing Gasaway
as the temporary sole managing conservator and Bailey as the temporary possessory conservator of
the child. The trial court also limited Bailey’s access to the child to supervised visitation and
2 The parties disputed whether Bailey’s period of possession had ended. Bailey testified that
Gasaway had agreed to let her have the child for the “entire summer,” but she admitted that she did
not return Gasaway’s calls at that time, explaining that she “chose to protect [her] child.” In her
briefing, Bailey explains that she “refused to return the child to [Gasaway] after she was made aware
of the abuse.”
4
electronic communication at specified times. Gasaway was responsible for up to $200 of the
supervised visitation cost “so long as [Bailey had] paid her entire $500.00 in child support in
that month.”
The trial court held review hearings in February 2015 and May 2015. No witnesses
were presented at the February 2015 hearing, but both parties were present. Bailey had recently
retained counsel, and the trial court updated her attorney on the status of the case and the court’s
concern with Bailey’s “hostility to Court orders.” During the hearing, Gasaway also raised concern
with the court about statements that Bailey had been making to the child when speaking to the child
by phone, such as “Daddy went to court so you can’t come to my house anymore because the Court
said daddy is trying to keep us apart.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the court warned Bailey’s
attorney that “this might be her last best chance before I start putting in some really restrictive
provisions to protect the child,” and the attorney assured the court that Bailey would comply with
court orders going forward.
The witnesses at the May 2015 review hearing were the parties, an investigator from
the Williamson County sheriff’s office, and a program director from LifeSteps, a visitation service
provider. The witness from the sheriff’s office testified that the preliminary testing on the child’s
panties was negative for semen and that the child had not made an outcry when interviewed at the
Child Advocacy Center. The program director from LifeSteps testified about the termination of
services for Bailey based on her conduct—violating policies and procedures and “confrontational
and aggressive incidents”—but that the program would reconsider supervising visits. Gasaway
testified about statements that he heard Bailey make to the child during phone conversations that
5
occurred after the February 2015 hearing, such as “daddy is trying to keep us apart” and “things of
that nature.” Bailey testified that she was employed, admitted that she was behind on child support
payments and that she made some of the complained-of statements to the child, but she denied that
she made others. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court warned Bailey that this was her
“last chance” and that he would be “cutting” access next if she continued to talk about the litigation
with the child.
Following the May 2015 hearing, the trial court also entered further temporary orders.
The trial court enjoined the parties “from discussing the litigation with the child or within her
presence, implying that the other party is the reasons the visitation is supervised, making disparaging
remarks about the other party, or making false allegations of abuse” and ordered Bailey to pay for
the supervised visits at her own expense and to pay Gasaway the $500 in child support “without any
credit for supervision as previously ordered.”
The final hearing occurred in December 2015. The witnesses at the final hearing were
the parties. The primary disputes concerned the reasons that Bailey had not visited with the child
and statements that she made to the child during recorded telephone conversations after the
May 2015 hearing. Bailey had not had visits with the child after July 2015 because, according to her,
she could not afford LifeSteps. Both parties also testified about the phone conversations, and the
exhibits included recordings of portions of the phone conversations. Gasaway testified that he
recorded the conversations and that he and the child were listening during the conversations. In the
conversations, Bailey told the child that it is the “judge at the court” and “your dad” that were trying
to keep them apart and told Gasaway that he was “gonna go to prison. Soon.” When Gasaway
6
warned her that discussing the litigation was a violation of the court order, she responded that she
did not care what he or the judge said.
In April 2016, the trial court signed the final order granting Gasaway’s suit to modify
the parent-child relationship. In the order, the trial court found that “the following orders are in the
best interest of the child” and ordered the appointment of Gasaway as sole managing conservator;
the appointment of Bailey as possessory conservator; and modification of Bailey’s access to
supervised visitation at specified times. The trial court also terminated all electronic communication
between Bailey and the child. As support for its orders concerning supervised visitation, the trial
court found that “credible evidence has been presented that Elicia M. Bailey has a history or pattern
of child neglect directed against [the child].” The trial court also entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law. This appeal followed.3
Analysis
Bailey presents five issues on appeal. She, however, generally fails to support her
issues with substantive arguments or citations to authorities or the record. See Tex. R. App. P.
