Date: 12-10-2016

Case Style:

Case Number: 02-15-00472-CR

Judge: Sue Walker

Court: COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Debra A. Windsor
David M. Curl

Defendant's Attorney:

J. WARREN ST. JOHN

Description: At approximately 1:00 a.m. on January 4, 2015, Officer Kristopher Taylor
and Sergeant Daniel Hunt of the Blue Mound Police Department noticed a
vehicle traveling without a functioning right brake light. The officers initiated a
traffic stop. Jennifer Dowling was driving the vehicle, and King was a passenger.
The vehicle was owned by King. Neither Dowling nor King had their driver’s
licenses with them, but they gave officers other identifying information. Officer
Taylor went to his squad car to check on the status of the respective driver’s
licenses and to check for warrants. During the approximate fifteen minutes it
took for Officer Taylor to run searches on the driver’s licenses and check for
warrants, Sergeant Hunt remained posted outside the front passenger door while
King waited in the front passenger seat. Officer Taylor discovered that neither
Dowling nor King possessed a valid driver’s license and that neither Dowling nor
King could produce proof of insurance. Officer Taylor arrested Dowling for
driving without a valid driver’s license.
After Dowling was arrested, Officer Taylor asked King to exit the vehicle
because the officers were going to impound the vehicle.1 According to Officer
1Officer Taylor testified that the vehicle needed to be impounded because neither Dowling nor King had a valid driver’s license or proof of insurance, and the vehicle could not be left overnight.
3
Taylor, King acted nervously when he exited the vehicle and walked “very
abnormal[ly] . . . taking very small steps.” After exiting the vehicle, King asked,
“Can I call my wife or something, or is there somebody that can come drive me
away?” Officer Taylor responded, “Um, no, here’s—do you have anything in your
pockets?” Officer Taylor then asked King if he minded turning out his pockets,
and King willingly turned out his pockets, handing Officer Taylor a pocketknife.
Officer Taylor then asked if he could perform a pat-down on King, and King
indicated that Officer Taylor could perform the pat-down. During the pat-down,
Officer Taylor had King place his hands on the top of his head, interlock his
fingers, and spread his feet. Officer Taylor testified that at first King spread his
feet “very minimally,” so Officer Taylor kicked King’s feet so they would be
spread further apart. Officer Taylor noticed a white cylinder-shaped container fall
out of King’s pants during the pat-down.2 King eventually admitted to Officer
Taylor that the container contained methamphetamine.
King and Dowling were placed in the back of the officers’ squad car while
the officers waited for a tow truck to impound the vehicle. While King and
Dowling were alone in the squad car, the following discussion took place:
King: Where’s that pipe?

Dowling: I don’t know.

2Officer Taylor discovered a second container—found inside of King’s pant leg—after a subsequent pat-down following King’s arrest.
4
King: I don’t know either. It doesn’t matter now; they found all that on me. They found all the dope.[3]

King also asked Dowling, “Why did I have that on me,” and “Why didn’t I stash
that somewhere?”
King filed a motion to suppress all tangible evidence seized without a
warrant, including the seized methamphetamine and his admissions to Dowling.
At the suppression hearing, the State argued that King’s motion should be denied
because King consented to the pat-down and, alternatively, because the
pat-down was justified because of officer-safety concerns. The trial court
ultimately denied King’s motion to suppress, finding that the interaction between
King and the officers was a “consensual encounter.” After his motion to suppress
was denied, King entered his guilty plea.
III. KING’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In two issues, King argues that the trial court should have granted his
motion to suppress because the purpose of the traffic stop had ended prior to the
consensual encounter and because officer-safety concerns did not justify his
extended detention. The State counters that the purpose of the traffic stop had
not ended prior to the consensual encounter and that, in any event, officer-safety
concerns justified any extended detention.