38.1(i) (requiring “clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations
to authorities and to the record”); see Davis v. American Express Bank, No. 03-12-00564-CV,
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 9662, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting
that “[a]ppellate issues must be supported by argument and authority, and if they are not so
supported, they are waived”); Lee v. Kaufman, No. 03-10-00148-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6969,
Although 3 Bailey was represented by counsel at times in the underlying proceeding
including during the final hearing in December 2015, she is acting pro se on appeal.
7
at *9–10 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding issue waived that was not
supported “with arguments, legal authority, or citations to the record”). “[P]ro se appellants are held
to the same standard as parties represented by counsel to avoid giving unrepresented parties an
advantage over represented parties.” Stewart v. Texas Health & Human Servs. Comm’n,
No. 03-09-00226-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 9787, at *2 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 9, 2010, no
pet.) (mem. op.). Holding Bailey to this standard, we conclude that she has waived her issues by
failing to support them with substantive arguments or appropriate citations to authorities and the
record. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Nonetheless, we will attempt to address her issues as best we
understand them. See Stewart, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 9787, at *2 n.1 (addressing pro se appellant’s
“complaints as best we can”).
2011 Divorce Proceeding and Other Suits
In her first issue, Bailey argues that “[t]he trial court showed prejudice and deprived
[her] of her constitutional rights when it denied [her] motion for continuance after her attorney’s
sudden withdrawal.” The trial court, however, denied this motion in the 2011 divorce proceeding.
In other places in her brief, she also complains about provisions in the 2011 divorce decree, such as
the division of the marital estate and the amount of her child support obligation, and she challenges
the trial court’s denial of a petition that she filed in October 2013, seeking to reduce the amount of
her child support obligation. She further complains about trial court rulings in subsequent
modification suits that she filed after she perfected the appeal in this case, including contending in
her fourth issue that “[t]he trial court made error and abused its discretion when it did not recuse
8
itself” and in her fifth 4 issue that “[t]he trial court made error when it did not hear a motion to modify
after it had been properly filed and served.”5
“As with other final, unappealed judgments which are regular on their face, divorce
decrees and judgments are not vulnerable to collateral attack.” Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899,
902 (Tex. 2009). “Errors other than lack of jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter render
the judgment voidable and may be corrected only through a direct appeal.” Id. (citing Reiss v. Reiss,
118 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003)). This Court dismissed her appeal from the 2011 divorce decree,
see Bailey, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 449, at *1, and she may not collaterally attack the 2011 divorce
decree in this appeal, see Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 902; Reiss, 118 S.W.3d at 443.
Further, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider her complaints about the
trial court proceedings concerning her 2013 and 2016 petitions to modify the parent-child
relationship. Bailey’s notice of appeal in this case identifies the trial court’s judgment that was
signed on April 7, 2016, as the judgment that she is appealing. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1 (setting
4 In Bailey’s suit seeking to modify the parent-child relationship that she filed in May 2016,
Bailey filed a motion to recuse the trial judge on July 13, 2016, the trial court signed an order on
July 20, 2016, denying the motion to recuse, and a judge assigned by the regional administrative
judge also signed an order on August 10, 2016, denying the motion to recuse. See Tex. R. Civ.
P. 18a. To the extent Bailey is complaining about bias by the trial court in the underlying proceeding
of this appeal, she has failed to preserve error. See id. (requiring verified motion asserting one or
more grounds listed in rule 18b and not “based solely on the judge’s ruling in the case”); see also
Barron v. State Attorney Gen., 108 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.) (noting that
procedural requisites for recusal in rule 18a(a) are mandatory and that “party who fails to conform
waives his right to complain of a judge’s failure to recuse himself”).
5 Bailey appears to be referencing her suit seeking to modify the parent-child relationship
that she filed in May 2016. She also filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship in
September 2016. In her fifth issue, she argues that the trial court should have heard her suit to
modify in September 2016 and that it abused its discretion by requiring her to post a bond “after it
should have recused itself.”
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forth requirements for perfecting appeal); see generally Tex. Fam. Code §§ 156.001–.410
(addressing procedures for suits to modify orders providing for conservatorship, support, or
possession of and access to child). Thus, we may not consider her complaints about those separate
proceedings in this appeal.
On these bases, we overrule Bailey’s first, fourth, and fifth issues.
Conservatorship and Possession and Access to the Child
In her second issue, Bailey argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion
when it granted Gasaway sole managing conservatorship and “lacked sufficient evidence when it
restricted [Bailey]’s rights to the child.” She asserts that the trial court must have improperly
restricted her possession and access to the child, including the termination of electronic
communications, based on its determination that she filed a false report that Gasaway had sexually
abused the child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 261.107(b) (authorizing court in suit affecting parent-child
relationship to restrict access to child by person who knowingly makes false report of child abuse
or neglect). Bailey urges that this basis was improper because she was required to file the report
when she had “reason to believe the child [was] being abused and she acted accordingly.” See id.
§ 261.101(a) (describing when report of child abuse or neglect is required). She also argues that it
was “uncontested that the child showed swift and considerable developmental improvement within
the two and a half weeks she was with [Bailey] in July and August 2014” and that she has never seen
signs of autism in the child.
A trial court may modify conservatorship and possession if the petitioning parent
shows that the circumstances of the child, a conservator, or some other affected party “have
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materially and substantially changed” and that modification would be in the best interest of the child.
Id. § 156.101(a)(1). When a trial court makes a decision modifying conservatorship, we review that
decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451
(Tex. 1982) (giving trial court “wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child”);
Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (reviewing trial
court’s decision to modify conservatorship under abuse of discretion standard and describing that
standard of review). The trial court, the observer of “the witnesses’ demeanor and personalities,”
does not abuse its discretion “as long as some evidence of a substantive and probative character
exists to support the trial court’s decision.” Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 587.
In its findings of fact, the trial court found that there had been a material and
substantial change in the circumstances of the child and a conservator after the date the prior order
was rendered, and Bailey has not specifically challenged this finding on appeal. See McGalliard
v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986) (explaining that unchallenged findings of fact “are
binding on an appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law, or if there is no
evidence to support the finding”). Gasaway also presented evidence concerning the parties’
relationships with each other and the child after the parties were divorced in 2011, including
evidence of Bailey’s inconsistent visitation with the child, her statements to the child that violated
the trial court’s orders, and her refusal to return the child to Gasaway in August 2014 after her period
of possession had ended. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of a material
and substantial change. See id.; see also McAleer v. McAleer, 394 S.W.3d 613, 620 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (concluding that it was bound by unchallenged finding of
11
fact because “there [was] some evidence in the record supporting this finding”); see also
In re Marriage of Koenig, No. 14-16-00319-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 5747, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 22, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that “court is not
confined to rigid or definite guidelines in determining whether a material and substantial change has
occurred” and listing material changes that can support modification); Arredondo v. Betancourt,
383 S.W.3d 730, 734–35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (explaining that whether
a material and substantial change of circumstances has occurred “is fact specific and must be
made according to the circumstances as they arise” and listing material changes that may
support modification).