3This discussion can be heard on the recording from the squad car’s dash camera.
5
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
We give almost total deference to a trial court’s rulings on questions of historical
fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of
credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact
questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at
673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v.
State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
B. The Law regarding Detentions Following a Traffic Stop
A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for
investigation of a traffic violation. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.
Ct. 781, 788 (2009). The temporary seizure of a driver and passengers ordinarily
continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the traffic stop. Id., 129 S.
Ct. at 788. A traffic stop ends “when the police have no further need to control
the scene.” Id., 129 S. Ct. at 788. An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to
the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the encounter into something
other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend
the duration of the stop. Id., 129 S. Ct. at 788.
Stops that exceed the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop
was made violate the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.
6
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015). A seizure that is
justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, “become[s] unlawful
if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission”
of issuing a traffic ticket. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125
S. Ct. 834, 837 (2005)). An officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident
to the traffic stop, such as checking the status of driver’s licenses, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants, and inspecting the automobile’s
registration and proof of insurance. Id. at 1615. Authority for the seizure ends
when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are, or reasonably should have been,
completed. Id. at 1614. For the duration of the traffic stop, a police officer
effectively seizes everyone in the vehicle, including the driver and all passengers.
Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327, 129 S. Ct. at 784.
C. Application of the Law to the Facts
Here, King was pulled over pursuant to a lawful traffic stop because his
vehicle was traveling without a functioning right brake light.4 See Tex. Transp.
Code Ann. § 547.323 (West 2011). The officers checked on the status of
Dowling and King’s driver’s licenses and attempted to confirm that the vehicle
was covered by insurance, and the officers discovered that neither Dowling nor
King possessed a valid driver’s license, nor could they produce proof of
insurance. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (holding officer’s mission includes 4King does not dispute that he was pulled over pursuant to a lawful traffic stop.
7
ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop). Officers decided to impound the
vehicle because it could not be left overnight and because neither Dowling nor
King had a valid driver’s license or proof of insurance. See Palacios v. State,
319 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. ref’d) (“When Deputy
Ainsworth determined that neither Palacios nor the passenger had a valid driver’s
license and that neither could produce insurance for the vehicle, Deputy
Ainsworth had the legal authority to impound the vehicle.”); see also Benavides
v. State, 600 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (“[A]n automobile may be
impounded if the driver is removed from his automobile and placed under
custodial arrest and no other alternatives are available other than impoundment
to insure the protection of the vehicle.”).
Dowling was arrested for driving without a valid driver’s license. King
argues that the mission of the traffic stop ended once Dowling was arrested and,
therefore, his consent to the pat-down was ineffectual because the stop was
improperly extended. The State counters that the stop was not improperly
extended and, therefore, King’s consent was valid. See Meekins v. State, 340
S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (noting that one of the exceptions to the
search warrant requirement is a search conducted with the person’s voluntary
consent). We agree with the State that the stop was not improperly extended.
The United States Supreme Court has made several holdings in recent
years regarding when a traffic stop ends and when it is improperly extended. As
noted in Johnson, a traffic stop “ends when the police have no further need to
8
control the scene.” 555 U.S. at 325, 129 S. Ct. at 783. As noted in Rodriguez,
the seizure of drivers and passengers “ends when tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” 135 S. Ct. at
1614. Here, officers still had need to control the scene when Officer Taylor
asked for King’s consent to the pat-down. Namely, the officers were waiting for a
tow truck to impound King’s vehicle. Similarly, the impoundment of the vehicle
was a task tied to the traffic infraction, and King makes no argument that that
task should have reasonably been completed at the time Officer Taylor asked for
his consent to the pat-down.5
We therefore hold that the traffic stop was not improperly extended, and
we overrule King’s first issue. Because we overrule King’s first issue relating to
his consent to the pat-down, we need not decide King’s second issue concerning
whether officer-safety concerns justified the pat-down.

Outcome:

Having overruled King’s first issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments:

Texas Department Of Corrections Offender Info