Similarly, the trial court found that it was in the child’s best interest to appoint
Gasaway sole managing conservator and to limit Bailey’s possession and access to supervised
visitation. Construing Bailey’s arguments as challenges to the trial court’s best interest findings, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest findings. See
Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 587; see also Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (listing
non-exclusive factors for making best interest determination including “emotional and physical
danger to the child now and in the future” and “acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate
that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one”); Hinojosa v. Hinojosa,
No. 14-11-00989-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4504, at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Apr. 9, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A] trial court is permitted to place conditions on a parent’s
access, such as supervised visitation, if necessary for the child’s best interest . . . .”). Gasaway’s
evidence included that Bailey had not exercised visitation with the child and that she had been unable
12
or unwilling to follow court orders, including making improper statements to the child after being
warned by the trial court of the consequences of doing so.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by modifying conservatorship to appoint Gasaway as the sole managing conservator
of the child and limiting Bailey’s possession and access to the child to supervised visitation
without electronic communication. See Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 587; see also In re O.G.,
No. 05-13-01263-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 7021, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 26, 2014, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that “question of conservatorship of a child is left to the trial court’s
discretion because it is in the best position to observe the demeanor and personalities of the
witnesses and can feel the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading
the record” (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Hinojosa, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4504, at
*20. We overrule Bailey’s second issue.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
In her third issue, Bailey argues that the trial court erred when it made its findings of
fact and conclusions of law because it “failed to provide evidence or explanations of how it made
its findings of fact or state in particular, how it came to its conclusions of law.” A trial court,
however, is not required to detail the evidence or explain how it made its findings of fact or to
provide an explanation of its conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 297–299; see also Rich
v. Olah, 274 S.W.3d 878, 886 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (stating that trial court is not
required to make additional findings of fact “that are evidentiary”). Rather, a trial court’s findings
of fact are subject to review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence by the same standards
13
applied to a jury verdict. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); see City of Keller
v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 810, 822 (Tex. 2005) (describing review of evidence under legal
and factual sufficiency standards of review). And we review a trial court’s conclusions of law de
novo and will uphold the conclusions if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported
by the evidence. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002).
Bailey also argues that the trial court’s “findings and conclusions lack substantial
evidence and are erroneous in their entirety,” “denies all allegations against her,” and specifically
challenges the following findings of fact:
• There is credible evidence of a history or pattern of past or present child
neglect or emotional abuse by Elicia Bailey directed against the child . . . .
• There is also credible evidence of false accusations made by Elicia Bailey
alleging that Jeremy Gasaway sexually abused the child and the Court has
concerns that it is likely that Elicia Bailey would make similar accusations
against Jeremy Gasaway in the future and try to persuade the child that
Jeremy Gasaway sexually abused her.
• Elicia Bailey failed to exercise her possession and access granted to her under
the Court’s temporary orders for an extended period of time when there was
no legitimate impediment to her exercising visits.
• Elicia Bailey is unable to follow court orders and injunctions regarding
conservatorship, possession and access, or child support.
• The periods of possession vary from the Standard Possession order for the
following reasons: . . .
e) Elicia Bailey’s frequent outbursts and disrespectful behavior in court
that indicates an inability to conduct herself appropriately even when
under scrutiny;
. . .
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i) the credible evidence that Elicia Bailey suffers from undiagnosed
mental health issues that impedes [sic] her ability to parent the child
in a healthy manner;
j) Elicia Bailey’s refusal or inability to work consistently with a mental
health professional or submit to a court ordered psychological
evaluation; [and]
. . .
n) Elicia Bailey’s inability to model good behavior for her own child.
As support for her challenges to these findings, Bailey relies on evidence that is not
in the record and continues to make similar factual assertions to the ones that she made to the trial
court. She asserts that “there is enough evidence to support that [Gasaway] sexually abused the
child”; that “the [trial] court’s ruling was the legitimate impediment” to her failure to exercise
visitation; that she “will not consistently work with a mental health professional when there is no
necessity for it”; and that “[i]t is uncontested that the child learns and develops much quicker when
she is in [Bailey]’s care.” She also asserts that she “has not knowingly and purposely violated any
court orders” and provides explanations for her failure to follow court orders, such as her failure to
make child support payments because “she was unemployed.”
We, however, may not consider evidence that is not part of the record. See Sabine
Offshore Serv., Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam); Carlton
v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 32 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000,
pet. denied). It also was for the trial court to resolve the conflicts in the evidence and to judge
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. See McGalliard,
722 S.W.2d at 697 (explaining that trier of fact may believe one witness and disbelieve others when
15
faced with conflicting evidence and it may resolve inconsistencies in testimony of any witness);
Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 587; see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819. Thus we defer to the trial
court’s credibility determinations and its resolution of conflicts in the evidence in favor of its
findings. Moreover, based on our review of the evidence, we have concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of material and substantial change and its best interest
findings as to conservatorship and access and possession of the child. See Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at
587. On these bases, we overrule Bailey’s third issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Bailey’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s final order.
__________________________________________
Melissa Goodwin, Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Goodwin
Affirmed
Filed: August 22, 2017
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Outcome: Affirmed
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: